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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on analysing the financial sustainability of local government 
authorities (LGAs) in Tanzania with reference to decentralisation. In this context, the 
financial sustainability of LGAs is considered as an important aspect for decentralisation 
to succeed, especially in enhancing horizontal equity and public services in general. 
Specifically, the study attempts to: (i) assess and explain variations in financial 
sustainability across LGAs (ii) explore consequences of financial difficulties whenever 
they arise in the course of budget execution, and ways used to mitigate the difficulties. 
The study uses a quantitative approach, whereby financial indicators are used to analyse 
LGAs’ financial performance reports to achieve the first objective, and qualitative 
analysis of interview data from three case studies to achieve the second objective.  
The empirical findings suggest decentralisation in Tanzania influences financial 
sustainability of LGAs in different ways. First, councils with a large proportion of poor 
people not only have low financial sustainability, low expenditure per person and low 
own source revenue per person but also receive a lower average grant per person. This 
poses the danger of exaggerating the horizontal gap in service access. Secondly, council 
size and population size contribute negatively while the flow of government grants and 
poor financial management practices contribute positively to variations in financial 
sustainability. Thirdly, the findings suggest decentralisation may not discourage 
complacency in LGAs’ revenue mobilisation and financial management practices. On 
the other hand, observation from the case studies suggests financial difficulties are 
prevalent in LGAs. They adversely affect LGAs’ operations, especially in executing 
development projects in priority sectors: health, education, water and agriculture. To 
mitigate the difficulties, LGAs involve people in service provision, cuts or postponing 
activities as immediate options, and seeking alternative revenues sources for the long 
term.  
The study offers three main contributions. First, it bridges two interrelated but distinct 
research themes: financial sustainability and fiscal decentralisation studies. This 
broadens the scope of analysing both themes. Secondly, it offers insights into why 
decentralisation may or may not achieve its potential. This is in response to the 
observation from some studies, which report the outcome of decentralisation in 
developing countries to be limited. Lastly, it offers feedback on the way decentralisation 
is executed in a country that has long-standing initiatives on enhancing horizontal equity 
and improving provision of public services in general. 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on analyzing the financial sustainability of local government 
authorities (LGAs) in Tanzania, with reference to decentralisation. The context of the 
study considers assessing financial sustainability of LGAs as an approach for evaluating 
the way decentralisation has been designed and executed. In this respect, financial 
sustainability is considered as a precondition for decentralisation, particularly in 
improving access to public services and enhancing horizontal equity in service 
provision. The rationale is based on the need for balancing resource availability with 
expenditure functions so as to make LGAs effective in their operations. Smoke (2001) 
and Wang and Ma (2014) stressed the importance of proper design and implementation 
of reform programmes to attain the benefits. It is imperative that the decentralised 
agencies have sufficient financial capacity to deliver devolved functions on a continuing 
basis, and hence realise the benefits.  
The outcome of decentralisation in developing countries is a mixed bag. Several studies 
such as Smoke (2001), Scott (2009), Cabral (2011) and Boex and Yilmaz (2010) report 
limited success of decentralisation in different contexts, which lead to deeper questions 
about the desirability of the decentralising approach. However, it can be argued that the 
right decentralisation approach is the one that enables LGAs to deliver their devolved 
responsibilities effectively and continuously. The ability of the LGAs to deliver assigned 
responsibilities is the focal point for achieving the benefits, especially those related with 
service provision. The literature (chapter 3) emphasises matching responsibilities 
assigned to LGAs with resource availability. Conversely, LGAs may not be able to 
operate effectively because of difficulties arising from the mismatch of responsibilities.  
Inappropriate design of decentralisation and/or its operationalisation can perpetuate 
inequity in the provision of public services. This is likely to happen if the design does 
not embed an adequate intergovernmental grant system to compensate for differences in 
LGAs’ resource capacity. In the absence of a proper mechanism, LGAs with a rich 
financial resource base will be more able to sustain provision of public services than 
poor LGAs (Buchanan, 1950). The use of intergovernmental grants is consistent with 
central government’s income redistribution role, so as to ensure that a satisfactory level 
of key public services is offered in all jurisdictions (Oates, 1972). 
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1.1 Background to the Research 
In Tanzania, the government has used decentralisation reform as a platform for 
improving the wellbeing of citizens, which enhances the role of LGAs significantly 
(URT, 1998). In the course of implementing a decentralisation programme, the country, 
in collaboration with development partners, has invested significant resources. 
According to the World Bank Report (2013), for instance, the financial support to LGAs 
solely for development activities was US$379 million from 2005/06 to 2010/11. Thus, 
it is appropriate to appraise decentralisation processes while they are still ongoing. 
Moreover, the decentralisation reforms are identified as unfinished work and take longer 
time to mature (Guess, 2007). 
The design and implementation of decentralisation reforms is crucial in propelling 
achievement of their aims. Cabral (2011) emphasizes that the success of decentralisation 
reforms largely depends on appropriate design and execution of the reform programmes 
and processes. The decentralisation system influences both LGA’s functions and their 
respective financial performance. Furthermore, as Wang and Ma (2014, p.756) noted, 
“the inappropriate operationalization of fiscal decentralisation can result in inconclusive 
findings” on the impact of decentralisation. Smoke (2001) emphasizes matching 
decentralised responsibilities with stable and assured financial resources if reforms are 
to be effective. This study recognises the need for decentralisation to ensure that LGAs 
become financially sustainable. Being financially sustainable would facilitate LGAs to 
discharge the responsibilities entrusted to them, effectively over time.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that poor financial sustainability hinders the ability of 
LGAs to deliver services. A good example is provided by Carmeli (2007) who found a 
positive relationship between LGAs’ financial health and their ability to provide public 
services in Israel. LGAs with relatively poor financial health were observed to have 
delivered poor services in subsequent years. Thus, if fiscal decentralisation does not 
enhance financial sustainability of LGAs, success is less likely to materialise. 
Specifically, it will be difficult to (i) improve access and efficiency in service provision 
if responsibilities overwhelm financial ability; and/or (ii) bring equity in accessing 
public services if poor LGAs are marginalised. It is noted that adequate financial health 
is a precondition for the attainment of objectives in any organisation (Cabaleiro et al., 
2012).  
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In LGAs, financial sustainability refers to the ability to deliver responsibilities on a 
continuing basis, in both the short and long term (Dollery and Crase, 2006; Dodor et al., 
2009). It determines the ability of LGAs to meet current and future obligations as they 
arise throughout the fiscal year, without compromising the existing level of public 
services. The flow of central government grants to each LGA is most important in 
determining their fiscal position. As observed in the US, the structural deficit in 
Michigan caused a reduction in revenue share to local authorities and contributed to the 
financial troubles of LGAs (Skidmore and Scoresone, 2011). On the other hand, the 
ability of LGAs to raise revenues from their own sources is vital towards budget 
execution and in determining their financial sustainability. It facilitates their flexibility 
in mitigating financial shocks. LGAs will not be able to respond to fiscal stress that may 
arise from reduction in intergovernmental grants if their ability to generate revenues 
from their own sources is constrained (Reschovsky, 2003). If LGAs become fiscally 
stressed, they are unlikely to meet devolved responsibilities properly. 
 
According to Skidmore and Scorsone (2011), the two options LGAs can take during the 
period of financial difficulty are to either increase efficiency or cut down expenditure. 
The first enables them to continue with the same level of public services with fewer 
resources, and the second cuts down expenditure to match generated fund/revenues. 
However, considering the execution of LGAs’ responsibilities is reflected in their annual 
budgets, the first option seems rarely possible especially for difficulties that arise during 
the course of the current budget. It would be difficult for LGAs to reorganise their 
service provision arrangements within a short period in order to solve the problem 
through enhanced efficiency. On the other hand, the second option has negative 
implications for the provision of services and overall success of decentralisation 
reforms. Insufficient revenue to finance social and economic infrastructure, for instance, 
negatively affects service delivery (Folscher, 2007). In the short run, the consequence 
will be to reduce the quality and level of services while in the long run it will be to 
extinguish economic competitiveness and its underlying benefits. The difficulty of 
obtaining a solution to financial troubles without compromising service provision 
enhances the need for appropriate reform design and its operationalisation.  
 
Thus, based on the theoretical and empirical literature, there is an inherent relationship 
between decentralisation and financial sustainability of LGAs. On one hand, the design 
16 
 
and operationalisation of decentralisation influences financial sustainability through 
assignment of responsibilities and resources to LGAs. As Stone (2015) identifies, 
decentralisation could influence financial sustainability of LGAs in both ways, 
positively and negatively. On the other hand, financial sustainability of LGAs influences 
the success of decentralisation through the execution of devolved functions. For 
instance, Krueathep (2014) acknowledges the importance of establishing a clear 
distribution of budgetary responsibilities to key budget actors within decentralisation 
settings, to avoid poor fiscal conditions in LGAs. This underscores the importance of 
decentralisation design to assign responsibilities to LGA officials in order to steer 
towards a successful outcome. Despite the inherent relationship between 
decentralisation and financial sustainability of LGAs, there is limited research that 
explores the role of decentralisation on financial sustainability, as Stone (2015) 
recommends, or the other way round. Considering this gap, this study examines the 
financial sustainability of LGAs in Tanzania with reference to decentralisation.  
 
1.2 Rationale of the Study 
Tanzania has prioritised the provision of public services in an equitable manner since 
attainment of independence in 1961 (Belshaw, 1982). Since then, the government has 
taken a number of remarkable steps, such as the Arusha Declaration (1967), which 
emphasised horizontal equity through socialist policies. This was followed by a massive 
decentralisation reform in 1972, which collapsed over the next 10 years due to poor 
design and operational problems (URT, undated). The collapse of the decentralisation 
programme was partly attributed to the absence of LGAs, which had been abolished in 
the process. The implementation of such reform was coordinated by regional planning 
committees without local elected leaderships. Also, the execution of the programme 
faced financial difficulties because of donor withdrawal in financing regional plans.  
To support the initiatives, the government re-introduced LGAs in 1982. This was 
followed by introduction of a structural adjustment programme in 1986, which guided 
the macroeconomic policies of the country until 1996. However, the implementation of 
the structural adjustment programmes was given mixed interpretations because of 
deviations between stated and actual actions and a lack of grounded data to verify the 
impact (Ellis and Mdoe, 2003). Until the late 1990s, the level of income inequality in 
the country seemed to deepen, as evident in the World Bank Gini coefficient for the 
country which increased from 0.353 to 0.373 between 1991 and 2000. Following this 
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concern, the government re-initiated the decentralisation agenda under the name of 
Decentralisation by Devolution (D by D) in 1996. The D by D programme paralleled the 
introduction of the National Poverty Eradication Strategy, which identifies LGAs as 
important implementation agents in the poverty eradication initiatives. Considering this, 
the introduced reforms aim at improving access to public services, particularly to the 
poor, so as to induce their economic wellbeing, reducing the poverty level and inequality 
(URT, undated). Therefore, in the new settings LGA’s operations embed both 
components of poverty reduction and the equity in service provision. While considering 
the experience from previous refoms, this study examines whether the D by D 
programme offers the prospect of enhancing horizontal equity and improving service 
provision in general.  
 
1.3 Study Objectives 
The main objective of the study is to investigate the financial sustainability of LGAs 
with reference to decentralisation reforms. Following this, the study aims to identify 
whether the execution of the reform offers prospects of attaining the decentralisation 
objectives of enhancing equity in service access and improving service provision in 
general. Specifically, the research has the following two research objectives.  
 
The first objective is to investigate and explain variations in financial sustainability. The 
analysis of LGAs’ financial sustainability is made over time and in comparison to others, 
and by identifying factors that explains the variations in order to establish the influence 
of decentralisation. To accomplish this objective, answers to the following question are 
sought:  
i. How does the financial sustainability of local governments vary across 
Tanzania in the context of decentralisation reforms? 
 
This question provides insight into whether the design and implementation of 
decentralisation enhances the financial sustainability of LGAs in a way that would 
enhance horizontal equity in service provision. The assessment of financial 
sustainability uses financial indicators derived from financial performance reports of 
LGAs before evaluating factors that explain the variation. Specifically, the study 
considers two groups of financial indicators, which are budgetary solvency and services 
solvency. These categories are considered appropriate because they are capable of 
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reflecting LGAs’ long-term fiscal performance corresponding with the execution of the 
devolved responsibilities, which tend to be of long-term in nature (more details about 
selection of measurement indicators are provided in subsection 5.6). Thus, the 
comparative financial sustainability analysis encompasses a sample of LGAs comprising 
communities with different income poverty levels. More details about the sample and 
data used are provided in the methodology chapter, subsection 5.4.  
Secondly, the study analyses the consequences of financial difficulties that arise while 
LGAs are working to meet their annual targets, and the approaches used to mitigate the 
difficulty and to enhance financial sustainability. This objective is intended to identify 
the impact of the difficulties and corresponding mitigation techniques on the overall 
purpose of improving public services. In order to accomplish this objective, the research 
intends to address the following research question: 
ii. What are the consequences of financial difficulties arising while LGAs are 
in the course of executing their annual financial budgets, and how do LGAs 
mitigate the difficulty? 
 
In seeking answers to this second question, the study employs comparative analysis of 
three LGAs as case studies. This involved collecting the views of LGA officials through 
interviews.  While seeking response to this question, the study also sought to identify 
challenges associated with enhancing financial sustainability in LGAs. 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The rest of the thesis comprises seven chapters. The second chapter provides the 
theoretical framework underpinning the research work in seeking responses to the 
research questions. It reviews the fiscal decentralisation theory and its link with fiscal 
condition studies. Chapter three reviews theoretical and empirical literature related to 
two main themes: decentralisation and financial sustainability. The first theme explores 
decentralisation experiences from both developing and developed countries. The second 
theme discusses financial sustainability of LGAs, factors influencing their financial 
sustainability, how they are linked to decentralisation design and/or operationalisation, 
and the practice of measuring this.  
Chapter four discusses the background of decentralisation reforms in Tanzania. It 
explores the historical background of LGAs, their institutional settings, functions and 
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their financing arrangements under the decentralisation system. Chapter five describes 
the methodology; it discusses the research paradigm, data and methods used. It also 
provides a discussion of the measurement indicators, associated meanings and their link 
to decentralisation reforms. Chapter six provides analysis of the financial sustainability 
of LGAs and a discussion of explanatory variables. Chapter seven presents analysis and 
discussion of the consequences of financial difficulties, methods used to mitigate them 
and challenges facing Tanzanian LGAs in enhancing their financial sustainability. 
Finally, chapter eight provides the conclusion, the study’s significance and contribution, 
acknowledging its limitations, and areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 : THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical background that has been used to guide the research 
processes and interpretation of the results. It starts by explaining the evolution of 
decentralisation, which is followed by describing the fiscal decentralisation theory 
which provides the basis for redistribution of roles between different levels of 
government. The theory provides the rationale for decentralising government functions 
as well as the redistribution of resources that ultimately have an impact on the public 
services offered and the wellbeing of the people served. It is considered to be relevant 
to the context of Tanzania because, as in many developing countries in Africa (Smoke, 
2001), people have high hopes from their local government in offering access to basic 
public services such as health, education, water, and basic infrastructure. The study does 
not test the theory but rather uses it in evaluating the ongoing decentralisation reforms, 
particularly in interpretation of the findings. The chapter also describes the link between 
fiscal decentralisation and financial sustainability of LGAs, the conceptual framework, 
and it ends with the chapter summary. 
2.2 Decentralisation Evolution 
The concept of decentralisation has its roots back in the non-centralised political 
structures of the ancient Greek kingdoms, followed by the Roman Empire which 
underwent “advanced decentralisation reforms on a large scale” (Widmalm, 2008: p. 
27). It evolved through different stages of transfer of authority and responsibilities from 
central to lower governments. However, the form and terminology used to reflect 
reforms differ with time. According to Petak (2004), in the 1950s the emphasis was on 
the deconcentration of decision-making power from central government to lower levels 
of government in dispersed locations. Following this, the term decentralisation arose in 
the 1970s, and the new wave of public sector transformation occurred worldwide, 
involving a diffusion of power and responsibilities over public service provision from 
central to lower levels of government and the private sector. Other new terms, such as 
devolution, emerged together with decentralisation to reflect the scope of institutional 
changes coupled with the transfer of decision making to lower levels of government. 
However, devolution itself is considered as the higher level of decentralisation that 
involves transfer of both fiscal and political powers to lower levels of government.  
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On the other hand, Widmalm (2008) identified three aspects that together define 
decentralisation, particularly when referred to the vertical transfer of power: 
geographical location, legal status and area of responsibility, and power distribution. For 
reforms to be considered as decentralisation, they should involve transfer of real power 
to lower levels of government, corresponding with the allocation of geographical areas 
and legal recognition of responsibility. Otherwise, decentralisation is in fact only 
delegation, which implies that responsibilities are assigned to an institution that will 
have no means of influencing the method of implementation. In this regard, evaluation 
of decentralisation’s success through a decentralised agency becomes unrealistic. When 
Wildman (2008) identified assignment of power to a decentralised agency, he also meant 
to include resources. An institution assigned with an area of responsibility and legal 
recognition but without resources has no power in terms of resources. These aspects 
determine whether decentralisation prevails or not, especially in the transfer of 
responsibility to a decentralised agency. They are preconditions for identifying whether 
decentralisation is really translated into practice or not.  
 
2.3 Fiscal Decentralisation Theory 
Fiscal decentralisation is a long-term gradual process of assigning revenue sources and 
expenditure functions from central to local government (Salman and Iqbal, 2011; 
Eleccion, 2013). It is also referred to as fiscal federalism, and is broadly identified as the 
study of structure and functioning of central and local governments (Smoke, 2001; 
Oates, 2005, Dziobek, 2011). Basically, there are two issues in any fiscal 
decentralisation: the assignment of responsibilities and distribution of resources. Stable 
and assured financial resources that match the functions of decentralised agencies are a 
top priority for effective decentralisation reforms (Crook and Manor, 2000). The fiscal 
decentralisation theory explains how the fiscal system should be designed in a multilevel 
government in order to establish optimal government. The theory was developed by 
Wallace Oates in 1972 and is linked with Musgrave’s theory of public finance (1959) 
which categorised functions of national governments into three groups: allocation of 
resources, income distribution and macroeconomic stabilisation. Thus, fiscal 
decentralisation theory requires each level of government to perform what it can do best. 
 
In multilevel government settings, the theory proposes that central government should 
take charge of macroeconomic stabilisation policies, income distribution and monitor 
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and balance provision of public goods whenever there is the possibility of negative spill-
over between LGAs. On the other hand, LGAs should provide local public goods 
because their proximity to people enables them to know local preferences. Demand and 
preferences for some public services vary across localities, which puts LGAs in a better 
position than central government to provide such services. Also, the LGAs’ proximity 
to people minimises the cost of extracting information on local preferences and needs 
(Salman and Iqbal, 2011). Services which reflect both the interest of local people and 
also external users should be dealt with by central government. In addition, the central 
government should handle provision of services which significantly benefit individuals 
of all jurisdictions. Thus, capital-intensive projects such as electricity and transport 
infrastructure are better managed by central government, because of the possibility of 
economies of scale (Smoke, 2001). 
 
In relation to income distribution, central government should be responsible for the 
equitable offering of public services across LGAs. LGAs cannot perform their functions 
in a fair manner if they are left to finance themselves entirely. If they are required to 
finance their all operations independently, then fiscal inequalities among them will 
persist unless they all have the same fiscal capacity (Buchanan, 1950). However, in 
reality it is difficult to find a country whose LGAs have the same fiscal capacity. As a 
result, poor LGAs will impose higher tax rates than wealthier LGAs, with 
correspondingly inferior public service programmes (Buchanan, 1950; Oates, 1972; 
Prud’homme, 1995). Poor people in well-off LGAs will be better-off than those in poor 
regions because their LGAs can collect more taxes, which enhances the level of public 
services. Alternatively, if the same level of service is to be offered, then the tax burden 
on residents of different LGAs will have to differ (Buchanan, 1950). This is likely to 
cause movement of people from one LGA to another with more attractive tax policies. 
For instance, if a LGA has a higher rate of tax on rich people to fund services benefiting 
the poor, then the rich people will move to LGAs with a lower rate and the poor people 
will move in to benefit from better services (Prud’homme, 1995; Smoke 2001). Hence, 
in the absence of central government intervention, population mobility between 
jurisdictions will make an income redistribution policy self-defeating (Martnez-Vazquez 
and McNab, 2003).  
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The use of intergovernmental grants is consistent with the income distribution role, to 
ensure that a satisfactory level of key public services is offered in all jurisdictions (Oates, 
1972). As Smoke (2001, p.5) identifies “...central government is in position to 
redistribute resources from wealthier to poorer jurisdictions”. This can be done through 
the national budget, whereby richer LGAs subsidise poorer ones. Meanwhile, LGAs 
should be responsible for intra-jurisdictional income redistribution, through local tax 
policies and prioritisation of public service provision. Prud’homme, (1995, 2003) notes 
that analytical and empirical research indicates that national budgets tend to regulate 
regional disparities.  
 
Nevertheless, Oates (2005) identifies that the emergence of second generation theory of 
fiscal federalism in the 1990s considers the relationships between decentralised organs 
differently. As summarised in table 2.1, the second generation builds on the traditional 
theory, which is the first generation by relaxing the assumption about incentives of 
implementing agents. The traditional version assumes the objective function is to 
maximise social welfare under benevolent actors, while the second generation considers 
the influence of political environment and fiscal incentives on actions of implementing 
agents (Weingast, 2014).      
 
Table 2.1: Assumptions of First- and Second-Generation Theory 
First Generation of Decentralisation 
Theory 
Second Generation of Fiscal 
Decentralisation Theory 
• Assumes governments operate in order 
to maximise social welfare.  
• Therefore, decentralisation is favoured 
because local governments can easily 
capture local preferences while central 
government concentrates on 
macroeconomic stabilisation and 
income redistribution.  
• The central government can also offer 
services which cut across jurisdictions. 
• Built upon the first generation 
theory, but it assumes governments 
maximise their own objective 
functions through political 
processes and information 
asymmetry.  
• Thus, decentralisation can reduce 
inefficiency through reducing 
information asymmetry and/or 
promoting tax competition among 
LGAs. 
Source: Author derived from literatures 
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The second-generation theory of fiscal federalism explains the behaviour of political 
agents in political processes and their influence in objective functions, while 
simultaneously focusing on information problems, moral hazard, and free-riding 
between government sub-levels (Dziobek et al., 2011). The assumption is that political 
and fiscal institutions operate under imperfect information while the behaviour of 
participants is induced by utility maximisation. Thus, the emphasis is not just on 
decentralisation but also on the form it takes. Decentralisation processes that make 
LGAs rely on their own resources should be seen as more efficient than those which 
make LGAs rely heavily on central government transfers. Hence, competition among 
LGAs is inevitable since utility maximisation is the driver of their objective function. 
This is contrary to first-generation theory, whereby the tax base for local government 
focused only on property taxes and user fees but not on other sources. The first 
generation aimed to avoid competition, economic distortions and double taxation that 
would lead to the shifting of economic activities from one LGA to another with lower 
tax rates. 
 
However, from the view of public service users, the availability of balanced and 
satisfactory services on a continuing basis takes priority, regardless of the source of 
funding. Whether LGAs raise funds from their own revenue or receive funds from the 
central government is less important, as long as the system treats them equitably. The 
case is more relevant to developing countries where, as Prud’homme (1995) points out, 
the main concern is not difference in preferences but rather availability of basic services 
such as health, education, water and infrastructure. Therefore, the intergovernmental 
fiscal system needs be designed properly and operationalised to match the distribution 
of resources with responsibilities. Effective fiscal decentralisation should ensure 
appropriate assignment of expenditure functions between different government levels, 
appropriate assignment of tax revenues and efficient fund transfer systems (Kardar, 
2006). This will minimise imbalances in service delivery while simultaneously bringing 
public goods and services close to the people. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the 
assumptions behind the first- and second-generation theories of fiscal decentralisation. 
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2.4 Relationship between Fiscal Decentralisation and Financial 
Sustainability  
The design of fiscal decentralisation and its execution are keys to the success of 
decentralisation reforms. These determine the distribution of responsibilities and 
resources between government tiers. Effective fiscal decentralisation requires clear 
distribution of roles and responsibilities to LGAs and assignment of sufficient finance 
to execute them (World Bank, 2010). If LGAs “are to carry out decentralised functions 
effectively, they must have adequate revenues – raised locally or transferred from the 
central government – as well as the authority to make expenditure decisions” (UN-
HABITAT, 2002: p.6). A well designed decentralisation system is an essential 
precondition to achievement of the decentralisation benefits (discussion about the 
benefits of decentralisation is in the next chapter). It establishes the system which 
enables LGAs to meet their expenditure obligations on a continuing basis, which is a 
function of financial sustainability. As Huang and Ho (2013) identify, financial 
sustainability of LGAs determines their ability to meet short-term and long-term 
financial obligations arising from service delivery functions and borrowings as they 
come due. If reforms do not match resources following an increase in responsibilities, 
then financial sustainability of LGAs will deteriorate. 
 
In any local government system, fiscal decentralisation determines resource distribution 
to different government levels, which is vital for fulfilling citizens’ demands (World 
Bank, 2010). It is the design of the fiscal decentralisation system which affects LGAs’ 
expenditure decisions, revenue mobilisation power, borrowing power and 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers (Vo, 2010). All components are very important in 
LGAs’ financial sustainability. Therefore, on one hand the design of the system affects 
LGAs’ financial sustainability and on the other financial sustainability influences 
attainment of decentralisation benefits (as presented in figure 2.1). Moreover, the system 
should emphasise horizontal equity, as the theory suggests. This will provide a balance 
in LGAs’ capacity to deliver responsibilities regardless of the differences in their 
resource base. It is intergovernmental transfers as part of the income redistribution role 
which is expected to handle LGAs’ disparities in resource base.  
 
Furthermore, Dollery (2009) identifies two factors that associate financial sustainability 
with fiscal decentralisation design. The first is the existence of vertical revenue 
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imbalance where central government collects taxes exceeding expenditure. This factor 
will clearly persist since the central government is always in charge of major sources of 
tax collection for the sake of the country’s economy, as previously noted. However, the 
impact can be eliminated through an intergovernmental transfer system. The second 
factor is horizontal fiscal imbalance, where different LGAs have different revenue 
mobilisation capacity. The findings of Johnson et al. (1995) indicate local governments 
in rural areas impose a higher fiscal burden on their tax payers, compared to metropolitan 
areas, to support their budgets. This shows that differences in tax bases impose different 
tax burdens on their citizens. If LGAs’ financial sustainability persistently differs 
because of the second factor, there must be an inherent problem in fiscal system design. 
Johnson et al. (1995) indicate weaknesses in intergovernmental transfers contributed to 
the fiscal burden in rural LGAs in the US. A well designed system in a unitary 
government, as theory suggests, would ensure all LGAs have the same capacity despite 
their revenue capacity. The figure 2.1 below summarises the linkage between 
decentralisation design, its influence on LGAs’ financial sustainability and realisation 
of decentralisation benefits. 
 
Figure 2.1: Interrelationships between decentralisation and LGAs’ financial 
sustainability 
 
Source: Author 
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Besides ensuring the equity of LGAs, the design of the system should also discourage 
soft budget constraint practices. LGAs should be efficient in mobilising revenues from 
internal sources so that intergovernmental transfers aimed to equalise their financial 
capacity become meaningful. Otherwise, the people who are the beneficiaries of the 
services provided by LGAs will not benefit from the equalising system. Less efficient 
LGAs will distort the whole fiscal system by depending heavily on intergovernmental 
transfers. Thus, for LGAs to have sustainable finance, the system should ensure financial 
resources match devolved responsibilities while simultaneously ensuring equity and 
discouraging slack in revenue mobilisation. These are vital components for 
decentralisation reform to succeed. If this is the case, then evaluating financial 
sustainability of LGAs offers the prospect of identifying whether the design and/or 
operationalisation of the decentralisation system is likely to succeed. It will provide 
insight into the impact of decentralisation on LGAs’ financial sustainability and the 
likely impact of LGAs’ financial sustainability on the success of decentralisation. 
Despite financial sustainability not being an ultimate measure of LGAs’ success in 
exercising their functions, its absence compromises the level and quality of services 
provided (Huang and Ho, 2013). 
 
2.5 Conceptual Framework 
The study blends together the framework of Hendrick (2004) and the Canadian Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (CICA) to draw up a framework that suits the context of this 
study. Hendrick’s (2004) view of LGAs’ financial condition has a multidimensional 
aspect which results from the interrelationship between various factors in the local 
government system. Meanwhile, SORP-41 in the CICA (2013) handbook identifies three 
components of financial conditions. The first reflects the ability to maintain existing 
service levels and credit or requirements without an enhanced debt burden on the 
economy. The second reflects the ability to raise additional finance in response to 
additional commitments, and the third reflects the extent of dependence on external 
finance sources which are out of the LGA’s control. The combined framework allows 
consideration of variables that are influenced by decentralisation reforms in evaluating 
                                                          
1Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP-4) Indicators of Financial Condition, Adapted from CICA 
Handbook-Public Sector Accounting, CGA Student Edition, 2013, with permission of the Chartered 
Professional Accountants of Canada, Toronto, Canada. “Any changes to the original material are the sole 
responsibility of the author and have not been reviewed or endorsed by the Chartered Professional 
Accountants of Canada.” 
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financial sustainability. It helps to identify suitable financial sustainability measurement 
indicators, along with fiscal decentralisation theory, to interpret the outcome. The 
framework adopted in this study is presented in figure 2.2. The intention is not to test 
the theory but rather to apply it in evaluating similarities and differences in LGAs’ 
financial sustainability. As Whitaker (1985) concludes, factors which influence LGAs’ 
spending also influence financial health. The design and operationalisation of the 
decentralisation system influence not only LGAs’ spending patterns and finances but 
also their ability to cooperate with other players.   
 
Figure 2.2: Combined Conceptual Framework 
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2.6 Chapter Summary 
The chapter presents the fiscal decentralisation theory developed by Oates in 1972, 
which provides the basis of the research processes and interpretation of the results. The 
theory requires central government to discharge macroeconomic stabilisation and 
income redistribution roles, and local governments to be responsible for delivery of 
services which reflect local needs. It discourages horizontal imbalance through an 
income redistribution role, in which intergovernmental transfers can be used to promote 
fiscal equity across LGAs. If reform adheres to this theory, the expected impact is not 
just the improvement of services because of efficiency in resource allocations, but also 
equity in such services. The theory is considered appropriate in the context of 
decentralisation reforms in Tanzania, where the provision of basic public services is a 
major concern. Thus, people have high hopes from different government levels, 
especially from LGAs, to meet basic public services such as health, education, water and 
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infrastructure. The relevance of the theory is enhanced by the variations in financial 
resources across regions (as discussed in chapter 4), making income redistribution a 
crucial issue in implementation of the reform. Thus, the research questions aim to 
evaluate whether reform design conforms to the theory, hence offering the prospect of 
improving service provision in an equitable manner. The chapter describes the evolution 
of decentralisation, the link between fiscal decentralisation and financial sustainability, 
and the conceptual framework. 
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CHAPTER 3 : LITERATURE REVIEW 
3. 1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of the theoretical and empirical literature related to 
decentralisation and the financial sustainability of local governments. It starts by 
discussing ways in which decentralisation reforms can be evaluated, followed by 
drawing experiences relating to the achievement of decentralisation benefits. Thereafter, 
the chapter discusses the general challenges of decentralisation, the decentralisation 
process in developing countries and related challenges, and the role of fiscal relations in 
shaping financial sustainability of LGAs. It further discusses the functions and 
importance of LGAs, the meaning and background of financial sustainability in LGAs, 
including the reasons for evaluating financial sustainability and the practice of 
measuring it.  
 
3.2 Background of Decentralisation 
Decentralisation of government functions has been a global agenda since the 1970s. Its 
meaning in relation to the public sector depends on the two forms that it can take 
(Litvack et al., 1998; Litvack and Seddon, 1999). First, it refers to transfer of 
responsibilities from central government downwards to states and local authorities, 
which is the focus of this study. The devolution of power is expected to reduce the role 
of central government and to induce intergovernmental competition; checks and 
balances hence increase responsiveness and efficiency (Bardhan, 2002, Widmalm, 
2008). Secondly, it refers to transfer of responsibilities between governmental and non-
governmental sectors to incorporate market forces. This is also referred to as market or 
economy decentralisation because it involves shifting responsibilities from public to 
private sectors.  
 
Despite decentralisation reforms being underway globally, the processes and 
programmes involved seem to differ between developing and developed countries. 
Developed countries consider decentralisation as a better option for providing public 
services in a more cost-effective approach (Petak, 2004). Thus reforms mainly involve 
re-alignment of procedures and processes of public service delivery through the 
introduction of various New Public Management (NPM) tools. This includes 
reengineering the public service delivery function, while employing various private 
sector tools and the marketisation of public service delivery (Halligan, 1997). 
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Meanwhile, developing countries consider decentralisation reforms as a means of 
tackling economic inefficiencies, macroeconomic instability, and ineffective 
governance (Petak, 2004; Manor, 1999). Reforms in these countries aim to boost 
economic development, political stability and poverty alleviation. Over 80 percent of 
developing and transition economies implement decentralisation policies following 
failure of a centralised strategy to promote development and poverty reduction 
(Johnson2, 1999). Thus, in developing countries reforms focus on transfer of power and 
responsibilities to lower levels of government, seeking community participation in 
development projects, involving the private sector in development programmes and 
enhancing political stability (Crook and Manor, 2000).  
 
As in many developing countries, Tanzania attempted to decentralise its government 
functions for the first time in 1972. The aim was to deal with interregional development 
gaps and access to public services between urban and rural areas and within the rural 
areas. However, the introduction of reforms went hand in hand with the abolition of the 
local government structure inherited from colonial rule. This structure was considered 
inconsistent with the decisions of the then new government. As a result, during 
implementation the reforms raised a number of problems3 partly as a result of the 
abolition of the LGAs, and hence the programme ceased just after 10 years. The 
implementation of government functions from 1972 to the early 1980s was made 
through regional planning committees coordinated by the central government, but in 
1982, LGAs were re-introduced. In the late 1990s, the country re-initiated another 
reform under the name of Decentralisation by Devolution (D by D) in order to enhance 
local government functioning. The reform is still ongoing and its long-term goals include 
poverty alleviation, improving quality and access to public services especially to the 
poor, and ensuring equity in public services (URT, undated).  
The decentralisation policy paper of 1998 provides the foundation of the ongoing 
reforms; it identifies four main aspects of D by D. First is political decentralisation, 
which aims to devolve decision-making power to LGAs within the national legislation 
framework. Secondly, fiscal decentralisation is intended to provide LGAs with 
                                                          
2   Foreword provided by Ian Johnson, the World Bank Vice President (Environmentally and Socially 
Sustainable Development Network), in Manor, J. (1999). The political Economy of Democratic 
Decentralisation 
3 For more details about these problems see URT (undated), the History of Local Government System in 
Tanzania issued by the Prime Minister’s Office- Regional Administration and Local Government.  
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discretionary power over financial decisions and own-source revenue generation. 
Thirdly, administrative decentralisation aims to provide LGAs with discretionary power 
over staff recruitment and local decisions and to make the staff accountable to their local 
councils. Finally, it brings changes to central-local relations by setting clear 
communication links between LGAs and central government ministries and 
departments; the policy paper identifies the minister in charge of LGAs as the 
coordinator of other central government ministries in communicating regulations and 
guidelines to LGAs.  
3.3 The Practice of Evaluating Decentralisation Reforms 
As presented in chapter two, decentralising government responsibilities encompasses 
three basic functions: resource allocation, income redistribution and macroeconomic 
regulation. However, considering the broad nature of these functions, it is not an easy 
task to assess the success of decentralisation reforms. Also, the execution of reform 
normally carries multiple objectives which increase the difficulty of establishing their 
success (Rees and Hossain, 2010), especially as in most cases reforms are ongoing 
(Halligan, 1997). The objectives might even differ from one level of government to 
another (central government and LGAs). Furthermore, the goals might not be explicitly 
identifiable and/or might be changing while reforms are in progress. The time span 
needed for decentralisation to show a result is another issue that contributes to the 
difficulty in evaluating the decentralisation reforms. Usually, it takes longer for the 
impact of decentralisation to be seen because it involves fundamental changes in long-
held attitudes and knowledge of how the public sector works (Smoke, 2003). In relation 
to duration, it becomes difficult even to obtain appropriate data for evaluating the 
success of reforms, which poses a challenge to the suitability of some standard analysis 
tools (Smoke, 2001). 
 
Despite the complexity of reform execution, various approaches have been identified in 
the literature that can be useful for evaluating reform design and its implementation. 
Petak (2004), for example, suggests using basic normative criteria to evaluate the 
success of decentralisation policies regardless of the country’s development level. These 
criteria are the basic conditions for successful decentralisation reform, and they can be 
analysed individually or in combination. According to Litvack and Seddon (1999), there 
are five basic conditions for successful decentralisation reform:  
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i. There should be a link between service provision responsibilities and functions 
of local government with local financing and fiscal authorities. 
ii. Informing the local community about the cost of services and delivery options 
together with resource availability and sources so that they can make appropriate 
decisions. 
iii. Existence of an accountability system based on transparency of information that 
would enable the community to effectively monitor the performance of local 
government. 
iv. Existence of a system that would enable communities to express their 
preferences to politicians, hence motivating them to participate. 
v. Reform execution should be supported by appropriate design of the legal and 
institutional frameworks, organised structures of service provision 
responsibilities and a well-designed intergovernmental fiscal system. 
 
Moreover, decentralisation has been assessed based on its ability to discourage soft 
budget constraint; it is an inefficient project if fiscal decentralisation allows soft budget 
constraint (Petak, 2004). The presence of soft budget constraints would undermine 
decentralisation efforts and devolution of decision-making processes because LGAs will 
remain relaxed and will not seek alternative ways of achieving fiscal needs. LGAs will 
be highly dependent on intergovernmental transfers to finance their budgets instead of 
making an effort to mobilise revenues from their own sources. This soft budget aspect 
is related to the ability of accountability systems aimed to make LGA officials work hard 
to mobilise resources. 
 
Among the studies which evaluated decentralisation, Wallis and Oates (1988) applied 
two measures to assess the extent of decentralisation. The first is expenditure share 
between central and local government, and the second is the revenue share of local 
government from central and own sources. Dziobek et al. (2011) used four measures to 
assess the degree of decentralisation: revenue, tax effort, expenditure and compensation 
of employees. Uchimura and Suzuki (2012) used five indicators to assess 
intergovernmental fiscal relations: the share of LGAs in total fiscal expenditure, share 
of LGAs in total fiscal revenue, dependency of LGAs on fiscal transfer, LGAs’ fiscal 
autonomy and discretion in LGAs’ expenditure. The diversity of measures reflects the 
variety of aspects that each study wished to evaluate.  
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However, in order to assess the potential of decentralisation reforms to enhance access 
to public services, this study considers it appropriate to evaluate LGAs’ financial 
sustainability. The rationale is that the financial sustainability of LGAs determines their 
ability to deliver services and hence attain decentralisation’s objectives. This 
corresponds with the proposition of Salman and Iqbal (2011) in evaluating the impact 
of decentralisation. They note that, whether decentralisation yields a positive or negative 
impact, it depends on expenditure distribution among different levels of government and 
their ability to execute them. Similarly, Scott (2009) identifies that one of the conditions 
for efficient service delivery in LGAs is the availability of sufficient financial resources. 
If LGAs are assigned expenditure functions without sufficient resources, their ability to 
deliver them will be limited and hence their objective not attained. On the other hand, if 
the income redistribution function is not well exercised within decentralisation settings, 
the danger of exaggerating inequity in the public services offered is high. Moreover, it 
is appropriate to consider soft budget constraints as part of evaluating decentralisation 
design and operationalisation, because it also influences the financial ability of LGAs to 
sustain their operations.  
 
3.4 Benefits of Decentralisation: International Experience  
There is little empirical evidence on the impact and attainment of decentralisation 
benefits in practice, given the paucity of reliable data concerning decentralisation 
reforms (Scott, 2009). However, from the limited literature, there is no consensus as to 
whether decentralisation benefits are realised in practice. Smoke (2001), for example, 
raises concern on the desirability of the decentralising approach because of the modest 
achievement of stated goals, despite extensive and costly effort. Similarly, Scott (2009) 
argues that, despite the difficulty of researching the area which limits conclusions about 
the subject matter, the expected benefits of decentralisation have not been realised in 
practice. However, for decentralisation to succeed it is imperative that its design and 
operationalisation ensure availability of fiscal resources which correspond to the 
responsibilities of the executing agencies and appropriate coordination. On the whole, 
the benefits are simply the end products of a holistic decentralisation system which needs 
to function properly. The following subsections discuss the empirical findings about the 
effect of decentralisation on some of its potential benefits.  
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3.4.1 Economic Development and Poverty Reduction 
One of the potential benefits of decentralisation is to enhance economic development 
and reduce poverty (Smoke, 2003; Litivack et al., 1998). This is expected to arise from 
the economic efficiency, good governance and involvement of deprived groups in 
reform programmes, resource redistribution and macroeconomic stability that 
decentralisation advocates. In addition, decentralisation attracts not only public sector 
but also many other players (Work, 2002), whose actions contribute to the country’s 
economic development. It includes community organisations, the private sector, 
international agencies and citizens. Although their roles and interests might differ, the 
overall effect of their actions will increase the success of decentralisation reforms. For 
instance, when an LGA invites private organisations into a joint venture project in the 
course of exercising its decision-making autonomy, its impact will be not only to 
enhance revenue sources but also to create employment opportunities. Similarly, 
equalisation grants tend to stimulate economic activities in poor regions through LGAs’ 
spending, hence contributing to overall production and economic development. 
 
However, empirical evidence on the impact of decentralisation on economic growth is 
not conclusive. Some studies have found a positive impact, others not. Iqbal and Nawaz 
(2010), found a positive impact of fiscal decentralisation on macroeconomic stability in 
Pakistan as did Stansel (2005) in a cross-section study of US metropolitan areas. 
However, Neyapti (2010) found a negative relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and budget deficits. Nevertheless, since inflation affects macroeconomic stability and 
economic growth, Neyapti’s study implicitly indicates a positive impact of 
decentralisation on economic growth. Similarly, Hanif et al. (2012) found a positive 
impact on job creation, negatively related to the inflation level in Pakistan. The findings 
of Hanif et al. show that fiscal decentralisation encourages employment opportunities 
and holds down the inflation level through discouraging nominal wage increases. Other 
studies which found a significant impact include Lin and Liu (2000) for China, Thiessen 
(2000) for Western Europe and middle income countries, and Zhang and Zou (2001) for 
India. Yilmaz et al. (2004) found a positive relationship between fiscal autonomy, which 
is a function of fiscal decentralisation and economic growth using an OECD dataset. 
Meanwhile, Lindert and Verkoren (2010) conclude that there has been a significant 
impact of decentralisation on economic development in South American countries. 
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On the other hand, Martinez and MacNab (2006) did not find any influence of 
decentralisation in economic growth of developing countries and observed negative 
influence in developed countries. The aforementioned authors utilised a dataset of 66 
worldwide countries, developed and developing, from 1972 to 2003 to examine the 
impact of decentralisation on economic growth and price stability. In terms of price 
stability, the study found there to be a positive impact in developing countries and a 
negative impact in developing countries. Priyadarshee and Hossain (2010) found limited 
participation of deprived groups in pro-poor decentralisation programmes in India, 
which raises questions on the relevance of such programmes if they cannot attract those 
it is supposed to help. Meanwhile, studies that found little impacts include Zhang and 
Zou (1998) for China and Davoodi et al (1999) for the US. Similarly, Thiessen (2003) 
found a high degree of fiscal decentralisation in high-income OECD countries 
contributes to stagnating capita stock growth and economic growth. Nevertheless, 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, (2003) and Scot (2009) argue that a lack of 
understanding on the linkage between decentralisation and economic growth contributes 
to the lack of a conclusion, because economic growth is affected by many factors. The 
discussion about discrepancies in empirical findings is covered in subsection 3.6.  
 
3.4.2 Efficiency and Equity in Service Delivery 
Another potential benefit of decentralisation is to improve efficiency and equity in 
service delivery. Decentralisation fragments the roles of government into small 
government units to induce intergovernmental competition; this implies that  a system 
of checks and balances will be achieved resulting in increased responsiveness and 
efficiency (Bardhan, 2002). The resulting intergovernmental competition is expected to 
promote innovation and experimentation, and hence increase overall productivity. 
However, Scott (2009) points out that there are many assumptions underlying this 
argument. It is assumed that LGAs will be close to people and will incorporate their 
needs and preferences in service delivery. It is also assumed that they will have sufficient 
funding from central and local taxes to finance services and that they will have adequate 
administrative capacity and this may not always the case.   
 
The conflicting empirical evidence for the impact of decentralisation on service delivery 
is perplexing. The study of Robalino et al. (2001) using panel data of low and high-
income countries found (i) higher fiscal decentralisation is consistently associated with 
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lower mortality rates and (ii) benefits of fiscal decentralisation are highly significant in 
low income countries. The implication of such findings is that decentralisation offers 
significantly higher improvement of services to developing countries than to developed 
countries. Similarly, Halder (2007) found the same positive impact of decentralisation 
on the infant mortality rate. The study of Toya and Skidmore (2013) found countries 
which are more decentralised had a record of fewer deaths. This implies decentralisation 
has a positive impact on people’s life in general. On the other hand, Widmalm (2008) 
found no relationship between decentralisation and social service provision, specifically 
primary education and health services in Indian LGAs. Similarly, Robinson (2007) 
found little evidence to support the argument in favour of decentralisation for equity and 
efficiency in service delivery. He states that empirical studies in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America did not necessarily identify any positive impact, while in some cases the service 
quality declined. On the other hand, the observations of Hossain and Helao (2008) from 
Namibia suggest that inappropriate decentralising approach in provision of services 
offers limited potential for that country to remedy unequal and imbalanced access to 
resources. For example, the country commercialised its water service provision, which 
limited its access to the poor.  
 
Nevertheless, variations in financial sustainability of LGAs might also be a contributing 
factor for fiscal decentralisation not attaining equity and efficiency in service delivery. 
As identified above, availability of sufficient financial resources for LGAs is vital for 
decentralisation to bring improvement to service provision. For instance, Lindert and 
Verkoren’s (2010) empirical evidence shows LGAs in Latin American countries having 
a mismatch between revenue flow and the responsibilities assigned; they have only a 
small share of revenue from the central government budget. Despite decentralisation 
initiatives over some two decades, in many countries the share of revenue from the 
central government to LGAs is below 10% and in a few it ranges from 10 to 15%. 
However, large LGAs have been identified to be efficient and effective in planning and 
management performance, likely to result in enhanced services, while smaller LGAs 
were found to be weak. In the latter scenario, it is also difficult for such LGAs to offer 
equitable access to public services for their communities.     
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3.4.4 Social Cohesion 
Decentralisation is also favoured because it offers the potential to enhance social 
cohesion by reducing conflicts, wealth inequalities, encouraging people’s participation 
and minimising ethnic tensions (Scott 2009; Salman and Iqbal, 2011). The empirical 
evidence from a few studies is convincing. For example, Lindert and Verkoren (2010) 
show that, in addition to economic development, there has been a significant impact of 
decentralisation on political, social and spatial landscapes in Latin American countries 
since its introduction. Nations have electoral governments and multiparty systems, and 
indigenous municipalities have been created in which ethnic groups get representation 
following introduction of a new constitution, which induced decentralisation reform. 
Before decentralisation initiatives, only six nations out of eighteen had regular electoral 
governments in Latin America. Also, the cross-country analysis of De Mello (2011) 
found people in decentralised countries highly valued their contribution in government 
decision making, compared to centralised countries. This implies that people feel that 
they are valued by their government system because of decentralisation aspects, thus 
enhancing social cohesion. On the other hand, King (2004) examines decentralisation 
reforms in attempting to give Indonesia peaceful and constitutional transfer of power at 
the national level. Before reforms, the country had dominant conflicts and instabilities. 
However, despite some positive impacts, King found social conflict was strengthened 
and lawlessness increased. Thus, it can be concluded that decentralisation had little 
impact on social cohesion in Indonesia. 
 
3.4.4 Reducing Corruption 
Decentralisation is also associated with a country’s level of corruption, but again there 
are two opposing propositions. Martnez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) provide two 
contrasting views of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and corrupt 
practices. On one hand, they identified there is a possibility of increasing corruption 
since decentralisation places LGA officials close to the people who are in need of the 
services. Therefore it is easier for people to use devious means to lobby the officials than 
it would be to influence central government officials. In LGAs, the distinction between 
politicians and executives is in most cases not clear, hence exposing them to corrupt 
practices. As a result, corruption is likely to limit any benefits of decentralisation. On 
the other hand, decentralisation is considered to have the potential to reduce the 
opportunities for corruption. The assumption behind this is that LGA officials are close 
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to the society, hence their acts are more visible than those of central government 
officials. In addition, decisions made by LGA officials usually have a lower impact and 
cover smaller jurisdictions than those of central government officials whose decisions 
are of greater import.  
 
The empirical evidence supports the view that decentralisation is related with lower 
levels of corruption. In Indonesia, for example, decentralisation was seen as a way of 
transforming the corrupt and highly concentrated government into a democratic, 
efficient and fair institution (Alm et al., 2004). Moreover, the interpretation of the 
findings of Robalino et al. (2001) suggests that fiscal decentralisation contributes to 
reducing the level of corruption in service delivery. The study shows improvement in 
health service provision in areas with a high corruption level, following decentralisation 
reform. It is also congruent with Arikan (2004) who found the corruption level to be 
lower in countries with a higher fiscal decentralisation level, although the relationship 
is not strong. Nevertheless, the multi-approach study of Treisman (2009) for 80 
countries did not find a generalised relationship between decentralisation and corruption.   
 
3.5 General Challenges of Decentralisation 
Despite the benefits promised through decentralisation there are some challenges in its 
implementation. The experiences from Nordic countries, for example, provide a warning 
that over-decentralisation might lead to extreme autonomy of local governments. 
According to Lane (1997), prior to the reforms of the 1980s those countries had over-
large local governments which led to problems in political participation and economic 
inefficiency due to out-competing the private sector and challenging the state. Therefore, 
reforms were initiated in order to improve productivity and effectiveness. The 
experience drawn from Nordic countries relates to the difficult of identifying an 
optimum decentralisation level. Establishing an efficient decentralisation structure is a 
complex process. As Smoke (2001) says, the provision of different public services may 
require areas of different optimal sizes, which may not necessarily correspond with the 
physical boundaries of LGAs. This enhances the complexity of setting an optimum 
structure.   
 
The way decentralisation policies are implemented can be a big challenge to its success. 
The study of Karanikolas and Hatzipanteli (2010) identifies three factors that hinder 
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successful implementation of decentralisation policy: the concentrated character of 
central government, a legal framework that hinders lower government levels from 
making decisions, and a local government decision-making structure that is confined 
within the centralised decision-making process. Similarly, Larbi (1999) provides 
evidence from the experience of financial devolution in the UK which shows there was 
resistance from civil servants to reduce centralised control and inadequate availability 
of technical systems to support reforms.  
 
Another challenge in decentralisation reform is the possibility of extending previous 
problems into the newly established structure. Hadiz (2004), for instance, claims that 
democratisation could hardly be attained in Indonesian decentralisation because it 
extended into the newly reformed structure, problems that existed before 
decentralisation. There was emergence of “new patterns of highly diffuse and 
decentralised corruption, rule by predatory local officials, the rise of money politics and 
the consolidation of political gangsterism” (Hadiz, 2004: p.711). As a result, 
beneficiaries were just individuals who previously worked as local operators, business 
people well connected politically. In addition, the family members of influential local 
politicians engaged in politics and were elected as parliamentary members, town mayors 
and village officers. In addition to Indonesia, Hadiz has identified the same experience 
in Thailand’s reforms, where the status quo interest and the vote-buying practice in rural 
areas contributed to bureaucratic resistance to decentralisation initiatives. As a result 
Thailand’s reforms of the 1980s were accompanied by the growing influence of local 
political groups and business alliances. Such groups included rich businessmen who 
were also engaging in criminal activities such as gambling, drugs and prostitution.   
 
3.6 Decentralisation Process in Developing Countries 
The design and decentralisation processes seem to correspond to the level of a country’s 
development. Public services that are better offered by LGAs in developed countries 
might not be better offered by the same level of government in developing countries, 
and vice versa. As a result, the objectives and processes involved in reform differ 
between developing and developed countries. Bardhan (2002), for example, concludes 
that while European Union nations have long debated on subsidiarity and devolution, 
and the US on states’ rights, most developing and transition economies in Africa, Latin 
America and Asia are still developing policies and restructuring their intergovernmental 
41 
 
relations. This view corresponds with the argument of Bale and Dale (1998), that the 
most common reforms in developing countries are those which involve realigning their 
basic operations. They include streamlining procedures, banning dual employment and 
increasing the salaries of public servants, fighting corruption, upgrading training, and 
decentralising service provision.   
 
On the other hand, Johnson4 (1999) stated that the emergence of fiscal decentralisation 
in more than 80% of developing countries is due to the failure of a concentration strategy 
in promoting development and reducing the poverty level. In addition, Smoke (2001) 
provides two additional reasons that contributed to the emergence of fiscal 
decentralisation initiatives in developing countries. The first is that fiscal difficulties 
arose from changes in international economic conditions and structural adjustment 
programmes. The second is changes in the political climate due to people being better 
educated, improved communication and enhanced awareness of central government 
bureaucratic problems. Thus, development agencies in collaboration with local leaders 
had to engineer decentralisation reforms to deal with such problems. Specifically, as 
Hadiz, (2004) and Widmalm (2008) suggest, the World Bank and USAID have been at 
the forefront in promoting the decentralisation agenda. The involvement of the World 
Bank is also reflected in its financial investment in promoting reforms. Between 1993 
and 1997, 12% of World Bank-funded projects concentrated on decentralisation reforms 
(Litvack et al., 1998).  
 
In Africa, the introduction of decentralisation reforms became widespread in the late 
1980s. Tanzania, for instance, introduced reforms through the decentralisation reform 
agenda of 1996 and decentralisation policy paper of 1998. Rwanda initiated reforms 
from 1997 to 2000 so as to enhance the involvement of people in decisions that affect 
their socio-economic matters, while South Africa introduced reforms in 1993 as part of 
the dismantling of the apartheid regime (Kauzya, 2007). Other examples include 
Morocco, which voted in a decentralisation law in 1973, although it was the 
constitutional reform of 1986 and 1992 which led to a moderate devolution; and Uganda, 
which initiated reforms in the early 1990s, with power and responsibilities devolving 
through a new constitution adopted in 1995 (Work, 2002). In recognising the potentials 
                                                          
4 Foreword provided by Ian Johnson, the World Bank Vice President (Environmentally and Socially 
Sustainable Development Network), in Manor, J. (1999). The political Economy of Democratic 
Decentralisation 
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of decentralisation to African countries, Prudhome (2003) identifies that the agenda will 
remain in effect for many years.   
 
However, Smoke (2001), Cabral (2011) and Boex and Yilmaz (2010) argue that 
decentralisation success, particularly in developing countries, is limited despite the best 
efforts of international and local development communities. As a result there is strong 
debate in the literature regarding the desirability of the decentralisation approach 
(Smoke, 2001). Nevertheless, before discussing its desirability, there are three issues of 
concern regarding the observations on the success of decentralisation. The first is on the 
design of the system, as already discussed in subsection 2.4, on which there is common 
agreement. The overall impact depends on the design of particular decentralised 
government systems (Cabral, 2011). However, Litvack et al, (1998; p.8) admit that 
“limited empirical evidence on what works and what does not make the design and 
implementation of decentralisation” in developing countries difficult. Further to this, 
Ishii et al. (2007) emphasise that the validity of decentralisation reforms in developing 
countries requires customisation to the local context rather that employing a general 
model across nations. The second is on the difficulty of establishing appropriate 
measures for assessing success, as discussed in subsection 3.4. Linking decentralisation 
and its potential benefits has been identified in the empirical literature as contributing to 
the difficulties in researching the area and achieving mixed results. The third issue is the 
length of time that needs to pass before the benefits of reform are realised; one of the 
possible reasons for fiscal decentralisation having limited success is the time required to 
change the long history of centralisation into decentralisation (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002).  
 
Moreover, there are features that literature consider as common to the majority of 
developing countries but not the developed ones, and are claimed to challenge the 
applicability of fiscal decentralisation theory. These are in addition to the general 
challenges outlined in subsection 3.5, and include the poverty level, cultural and political 
background, revenue sources to LGAs, people’s immobility, and corruption. The figure 
3.1 below summarises the arguments, which are outlined in more detail in the following 
subsections.  
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Figure 3.1: Arguments on Relevance of Decentralisation to Developing Countries 
 
Source: Author derived from literatures 
 
3.6.1 Poverty Level 
Fiscal decentralisation theory suggests that decentralisation would lead to greater 
welfare in society through matching local preferences and needs with decision-making 
autonomy. As identified in chapter two, the theory prefers local public goods and 
services to be offered by LGAs because local preferences differ from one jurisdiction to 
another. Also, it assumes people will be moving in and out of LGAs to match their 
preferences. Thus, poor people will move to LGAs with better social services and good 
infrastructure to improve their living standard, while well-off people will move to LGAs 
with a higher level of public services to maximise their satisfaction (Smoke, 2001; 
Martnez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003). Nevertheless, Prud’homme (1995) argues that 
poverty is a common feature in developing countries compared to developed countries, 
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which makes local preferences and needs homogeneous across jurisdictions. This 
implies the majority of households require basic needs which are common between 
jurisdictions. The similarity of preferences across jurisdictions enhances the need for 
income redistribution, as the theory advocates, to be effective in promoting horizontal 
equity in service provision.  
 
3.6.2 Cultural and Political Background 
Cultural differences, ethnic groups, and political and institutional conditions tend to 
undermine the need for and potential success of fiscal decentralisation in the majority of 
developing countries compared to developed countries (Smoke, 2001). Cultural 
differences are likely to strengthen resistance to change and lower the likely benefits of 
decentralisation. For reform programmes to be successful, they should be attuned to 
national cultural characteristics (Rajiani and Jumbri, 2011). Nevertheless, there are two 
views regarding the relationship between decentralisation and ethnic groups. On one 
hand, decentralisation is viewed as a way of reducing tensions between ethnic groups 
through people’s involvement in decision making (Scott 2009). On the other, the 
presence of ethnic groups is considered as an obstacle to the success of decentralisation, 
as it is likely to increase the reluctance of central government to decentralise power to 
LGAs, purposely to weaken those groups (Cabral, 2011). As a result, Cabral (2011) 
argues that in many African countries, ethno-regional pluralism is one of the factors 
limiting the success of decentralisation. This is supported by the findings of the cross-
country study of Robalino et al. (2001) which found that the benefits of decentralisation 
tend to be lower in countries with a large number of ethno-linguistic groups. 
 
Moreover, political and institutional structures have been identified as posing more of a 
challenge to decentralisation in developing countries than in developed countries. For 
instance, Crook (2003: p.77) says “… elite capture of local power structures” has been 
a major challenge towards the success of pro-poor decentralisation initiatives in Africa. 
Ruling party regimes have been identified as designing decentralised structures that 
safeguard their power and influence in LGAs. Despite of advantages of fiscal 
decentralisation, the absence of committed support of the political leaders is likely to 
limit the success of decentralisation. However, as Smoke and Lewis (1996) observe, 
such circumstances require decentralisation design to encompass strong institutional 
framework that conforms to reform objectives. 
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3.6.3 Revenue Sources for Local Government  
Successful fiscal decentralisation requires LGAs to have autonomy to raise part of the 
finance needed from their own revenue sources, as part of power devolution. However, 
in most cases the types of revenue available to LGAs in developing countries are income 
inelastic than in developed countries, hence obstructing local governments in raising 
sufficient income (Smoke, 2001). In addition to their limited autonomy, the ability of 
LGAs in developing countries to administer revenue mobilisation has also been 
questioned in the literature. For instance, Brueckner (2000:3) identifies the weakness of 
LGAs in tax administration as leading to “substantial and costless” tax evasion. In 
developed countries, tax evasion at LGA levels is relatively low. As a result, LGAs in 
developing countries are seen as less independent. The heavy dependence on transfers 
from central government, by itself, is considered as unsuccessful fiscal decentralisation. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that this does not undermine the importance of fiscal 
decentralisation in developing countries. Instead, considered an illustration of how the 
fiscal decentralisation system should be designed. An effective fiscal system design 
should be tailored to match the LGA’s functions and responsibilities with resource 
availability, whether generated internally or externally.  
 
3.6.4 Immobility of People 
One of the assumptions of fiscal decentralisation theory is the self-adjustment in service 
demand, particularly when population movement is possible. This assumes that people 
with similar interests will move to a locality with better public services, to maximise 
their preference mix. The movement of people in and out of a jurisdiction will continue 
until there is no more incentive to move. At that equilibrium point, there will be self-
adjustment in local taxation and public service provision. However, as Litvack et al. 
(1998) point out, the mobility of poor people in developing countries, especially in 
Africa, is limited because of the land, which is the main means of production for the 
majority of communities. Also, it is difficult for someone to find a quick sale for his/her 
land so as to shift to another jurisdiction, and for someone to acquire a new means of 
production in another jurisdiction to establish a new life. Another related challenge is 
the limited access to loan facilities that would help them to settle in new localities, 
because most ordinary people have insufficient securities. Thus, it is unlikely that the 
self-adjustment and equilibrium point will be freely attained, as the theory suggests. 
Nevertheless, it remains as a challenge in fiscal system design in developing nations to 
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ensure equity in LGAs’ financial capacity, so that public services reach ordinary people 
regardless of the LGA in which they are living. As Prud’homme (2003) argues, in 
developing countries particularly Africa, the importance of establishing interregional 
equity and income redistribution is enhanced by less population mobility because people 
value their regional affiliated identities irrespective of their income level. 
 
Moreover, the feasible mobility in developing countries involves people who are mainly 
part of the agrarian labour force moving to urban areas in search of greener pastures. 
Such people tend to move to urban municipalities without their families to seek 
economic support for them. Hence “...these cities grow rapidly from high birth rates and 
the in-migration of rural peasants unable to make an acceptable living from agriculture” 
(Smoke, 2001: 5). This has a multiplier effect. On the one hand it reduces the labour 
force in the locality they have left, reducing the tax base and leaving the elderly and 
children, who are more likely to be a burden on the social services. On the other hand, 
they put pressure on public service provision in the urban areas to which they move. The 
growth of infrastructure might not keep pace with population growth. Thus, there is little 
likelihood of attaining the equilibrium point, the point at which everyone is satisfied 
with the service he/she receives and hence has no further incentive to move from one 
jurisdiction to another. Therefore, in developing countries, the design and 
operationalisation of the fiscal system should attempt to ensure an equitable standard of 
living across jurisdictions and promote equality in regional growth. This will discourage 
the movement of people in search of greener pastures and better public services.  
 
3.6.5 Corruption 
Fiscal decentralisation theory assumes that efficiency in public service provision will be 
enhanced because LGAs will have easy access to local preferences, and decision-making 
power comes closer to the people. However, when corruption prevails, there is a danger 
of offsetting this benefit. Brueckner (2000), for example, argues that the prevalence of 
corruption in developing countries is likely to result in a higher per capita cost of 
providing public services by LGAs than would be provided by central government. In 
addition, LGAs in developing countries are likely to have more poorly trained staff than 
central government (Brueckner, 2000). All these factors put LGAs in developing 
countries at a disadvantage in providing public goods and services, compared to their 
central governments.   
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Nevertheless, Widmalm (2008) suggests that corruption is more persistent in developing 
countries because practices which are regarded as corruption in Western countries are 
here considered as usual and acceptable. According to Widmalm, corruption can be in 
the form of a public servant’s private use of working hours, considered prevalent in 
LGAs of developing countries. Absenteeism among qualified staff in the public service 
is seen to be high because they opt to provide their services on a private, commercial 
basis. However, the findings of Widmalm’s study in India show that even in developing 
countries people are not happy with corrupt practices. Therefore, it is important that 
decentralisation design to assimilate appropriate institutional settings and control 
mechanisms to lower corruption.   
 
3.7 The Role of Fiscal Relations in LGAs’ Financial Sustainability 
The fiscal relationship between different tiers of government affects the wellbeing of 
billions of people worldwide (Bird, 2011). This is why one of the objectives of the 
Comprehensive Development Framework of the World Bank, launched in 1999, is to 
promote decentralisation reform that reduces the poverty level arising from local 
disparities (Crook and Manor, 2000). However, for decentralisation to succeed, the 
design and implementation of the fiscal system matters. This is why Oates (1999) 
emphasises the need for appropriate alignment of responsibilities with fiscal instruments 
at the proper level of government if reforms are to succeed. There should be a balance 
between the roles and contributions of both parts, the central government and LGAs, in 
achieving overall objectives. It is important to align their interests so as to establish 
institutional convergence towards achieving reform objectives.  
 
Failure in designing and coordinating intergovernmental fiscal systems affects the fiscal 
condition of LGAs and the nation as a whole. Ignoring completeness of decentralisation 
systems has resulted in some countries not only missing the benefits but also 
experiencing deficit and macroeconomic instability (Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). Similar 
impacts have been reported by De Mello (2000) from a study which involved 30 
countries. The interpretation of his findings suggest that failure to coordinate 
intergovernmental fiscal relations lead to a deficit bias in decentralised policy making. 
These results indicate the importance of establishing a balance in the design of the fiscal 
system, which forms the basis of central-local relationships.  
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It is the fiscal system which lays the basis of assigning both expenditure functions and 
revenue sources to LGAs. As noted by Conway et al. (2005), the availability of sufficient 
financial resources for LGAs is the fundamental principle of decentralisation. Similarly, 
Salman and Iqbal (2011) believe that effective fiscal system design assigns functions 
followed by revenue assignment that correspond with expenditure needs. All these 
emphasise the need for reformers to consider resource availability while assigning 
functions to LGAs. The success of decentralisation depends on the details of policy 
design and context that consequently affect intermediate variables and service delivery 
outcomes (Cabral, 2011).  
 
Understandably, many issues require attention in designing a fiscal decentralisation 
system. Litvack and Seddon (1999) identify four aspects which they consider as 
principles to be adhered in order to make LGAs effective in discharging devolved 
functions: assignment of finance should follow clear assignment of functions, informed 
decision making, conformity to local priorities, and accountability. In addition, Smoke 
(2001) identifies three issues that also need attention at the macro level. First, in 
designing fiscal relationships consideration should be given to interdependence and 
inter-jurisdictional competition to avoid mobility of the tax base. The rationale behind 
this is that the tax climate between jurisdictions influences tax payers’ decisions on 
where to locate. People and businesses tend to gauge tax climate between alternative 
jurisdictions whenever deciding where to locate (ACIR, 1970). Thus, reformers should 
ensure that system design avoids unhealthy competition on tax policies among LGAs. 
The experience drawn from Italy indicates richer regions were benefiting from stiff tax 
competition than poor regions (Arachi and Zanardi, 2004). Although the second 
generation of fiscal decentralisation theories encourages tax competition among LGAs 
for “healthy” revenue results, its impact in Italy was limited.  
 
Smoke’s second consideration is that the design of the fiscal decentralisation system 
should consider national goals in the provision of public service, and equity between 
jurisdictions, hence justifying intergovernmental grants and standard of service. Every 
country has different priorities, which should be helpful in guiding the allocation of 
functions between central government and LGAs. Also, considering the similar nature 
of the functions assigned to LGAs, it is essential that the fiscal system emphasise 
interregional equity. Usually, the expectation of the people, who are the service 
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recipients, is to receive improved public services which reflect fairness and equity 
regardless of their geographical location. With the use of intergovernmental transfers, 
the central government is in the position of redistributing resources from wealthier to 
poorer LGAs (Smoke, 2001). A good example is provided by Arachi and Zanardi (2004) 
regarding the design of the intergovernmental transfer system in Italy which considers 
minimum standards in the health sector. The system has been designed to enable each 
region to achieve at least minimum requirements; this reflects a similarity to LGAs’ 
functions and equity in offering access to health services to all people.  
Thirdly, the system should accommodate differences in optimal criteria between central 
and local government in the assignment of revenue sources to minimise potential 
impacts. Optimal tax criteria for LGAs do not always conform to those of the nation as 
a whole. For instance, LGAs may wish to charge taxes on some sources which are 
limited because of overall national interest. Indonesia’s 1997 reforms of the local tax 
system, as explained in Simanjuntak and Mahi (2005), provide a good example. The 
central government reduced the number of local taxes and user charges from 40 and 180 
to 9 and 30 respectively. Their reduction was due to some of them being considered as 
inefficient and distorting the national economy. Moreover, the central government may 
limit some revenue sources to avoid transferring the burden to other LGAs. For instance, 
Bahl (2000) states that an LGA may force producers to buy all their materials or services 
from suppliers within the locality, in order to generate employment opportunities within 
the LGA and to increase the revenue base for tax collection. However, the impact may 
be to shift part of the tax burden to users of the product/service residing in other LGAs 
because it might be possible to get such materials elsewhere at lower cost.  
The optimal view criterion in allocation of revenue sources for LGAs establishes 
interrelationships between intergovernmental transfers and their own sources of 
revenue. Hence an appropriate system of local taxation cannot be established without 
simultaneously designing an appropriate intergovernmental transfer system (Oates, 
1999; Bird, 2011). The way revenues are collected and distributed within and between 
different government levels plays a vital role in the country’s overall fiscal performance. 
However, in practice the consideration of criteria for resource allocation between the 
central government and its LGAs is determined based on technical and philosophical 
considerations (Athanassopoulos, 1995). The technical concern relates to availability of 
information and data, while the philosophical concern relates to overall objectives. 
Nevertheless, precautions are still needed because, as Azis (2008) explains, any 
50 
 
misallocation of resources associated with national policy is likely to hinder 
achievement of overall decentralisation objectives.  
Generally, the intergovernmental fiscal relations determine systems for expenditure 
assignment, local taxation, intergovernmental transfers and local borrowings (Alm et al, 
2004). The fiscal decentralisation design should provide fiscal environment support for 
LGAs to execute their entrusted functions. It includes the presence of strong mechanisms 
for monitoring and evaluating the performance of LGAs. In the absence of fiscal 
environmental support, there is little chance of LGAs fulfilling their required 
responsibilities. Fiscal environment support is also meant to include the availability of 
finances, whether from within or outside, to finance their functions. Usually, there are 
three main sources of finance for LGAs: own resource revenues, intergovernmental 
transfers and borrowing. Thus the system should empower them with a certain degree 
of autonomy to raise part of their finances from within their jurisdiction. It should also 
ensure equitable distribution of intergovernmental transfers. Whenever possible, the 
system should set an acceptable environment for LGAs to raise debt finance. 
Nevertheless, the design of the whole system should aim towards the best deployment 
of all resources to achieve the overall objectives.  
 
3.7.1 Own Sources Revenue 
Own source revenue is important to LGAs not only for financing their expenditure but 
also because it reflects the extent of revenue autonomy devolved to them. However, as 
Bird and Vaillancourt (2008) explain, the exercise of assigning correct sources of 
revenue to multi-level governments is clear in theory but complicated in practice, for 
two reasons. First, central government is inherently in a position to collect most taxes 
more efficiently than LGAs, although the main problem associated with this is the 
possibility of vertical imbalance. Secondly, LGAs’ potential revenue sources vary 
widely from one jurisdiction to another, exacerbating horizontal fiscal imbalance.  
 
To deal with the difficulties of assigning revenue sources to LGAs, two main principles 
have been suggested. First, the allocation of revenue sources to LGAs should enable the 
richest LGAs to finance at least their expenditure (Bird, 2011, Bird and Vaillancourt, 
2008). This implies that intergovernmental grants should be just for supporting poor 
LGAs which cannot sustain their operations from own sources revenue. Secondly, local 
taxes should be raised from static economic units as much as possible, to avoid economic 
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distortion (Oates, 1999; Bird and Vaillancourt, 2008). The rationale is that, charging 
taxes on mobile sources would encourage them to shift from one jurisdiction to another 
with a more favourable tax burden. This movement is undesirable because it can create 
unnecessary interregional economic development imbalances; usually tax sources are 
also factors of production.  
 
Moreover, it is vital for the distribution of revenue sources to consider the consequential 
effect on the extent of revenue autonomy of LGAs. According to Dollery (2009), fiscal 
autonomy should give LGAs not only additional power to levy local taxes but also the 
freedom to determine local charges, fees and other revenue sources, vital for 
decentralisation success. It makes LGAs feel that they are part and parcel of reforms 
rather than implementation agents. In addition, sufficient revenue-raising autonomy 
enables LGAs to adjust the level of taxes according to their expenditure requirements 
and this can help to address vertical imbalances. In some cases, as Rodden (2002) and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2008) suggest, revenue-raising autonomy is used to assess LGAs’ 
ability to raise debt finance. This is used as an indicator of their credit worthiness, and 
that is why whenever LGAs depend heavily on central government transfers, credit 
rating agencies may evaluate the credit worthiness of the central government. The logic 
behind this is that it is the central government which provides the financial backup to 
LGAs. Limiting revenue autonomy makes LGAs become spending units of the central 
government because it also limits their expenditure autonomy (Brueckner, 2000; 
Neyapti, 2010). Thus, revenue-raising autonomy is an essential component in the design 
and operation of the fiscal system. Nevertheless, in practice LGAs may collect from in 
fewer tax sources than they are allowed to, either because of insufficient administrative 
capacity or over-reliance on intergovernmental transfers.  
 
Despite the emphasis placed on LGAs’ autonomy, being excessive is equally dangerous. 
One of the problems associated with excessive power in local taxation is the likelihood 
of accelerating horizontal fiscal imbalance between LGAs (Bird, 2011, Martinez-
Vazquez, 2008). Richer LGAs will be able to finance their expenditure more easily than 
poor LGAs. It is neither feasible nor desirable for LGAs to collect all their required 
revenue, but the general rule is to raise local taxes to their margin and not to operate with 
soft budget constraints (Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). In addition, Bird and Vaillancourt’s 
(2008) specific principles should guide an ideal local taxation system. These include 
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taxing relatively static tax sources; the tax proceeds should increase as expenditure 
increases; and tax proceeds must be stable and predictable. The tax should also be seen 
as reasonable and fair to the tax payers, as well as administratively efficient and 
effective. For the tax to qualify as local tax, Bird (2011) identifies five criteria that must 
all be met, the LGA’s influence on: (i) whether to levy or not, (ii) identification of 
specific tax base, (iii) setting the tax rate, (iv) administration of tax collection, and (v) 
retaining all collected revenues. However, he concludes that, in practice, it is 
inconclusive as to whether a particular country has an ideal local taxation system. This 
conclusion is based on the difficulty of establishing a system that meets all the criteria. 
Similarly, Martinez-Vazquez (2008) notes that no single acceptable system exists that 
suits all countries. Instead, the history of the country and its institutions are most 
important. It is therefore not surprising to find different countries have different local 
tax systems. The most important aspect is that the system should not lead to worse 
outcomes than hitherto experienced success.  
 
The proportion of own source revenue collection to their total revenue budget is 
normally regarded as the main indicator of LGAs’ tax autonomy (Simanjuntak and 
Mahi, 2005). On the basis of this indicator, Bird (2011) concludes that LGAs in 
developed countries have greater autonomy than developing and emerging countries. 
Using IMF data of 2002, his study shows the average revenues collected by sub-national 
governments of six developed countries was 30.2%, compared to 28.8% for seven 
emerging countries. However, a huge discrepancy is noted when comparing the two 
groups in terms of minimum revenue collection percentage. Indonesia had the lowest 
(2.9%) out of emerging countries group, while out of the developed country group 17% 
was the lowest (Spain). These figures support the argument of Bahl (2000), that 
developing and transition countries have limited choices in assigning tax autonomy to 
LGAs. As a result, their LGAs are heavily dependent on intergovernmental transfers. 
 
3.7.2 Intergovernmental Transfers 
The intergovernmental revenue transfer system is an essential and integral part in fiscal 
decentralisation. It plays three vital roles: internalisation of spillover benefits, 
equalisation of LGAs’ fiscal needs, and improving the whole tax system (Oates, 1999; 
Bird, 2011). In the absence of intergovernmental transfers, it is likely that those services 
which also benefit residents of other jurisdictions will be given low priority. LGAs 
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would give high priority to financing those activities which solely benefit their own 
residents, limiting spillover benefits to citizens of other jurisdictions. In reality, 
geographical boundaries indicate administrative demarcation between LGAs but they do 
not bar residents of one LGA from consuming the services of others (Oates, 1999). Thus 
the first reason for intergovernmental transfers is to enable LGAs to internalise their 
financing of activities which would also benefit residents of other LGAs. In other words, 
intergovernmental revenue transfers are used to match expenditure requirements for 
services which are also consumed by residents of other jurisdictions. 
 
The second reason for intergovernmental transfers is to equalise the spending needs of 
LGAs. Disparities in fiscal capacity among LGAs mean they have different capabilities 
in financing their functions in the absence of fiscal support from higher government. If 
LGAs are left with more power to raise revenues, fiscal disparities will increase because 
of regional differences in tax bases. Urban LGAs, for instance, are known to have 
stronger tax bases and administrative infrastructures than their rural counterparts (Bahl, 
2000). Richer LGAs would be able to finance their functions more comfortably than 
poor LGAs. Thus the criteria used for distributing grants to LGAs are of considerable 
importance in equalising their spending needs (Le Grand, 1975; Oakland, 1994); they 
should ensure that LGAs have similar spending capacity to deliver their functions, 
regardless of differences in service preferences. In practice, expenditure tasks devolved 
to LGAs in many countries substantially exceed their capacity in own source revenue 
collection (Bird, 2011). As a result, LGAs depend heavily on intergovernmental 
transfers to meet them. A well designed grant allocation system is very important in 
addressing disparities in the fiscal capacity of any country. However, the impotence of 
intergovernmental transfers in addressing fiscal capacity disparities is extremely high in 
developing and transition countries (Bahl, 2000), because their public sectors are 
characterised by wider differences in tax capacity among regions.  
 
The third role of intergovernmental transfers is to improve the overall tax system within 
a country. This is an intermediary role in deciding tax sources that should be collected 
by either parts of the government, central or LGAs. However, the administrative 
capacity to assess and collect taxes makes most sources more effectively collected by 
central government (Bahl, 2000). The reason for this, as discussed in subsection 3.7.1, 
is that central government is better able to assess and collect taxes, making it superior in 
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terms of administrative efficiency in collection of most taxes. Therefore, the central 
government can collect taxes from many sources at less cost than LGAs. Thereafter, the 
transfer system can be used to distribute the proceeds to LGAs. Moreover, the 
intergovernmental transfer system reduces the possibility of unhealthy competition 
among LGAs, an essential component in improving the overall tax system. Instead of 
LGAs competing unhealthily to enhance their tax bases to finance all of their 
expenditure, transfers offer assurance on the availability of at least part of the needed 
finances. Nevertheless, there are some revenue sources, such as property taxes, licensing 
fees and user charges, which are better administered by LGAs. LGAs can collect 
revenues from such sources not only cost efficiently but also at customised rates 
according to specific environment of every LGA so the administration of these sources 
is better left to LGAs.  
 
Generally, there are two approaches that any country may apply to distribute 
intergovernmental grants to LGAs. The first is the derivation approach, whereby the size 
of the grant is based on the amount of tax the central government collects from the 
population of each LGA (Bahl, 2000). A good example is found in Indonesia, where 
taxes from natural resources are shared through the derivation approach5. The second 
approach is the use of a formula to distribute fiscal resources from the central 
government to its LGAs. The amount distributed to each is calculated according to their 
gap on fiscal resources requirement. When an equalising formula is sought, Schneider 
(2002) identifies four criteria. The first is the needs-capacity gap, which is based on the 
differences between fiscal requirements and revenue raising capacity. The second is 
based on differences in LGAs’ revenue capacity; it just considers differences in tax 
capacity. The third is the use of service requirement indicators such as area, population, 
population density, infrastructure conditions and income per capita. These indicators are 
used as a proxy for service requirements that ultimately dictate fiscal needs. Such service 
indicators are found in distribution formulae for general purpose grants to LGAs in 
Indonesia. The Indonesian formula incorporates population, area, cost differences and 
poverty level (Brodjonegoro and Martinez-Vazquez, 2004). The fourth criterion is a 
grant equalisation formula based solely on equality of per capita income. In this 
approach LGAs receive grants reflecting differences in the per capita income of their 
                                                          
5 Discussion on Indonesian intergovernmental fiscal relations is provided by Brodjonegoro and Martinez- 
Vazquez (2004) Chapter 8 in Alm, J, Martinez-Vazquez, J and Mulyani, S.(eds) 
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residents. However, regardless of the criteria in use, the outcome of equalising grants 
(Oates, 1999) is for LGAs to receive grants according to their fiscal needs. This will also 
enhance their relative financial sustainability.  
 
Despite intergovernmental grants being a vital source of finance, they should not be 
excessive to the extent of undermining LGAs’ fiscal discipline (Oates, 1999). Heavy 
reliance on central government revenue transfers may lead to soft budget practices. This 
increases the risk of experiencing financial difficulties and even raises the question of 
whether resources are spent for the better interest of the people being served. When LGA 
officials become assured of a flow of funds in the form of grants to finance their 
organisational budgets, they may relax their efforts to collect revenues within their 
capacity. Italy is an example of countries that suffered the problem of soft budget 
constraint before its reforms of 2000 (Arachi and Zanardi, 2004). LGA officials had no 
incentive to manage their local taxes because any deficits were financed by grants 
pegged to health sector standards. In addition, LGAs had autonomy to raise taxes within 
a specified limit but they did not exercise this because intergovernmental transfers 
offered a guarantee. Apart from the soft budget constraint problem, Rodden (2002) 
claims that excessive use of grants limits the ability of voters to call to account the 
financial indiscipline of local officials. Rodden continues that the empirical literature 
shows that grants accelerate greater expenditure than does a similar increase in own 
source revenues. This is due to the missing link between benefits and source of finance; 
individuals view grants from different angles from own sources. The use of grants makes 
residents, who are the voters, feel that their expenditure is financed by non-residents. 
Therefore, even if there is financial indiscipline, they may not penalise LGA officials.  
 
However, one way of addressing soft budgets constraints, as Hy et al. (1993) suggest, is 
to incorporate LGAs’ tax efforts in grant allocation formulae. LGAs will become 
motivated to increase efficiency in their own source collection if they know in advance 
that their taxation is considered in grant allocation formulae. For instance, according to 
Arachi and Zanardi (2004), reforms in intergovernmental fiscal relationships in Italy 
which were completed in 2000 aimed to address soft budget constraints. The new system 
was designed to equalise up to 90% of the differences in own source revenue per capita, 
leaving 10% to be financed through expansion of local taxes. Moreover, the central 
government eliminated discretionary transfers and abolished constraints on the use of 
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revenue. All this was done to encourage LGAs to increase their tax raising and give them 
freedom to spend revenue on any programme they wished.  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that an ideal grant allocation system is one which not 
only provides financial support to LGAs but also motivates their efficiency in own 
sources revenue mobilisation. The system should be designed to reward higher tax 
efforts and penalise least tax effort. In this case, LGAs will be encouraged to optimise 
their own tax collection effort because they will be aware in advance of the rewards and 
penalties attached to grant allocation. In the US, Canada and Australia, for instance, their 
grant allocation systems consider revenues that LGAs would collect if they exerted 
average tax effort as a control mechanism (Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). In 
Africa, the importance of grant allocation system for establishing interregional equity 
and income redistribution is enhanced by less population mobility because people value 
their regional affiliated identities irrespective of their income level (Prud’homme, 2003). 
However, for this to work out the system should not tolerate inefficiencies.  
 
3.7.3 Local Borrowing 
LGAs can use borrowing as a source of finance in addition to own source revenues and 
intergovernmental transfers, and can be used to enhance financial sustainability. As Alm 
and Indrawati (2004) state, when LGAs are vested with sufficient autonomy to raise 
revenues and make expenditure decisions, this can also extend to borrowing. However, 
the use of debt finance in LGAs depends on a country’s specific regulations and policies. 
It is these policies and regulations which determine the extent of autonomy as well as 
reflecting the decentralisation system. Therefore, the design and operationalisation of 
the fiscal decentralisation system will determine the ability of LGAs to use borrowing. 
In local government finance, borrowing is useful in two main ways. First, as Alm and 
Indrawati (2004) explain, borrowing can be used to cover short-term variations in the 
revenue flow so as to ensure smooth provision of public services. Unpredictability of 
revenue flow may hinder not only LGAs’ operations but also attainment of overall 
decentralisation. “In most countries, the predictability of transfers from higher levels of 
government is key to enabling sub national governments to finance their basic service 
delivery or infrastructure investments” (Martinez-Vazquez and Searle, 2007:9). 
Therefore if LGAs can predict the flow of revenue versus expenditure, they may plan to 
use borrowing to cover any foreseen short-term mismatch.  
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Secondly, borrowing can be used to finance capital projects whose benefits extend to 
future generations (Alm and Indrawati, 2004). The existing capacity of an LGA might 
be insufficient to finance such capital projects. However, because their benefits extend 
beyond the current generation, the use of debt finance is justifiable. In this case, future 
generations will enjoy the benefits as well as bearing a fair share of the cost through 
taxation. Moreover, Alm and Indrawati (2004) argue that the use of borrowing in LGAs 
conforms to the principle of subsidiarity. This principle requires decisions and provision 
of government services to be made at the lowest possible efficient level and the benefits 
to fall within the area. Thus LGAs represents best-decision units whose decisions are in 
favour of the community they are serving. If this is the case, then financing capital 
projects through borrowing represents best decisions whose benefits are compatible with 
the needs of the LGA’s citizens. 
Given the importance of credit finances and impacts, Weist (2007) suggests that 
intergovernmental transfer systems should be designed to consider the borrowing 
capacity of LGAs. She proposes that many of the development projects of LGAs which 
have strong credit worthiness be financed with borrowing so that grants can be 
channelled to LGAs which are less creditworthy. Therefore the equalisation of LGAs’ 
capacity should be viewed from a broader perspective to incorporate borrowing 
capacity, instead of considering own source revenues only. Furthermore, when 
borrowing is allowed it can automatically regulate soft budget practices in LGAs. LGAs 
will be facing two options: either, they should exert greater effort so that they can raise 
sufficient finance to cover their expenditure, or exert less effort and then cover the 
shortfall by borrowing. A good example is provided in the study of Hull and Searle 
(2007), which shows the interrelationship between taxation, service level and borrowing. 
The interpretation of the findings shows that revenue raising effort tends to be above 
average when sub-government units provide above average services, and vice versa. 
However, when sub-government units choose lower tax efforts than expenditure 
requires, they have to borrow above average to finance the difference to support their 
service level.  
Similarly, Oates (2008) shows that the use of borrowing in countries with well-
developed and efficient capital markets tends to discipline LGAs with soft budget 
practices, through higher borrowing costs and limited access. In such instances, LGAs 
will be forced to operate with hard budget constraints, especially when the central 
government refuses to provide a rescue package. Otherwise, they will not be able to 
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deliver their responsibilities effectively because of financial difficulties. In the US, for 
instance, the federal government strictly refuses to offer any package to bail out states 
facing fiscal difficulties (Inman, 2003). The precedent was set in the 1840s when the 
federal government rejected fiscal assistance to eight troubled states. This disciplines 
LGAs in debt policies to avoid financial difficulties.  
On the other hand, allowing the use of borrowing in LGAs can be dangerous, particularly 
when there are no strong control mechanisms in the fiscal system. It may exacerbate soft 
budget practices instead of controlling them. In the absence of strong control 
mechanisms, LGAs may borrow to finance capital projects which are not economically 
justifiable (Alam and Indrawati, 2004). This might be backed by expectations of LGAs 
to get assistance from the central government when they fail to repay the loans. This can 
distort the fiscal condition of the whole government. Thus Oates (2005) insists that, 
despite the intention of central government to resist providing bailout assistance, what 
matters is the credibility of their assertions. If LGAs believe that the central government 
will not act firmly on its decision, they may have strong reasons to participate in fiscal 
deficit policies through the use of borrowing in their financing decisions.  
In general, the use of debt finance in LGAs requires special attention so that its benefits 
can be realised, while simultaneously controlling the likelihood of negative impacts. 
Weist (2007) identified five aspects that should characterise municipal credit systems. 
These are presence of creditworthy LGAs, presence of projects which are viable, 
availability of credit and financial institutions or capital markets, existence of a 
supportive intergovernmental system, and a sound regulatory framework. These aspects 
can be incorporated in the design of fiscal decentralisation if borrowings are to make 
part of financing options to LGAs. 
3.8 Structure and Roles of LGAs 
The structure and functions of LGAs are mainly determined by the central-local relations 
in accordance with the country’s specific provisions and/or policies. This means that the 
functions and responsibilities of LGAs differ from one country to another, although in 
most cases they look similar. According to Olowu (2012), in many cases the extent of 
the power and authority of LGAs is dependent on the willingness of the central 
government to surrender some of its powers. However, he also identifies other cases, 
like Colombia and Bolivia, which reflect the outcome of the struggle from below. In 
such countries, the devolution of power from central government to LGAs was more of 
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an outcome of people’s initiative than the willingness of the central government 
authority. However, in either case the power and authority of LGAs are usually 
determined according to the design of the central-local relations. This can be through 
the constitution, legislation, policies or any other means. As Morphet (2008) points out, 
reform such as decentralisation reshapes the whole state because LGAs and central 
governments are not mutually independent.  
 
The experiences from different countries show that there are many ways in which power 
and its limitations are granted to LGAs. In the US, for instance, Dillion’s rule has 
established the limit of power and authority to LGAs since 1868 (Bowman and Kearney, 
2011); LGAs can only exercise powers that are absolutely essential to the objectives that 
brought them into existence. Thus, state authorities govern LGAs within their 
jurisdiction. In Australia, LGAs are governed by legislation enacted by states and 
territory governments which determines the extent of their powers and activities 
(Dollery et al., 2007). In the UK, LGAs are governed by a number of laws which define 
their roles and functions; any action against them may be instructed by the court to stop, 
and be considered as ultra vires (Chandler, 2009). However, Olowu (2012) concludes 
that, generally, LGAs in western and industrialised countries exist as statutory bodies, 
although they are creatures of the national governments; while in most developing 
countries the conditions for LGAs are stipulated in their national constitutions. 
 
The constitutionalising of LGAs is intended to provide a balance and to protect LGAs 
from the vulnerability of central government officials who fear to the loss of power. 
Examples of constitutions which stipulate the existence of LGAs include Bolivia, 
Colombia, Brazil, India, Philippines, South Korea, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa and 
Uganda (Olowu, 2012). In these countries, the powers and responsibilities of LGAs are 
laid down in the constitution. In Tanzania, the existence and function of LGAs are 
stipulated in Local Government Acts, although their existence is also enshrined in the 
constitution. However, the structures and protection needed to bring LGAs into 
existence makes them inferior in central-local relations. LGAs’ capacity to participate 
and to have influence in decisions, even those which affect their operations, becomes 
limited considering that their very existence requires constitutional protection. This is 
not the case in some developed countries whose LGAs have influence when it comes to 
matters that negatively affect their operations and/or existence. Elcock (2005) explains 
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that in the UK, for instance, local authorities formed three main representative 
associations to negotiate and argue with the central government against unwelcome 
policies. These are the Association of Metropolitan Authorities, the Association of 
County Councils, and the Association of District Councils. In the US, the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) enacted in 1959 undertakes the 
coordination role. The ACIR was established to ensure smooth cooperation and 
operation of the different tiers of government, coordinates the work of federal, state and 
local government within the government system. In Australia, The Commonwealth 
Grants Commission was established in 1933 to take charge of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. 
 
In central-local relations, it is important for the structure to establish a clear definition 
of the roles and functions of LGAs in order to avoid confusion. Overlapping of powers 
and functions between different tiers of government brings confusion which may result 
in a waste of resources. As identified in the theoretical framework chapter, it is better 
for LGAs to provide services that meet local preferences and for central government to 
take charge of the functions whose scope is beyond local government. However, despite 
this proposition, the willingness and philosophies of the central government influence 
the way reforms are designed and/or operationalised in practice. In the UK, for instance, 
LGAs have gone through a number of changes over time in order to match the 
philosophy of the government in power. The Thatcher administration abolished six 
metropolitan counties in 1983 (Davies, 1990) only because the values of the LGAs 
seemed to contradict central government policies (Elcock, 2005). However, when the 
Labour government came to power in 1997 it initiated a modernisation programme that 
enhanced the autonomy of LGAs (Morphet, 2008). All these cases show that the central 
government can devolve or remove power and functions from LGAs at will. Olowu 
(2012) also identifies cases in which central governments had to victimise LGAs instead 
of supporting them, just to avoid competition and being overshadowed.  This was 
prevalent in the immediate post-colonial leadership particularly in Africa. Governments 
excessively centralised powers to the extent of manipulating laws in order to weaken 
LGAs. 
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3.8.1 Roles of LGAs in Relation to Service Provision  
LGAs play a vital role in society’s wellbeing in any country, despite functional 
differences from one country to another. Their importance in delivering expenditure 
functions efficiently increases when the country is particularly large, and heterogeneous 
in resources or ethnically (Neyapti, 2010). They are assumed to take charge of local 
developments through the improvements of local production systems and the living 
standards of their people. Specifically, Chandler (2001) identified a range of tasks 
usually assigned to LGAs worldwide, either as basic/inexpensive or expensive tasks. 
Basic tasks include solid waste collection, pavement and minor roads, street lighting, 
parks and recreational areas, while expensive tasks include education services, rented 
housing services, social services, hospitals and healthcare, and police control and public 
safety.  
 
However, the nature of the services and the capacity of LGAs to run them depends on 
the country’s central-local system design. In Germany and the US, LGAs can run even 
utilities like gas and electricity (Chandler, 2001), while in other countries, such as 
Australia, LGAs have a very limited capacity. LGAs in Australia are responsible only 
for local roads, refuse collection and disposal, and maintenance of buildings, but not 
education, health, policing or public housing (Jones and Walker, 2007). In more general 
terms, LGAs are the first point of resort in any communities and are there to support the 
local communities (Morphet, 2008).  
 
In the international development forums, LGAs are considered to be key agents towards 
local sustainability and in addressing poverty (Lindert and van Verkoren, 2010). They 
are considered to play an essential role in economic development and poverty reduction 
in most developing countries. In these countries LGAs foster integration and 
implementation of societies’ development plans for addressing infrastructure challenges 
(Olowu, 2012), and for basic rural roads, community health, elementary education 
services, rural water supply and sanitation. However, these LGAs also face a number of 
challenges of less significance in developed countries, such as insufficient staff, 
insufficient professional training of available staff, unsatisfactory incentives and poor 
record keeping (Olowu and Smoke, 1992).  
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The roles of LGAs have changed with time from traditional to being more engaged. 
More new functions have been entrusted to LGAs in the modern age than before. For 
example in the UK, the Local Government Act 2000 charged LGAs with the wider role 
of not only promoting social welfare but also taking the leading role in economic and 
social development in their area (Chandler, 2001). In 1997, the incoming UK Labour 
government completely changed the way local governments were operating, entrusting 
them with the role of coordinating other public and private organisation partnerships in 
various projects within their area for the better prosperity of their society and the country 
in general. Their target was that 80% of all public services be offered by local 
government more autonomously than under the Conservative administration, and central 
government directed LGAs to specific targets (Morphet, 2008). The importance of 
LGAs in the UK became increased to the extent of being seen as defenders of local 
opinions and values against perceived extravagant, tyrannical and inefficient central 
government leadership (Elcock, 2005). In addition, LGAs provide employment 
opportunities which ultimately contribute to the national economy. In countries such as 
China, Australia, Germany, USA and Canada, by 2000 more than 80% of the total 
government employees were in LGAs (Olowu, 2012). 
 
3.9 Meaning and Background of Financial Sustainability in LGAs 
The word sustainability in relation to organisation performance refers to the ability to 
accomplish stated missions and serve stakeholders over time (Abt Associates, 1994). 
When considering this meaning, sustainability in LGAs refers to their ability to serve 
local communities over time. This is not a one-off event that LGAs have to attain then 
relax; it is an ongoing process. It corresponds with the way decentralisation devolves 
responsibilities to LGAs, rarely one-off tasks. From the same viewpoint, Dollery and 
Crase (2006) and Dodor et al. (2009) define financial sustainability as the ability of 
LGAs to meet service delivery expenditure obligations on a continuing basis, ensuring 
financial healthiness of the LGAs both short and long term. Generally, financial 
sustainability refers to the degree to which the existing level of services and creditor 
requirements can be met without increasing the burden on the economy. It includes not 
only the ability to raise sufficient revenue but also the way revenue and expenditure 
functions are exercised. In this regard, having higher fiscal capacity is essential but it 
does not necessarily imply that an LGA is financially sustainable. If an LGA struggles 
to meet its expenditure obligations as they fall due, it can be considered as financially 
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unsustainable. This can happen when there is a mismatch between the expenditure 
pattern and revenue flows.  
 
Other terminologies used closely or interchangeably with financial sustainability are 
financial condition, financial stress, financial health, fiscal strain, and fiscal condition 
(Dollery and Crase 2006; Cabaleiro et al, 2012). For instance, Van Helden (2000) 
defines financial stress as the LGA’s inability to meet near-future financial obligations. 
Kloha et al. (2005) define financial distress on a long- or short-term basis as the inability 
to meet standards in operating position, debt repayment, community needs and resource 
requirements over the foreseeable future. Walker and Jones (2006, p.355) define 
financial distress as “an inability to deliver services at pre-existing levels”. On the other 
hand, Lin and Raman (1998) provide an extended meaning of fiscal health to include 
not only good financial capacity but also the ability to maintain the prevailing service 
level that reflects the taxation level. Hendrick (2004) defines fiscal health in terms of 
ability to meet financial and service obligations. The Government Accounting Standard 
Board in the US (GASB, 1987) defines financial condition in terms of government’s 
ability to meet current and future services obligations (Zafra-Gomez et al., 2009), while 
Kioko (2013) defines it in terms of the ability to meet current and future obligations as 
they come due, throughout the fiscal year, while maintaining the existing service level. 
Cabaleiro et al. (2012) summarise various terms and definitions used by different 
authors, concluding that the use of various terms brings ambiguity in understanding 
differences, although in many cases the terms have similar meanings and are used 
interchangeably. 
 
This study uses these terminologies interchangeably to mean the ability of LGAs to meet 
expenditure on public services on a continuing basis. It adopts the framework of 
Hendrick (2004) and the CICA to assess an LGA’s financial health over time and in 
comparison with others. As noted previously, financial health is an essential aspect if 
LGAs are to meet their functions and responsibilities effectively. Factors which 
influence LGAs’ spending also influence their financial health (Whitaker, 1985). Since 
decentralisation influences LGAs’ expenditure functions, it also has an influence on 
financial sustainability. Well designed decentralisation reforms are expected to ensure 
the availability of resources to LGAs in accordance with their assigned responsibilities. 
Although being financially sustainable does not guarantee LGAs success in delivering 
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their functions and reforms in general, it is a necessary condition for sustaining the level 
and quality of services offered (Huang and Ho, 2013). Weak financial sustainability has 
negative implications for existing as well as near-future operations of LGAs. According 
to Helden (2000), an LGA which is financially unhealthy implies that: 
i. It has few funds at its disposal to cope with existing service provision 
expenditure on a continuing basis, or any likely additional financial requirements 
in the future. 
ii. It suffers or will have to deal with financial deficit in the near future, which may 
be reflected in unavoidable expenditure budget cuts in order to stay healthy.  
iii. It has few opportunities for raising additional revenues required in the existing 
period and in the future. 
 
3.9.1 Why Evaluate the Financial Sustainability of LGAs? 
The task of assessing the financial sustainability of LGAs is an organisational 
performance indicator that aims to identify their strengths and/or weaknesses, over 
different periods of time or in comparison to each other. It is useful in acknowledging 
the past and present situation and is vital for future strategies (Tehrani et al., 2012). 
Various groups have interest in the financial sustainability of LGAs for different reasons. 
Adequate financial health is a precondition for attainment of objectives in any 
organisation (Cabaleiro et al., 2012). So whoever is interested in the success of LGAs in 
delivering their functions should be concerned with their level of financial sustainability. 
In addition, there might be other players whose interests are associated with LGAs’ 
ability to meet their financial obligations.  
 
Justice and Scorsone (2012) provide a detailed explanation of how different groups 
might be seriously concerned with LGAs’ financial health. According to these authors, 
stakeholders in the municipal bond market are likely to be interested in LGAs’ ability to 
make timely payments. Reformers and decision makers are concerned with financial 
health and possible reasons for the prevailing financial condition. They need to know 
the areas of strength in the system design with regard to financial sustainability, and 
areas of weakness for improvement. Individual LGAs and elected officials would wish 
to know their financial health relative to other authorities, and the extent to which they 
can sustain the desired service level from period to period. Taxpayers and the community 
in general would wish to have satisfactory services on a continuing basis, while vendors 
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are concerned with the ability of their clients (LGAs) to pay merchandise supply 
obligations and service contracts. 
 
The importance of evaluating financial sustainability of LGAs is increased when 
considering the possibilities of dealing with it. LGAs have few options for dealing with 
financial difficulties, as compared to private sector organisations. In the private sector, 
financially poor institutions are either taken over or exit the market through a bankruptcy 
declaration and/or liquidation. Such options are not available to public organisations, 
particularly LGAs, except in a few countries such as the US (Hendrick, 2011) and Italy, 
where LGAs can declare bankruptcy. Therefore evaluating financial sustainability will 
help to ensure that LGAs operate smoothly and any potential consequences are dealt 
with while they are still at an early stage. The financial health of LGAs is essential not 
only for their own performances but also for the stability and efficiency of the public 
finance system of the whole country (Ma, 2001). 
 
Financial sustainability determines the ability of local government to deliver what is 
expected of them in the course of meeting the service demands of their local 
communities. It is an indicator of LGAs’ ability to meet their financial and service 
obligations (Huang and Ho, 2013; Honadle et al., 2004). An LGA which is financially 
unhealthy cannot sustain service delivery at the same level, in quantity and/or quality 
terms, compared to a financially healthy authority. In the environment of 
decentralisation reforms, where service delivery responsibilities of LGAs are gradually 
increased, the concern is not just to meet the current level of services, but also to be able 
to cope with the trend of the increase in responsibility. The execution of reforms takes 
time; therefore as service delivery obligations are devolved down to LGAs, it is 
important for them to have sufficient financial capacity to deal with them. Otherwise, 
the financial status of LGAs will be suppressed with the increase in responsibilities.  
 
Whenever LGAs experience financial difficulties, they may decide to significantly cut 
down expenditure in order to deal with it (Skidmore and Scoresone, 2011). However, 
the consequences of this option will fall on the service recipients because service level 
and/or quality will deteriorate along with the poor financial condition. In this respect, 
Carmeli (2007) found a positive relationship between LGAs’ financial health and the 
level of service offered. LGAs in Israel with poor financial health were found to deliver 
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poor services in subsequent years. Also, the findings of Nelson (2012) indicate that 
distressed municipalities in the US reduced the provision of various public services in 
order to cut expenditure, to mitigate the situation. For example, some municipalities 
were found to reduce retirees’ health benefits while others had to cancel major 
community events.  
 
Financially healthier LGAs can provide higher infrastructural support to both 
individuals and business than can weak LGAs. For instance, Nelson (2012) found weak 
financial conditions resulted in delaying capital projects and deferring maintenance of 
municipal buildings or even minor upgrades. The practice was found to be a common 
source of expenditure reduction in half (of 16) of the financially weak LGAs. Skidmore 
and Scoresone (2011) also found capital expenditure was vulnerable to reductions during 
financial difficulties in Michigan Municipalities, a significant impact on municipal 
infrastructure. In addition, financial sustainability influences residential and business 
location decisions (Honadle et al., 2004; Carmeli, 2007) and this is closely linked to the 
ability of LGAs to provide sustainable public services. Individuals and businesses prefer 
to establish residence and/or business locations in financially sustainable municipalities. 
The findings of Lin and Raman (1998) provide evidence which supports this argument. 
They found the financial condition of an LGA is a relevant attribute in property values, 
hence influences the location of homeowners.  
 
In a situation where financial conditions differ among LGAs, it increases the likelihood 
of regional disparities between them. Thus, the fiscal system should address it from 
design through to implementation. Despite the second-generation fiscal decentralisation 
theories to encourage competition among LGAs in order to attract investment and hence 
expand their tax base, the effect should not extend to causing variations in their financial 
sustainability. The competition should aim at promoting efficiency in planning and 
service delivery. Moreover, it can be argued that applicability of second-generation 
theories in countries with LGAs whose own source revenue capacity differs 
significantly, is limited. The experience from Italy supports this argument. Arachi and 
Zanardi (2004) conclude that poor LGAs in Italy cannot benefit from tax competition 
because rich LGAs are able to attract more investments. This feature is commonly found 
in developing countries where urban LGAs have a stronger base than rural LGAs 
(Smoke, 1993). Financially weak LGAs cannot compete with strong ones in supporting 
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infrastructure if the system is not well designed and/or operationalised. Richer 
authorities will be able to finance their expenditure at a lower tax rate than poorer 
authorities (Buchanan, 1950; Aronson, 1977). Thus, financially healthier LGAs will be 
attractive to individuals and businesses, hence expanding their tax base as well as the 
gap with weak LGAs (Prud’homme, 1995). Therefore, an ideal decentralisation system 
would ensure redistribution of income to all LGAs to avoid concentration of individuals 
and businesses in few municipalities. 
 
Moreover, financial sustainability has an impact on LGAs’ ability to raise debt finance, 
especially when the regulations of a particular country allow them to access borrowings. 
LGAs with a poor financial condition will find it difficult to raise debt finance, or they 
will get debt finance at a higher cost. A good example is provided by Kloha et al. (2005): 
in developed economies where LGAs can access capital markets, such as the US, 
financial sustainability determines bond ratings and may lead to a declaration of 
bankruptcy in the worst scenario. The US has a bankruptcy code which provides 
procedures on municipalities’ bankruptcy affairs, which is why it is possible for its 
LGAs to declare bankruptcy. According to Hendrick (2011), a number of US cities and 
suburban municipalities have experienced financial difficulties at least once since the 
1970s. These include New York City in 1975, Cleveland and Ohio in 1978, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania in 1991, Buffalo, New York in 2003, Jefferson County, Alabama in 2008, 
and Vallejo, California in 2008. Moreover, Nelson (2012) discovered that out of sixteen 
US municipalities included in his study, at least three received lower bond rating as a 
consequence of fiscal distress between 2007 and 2010. 
 
In developing countries where LGAs’ access to public debt is limited, financial health 
affects credit purchases and procurement of service provision contracts, specifically, 
procurement of development projects which require huge financial outlay and 
commitment over a considerable period. Being financially weak puts LGAs in a weak 
position to negotiate such procurement contracts in development projects. Consequently, 
the economic base of financially sustainable LGAs will continue to flourish because they 
will be in a strong position to negotiate and implement development projects. They will 
have relatively good infrastructures that attract investment and individuals, hence 
expanding their tax base. Therefore, it can be argued that if the decentralisation system 
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does not address interregional disparities, then financially poor LGAs will continue to 
be poor. 
 
Honadle et al. (2004) provide another reason for the importance of financial 
sustainability, which is to enhance LGAs’ flexibility to deal with unforeseen events and 
to attract high-quality human resources. Financially healthier LGAs are more flexible in 
response to the changing needs of services provision than are weak LGAs. Also, there 
are unforeseen events, such as the eruption of pandemic diseases or natural calamities, 
which require financial flexibility to deal with them. Although an LGA might have a 
budget set aside for unforeseen events, the budgeted amount and ability will not be the 
same between LGAs with different degrees of financial health. Likewise, when it comes 
to human capital, financially healthier LGAs can more readily attract highly qualified 
personnel than weak LGAs, as they will be able to offer attractive financial pay and 
incentive packages. Even in a country where recruitment and payroll of LGA staffs is 
done by the central government, as in the case of Tanzania, financial health is still vital, 
as it determines the ability to meet other, non-salary incentive packages which are 
administered at LGA level. In addition, it determines the likelihood of honouring 
professional expertise and meeting targets, which is important for job satisfaction. Any 
rational qualified personnel would prefer to work in an LGA that not only values but 
also implements the professional expertise he/she contributes, and attains targets. 
Financially weak LGAs may value expert advice but they are likely to be constrained in 
attracting the personnel.  
 
Furthermore, closely related to attracting human capital, financial sustainability has an 
impact on the employment rate. LGAs which are financially weak will not be able to 
take on new recruits. Also, even maintaining existing employees will be difficult if an 
LGA is facing a declining financial condition, because it may opt to reduce expenditure 
through cutting down payroll costs. For instance, Nelson (2012) found municipalities 
had to lay off some workers so as cut down costs as part of expenditure reduction in 
order to mitigate a weak financial condition; some municipalities increased the use of 
volunteer opportunities instead of recruiting new staff. The impact of laying off staff is 
to increases the overall unemployment rate, which has a negative impact on the national 
economy.  
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3.9.2 Factors Influencing Financial Sustainability in LGAs 
There is an inherent link between LGAs’ financial sustainability and the design and 
operationalisation of the fiscal system, which forms the basis of central-local 
relationships. The fiscal system determines the responsibilities and sources of finance to 
LGAs, which subsequently determine their financial sustainability. In countries which 
implement decentralisation reforms, as in Tanzania, the design of the fiscal system and 
its operationalisation forms the heart of LGAs’ financial sustainability. It determines 
their ability to sustain the execution of entrusted functions that ultimately influence the 
success of the reform. Poor financial sustainability will limit LGAs in executing 
devolved functions, hence limiting the benefits of decentralisation. Therefore, the 
financial sustainability of LGAs is an embedded feature of the fiscal system design and 
implementation. Since fiscal decentralisation emphasises LGAs’ equity to avoid 
regional disparities, the fiscal system is expected to promote equitable financial 
sustainability to all LGAs. 
 
Despite the central-local relation being at the heart of financial sustainability, there are 
various specific factors which contribute to LGAs’ financial sustainability problems. 
Such factors are in two broad categories, internal and external. Internal factors are those 
which are within LGAs’ influence, while external factors are those beyond LGAs’ 
influence. However, Hendrick (2004) and Dodor et al. (2009) classified them differently. 
Hendrick classified such factors as organisational and environmental, while Dodor et al. 
(2009) classified them into three categories: financial, environmental and organisational 
factors. Honadle et al. (2004) have provided an exhaustive list of specific factors: the 
physical environment, the nation’s economic health, the LGA’s status and that of 
neighbouring LGAs, national economic development policies, changes in population, 
central government transfers, the autonomy level of the local officials, and public service 
demand within the locality. Some of these factors may be associated with 
decentralisation reforms while others may not be. 
 
The physical environment in which LGAs operate is identified as having an impact when 
it comes to determining the economic base for local taxation. LGAs which are located 
in geographically wealthy areas are in a better position to raise revenue than their 
counterparts. As Johnson et al. (1995) point out, the quality of services and infrastructure 
depends on the economic base because it affects LGAs’ ability to generate the required 
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revenue to support them. Furthermore, when economic conditions change within an 
LGA over time, the impact will also be reflected in the revenue-raising capacity. 
Skidmore and Scoresone (2011), for instance, claim that one of the major reasons 
contributing to Michigan’s financial hardship between 2001 and 2006 was the decline 
of the manufacturing sector, which formed its economic base. 
 
Although it may be difficult to contain short-term changes in LGAs’ physical conditions 
within the fiscal system, long-term ones can be integrated, hence limiting variations in 
LGAs’ financial sustainability. For instance, it is difficult to deal with variations in 
financial sustainability in LGAs which are heavily dependent on seasonal crops as their 
tax base, especially in developing countries where irrigation is limited. However, the 
situation can be minimised if a thorough analysis is undertaken to establish the need-
capacity gap before setting equalisation grant formulae. Also, if it happens that the 
national economic condition changes, it is expected that this will have a similar impact 
on LGAs’ financial conditions throughout the country. A good example is provided by 
Skidmore and Scoresone (2011), who explain that one of the reasons why LGAs in 
Michigan suffered financial hardship in 2007 was the structural deficit at the state level, 
which was reflected in revenue share. Thus in a unitary state, national economic 
deterioration will affect transfers to all LGAs. Any decline in central government’s 
ability to provide financial support because of the changes in economic conditions will 
affect all LGAs, instead of making some of them better off than others.  
 
Another factor that contributes to LGAs’ financial sustainability problems is the 
mismatch between the functions and their financing capacity. Factors which influence 
municipal spending also affect financial sustainability (Whitaker, 1985). If the 
decentralisation is designed to transfer more responsibilities to LGAs than resources 
available to them, LGAs are likely to experience financial difficulties. Bhattacharyya 
and Bandyopyadhyay (2012), for instance, found constitutional amendments of 1992 led 
to a mismatch between revenue and functions in Indian urban authorities. In such a 
situation, LGAs are hardly capable of meeting their service delivery expenditure on a 
continuing basis. The service level and/or quality are susceptible to deterioration. As 
Spahn (1999) suggests, LGAs can overcome the difficulties through varying output 
services. The mismatch between financial capacity and LGAs’ entrusted functions can 
be seen as a failure of fiscal system design. Spahn (1999) emphasises that as reform 
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vests allocation functions to local authorities, there is a need for consistence in revenue 
outlay in order to stabilise macro-economic objectives. 
 
Mismatch between the revenue flow and the expenditure pattern has also been identified 
as contributing to financial difficulties. One aspect of fiscal difficulties in LGAs is the 
requirement to meet immediate financial obligations as they fall due (Justice and 
Scorsone, 2012), that is, it is a liquidity issue. The fiscal system should consider not only 
availability of financial resources to LGAs but also predictable flows of the resources. 
The emphasis should be on both, in collecting own source revenues and in the flow of 
central government grants. LGAs should collect revenues from their own sources not 
only through their best efforts but also as a predictable flow so as to match them with 
their expenditure pattern. Failure to do this means they cannot meet their revenue targets, 
hence limiting their power to finance their activities. Similarly, the flow of central 
government transfers should be sufficiently predictable to enable LGAs to execute their 
plans on time. Otherwise, they will not be able to meet their budgets, which may result 
in some of their targeted activities being postponed or cancelled despite having been 
approved. Consequently, the attainment of decentralisation benefits becomes limited. 
The findings of Nelson (2012) provide a good example. He found some LGAs had to 
cancel major approved events while others had to delay development projects because 
of their financial difficulties.  
 
National development policies and regulations may influence the financial sustainability 
of LGAs. If such policies and regulations are not well designed, they may suppress the 
financial sustainability of LGAs, even treating LGAs unequally. Such unintended effects 
of policies can result in halting the financial sustainability of LGAs. It is unlikely for a 
country to design policies which aim to favour the financial sustainability of some LGAs 
and to halt it in others. Policies which aim to ban local taxes from some sources to benefit 
the whole economy, for instance, are likely to have a negative effect on the financial 
sustainability of all LGAs which use such a revenue source. However, there might be 
some LGAs which are more heavily reliant on such sources than others, in which case 
it is expected that any compensation scheme that aims to neutralise the impact will 
consider the differences. Moreover, national policies which aim to attract investment 
projects in certain regions are also likely to benefit LGAs located in that area. For 
instance, in Tanzania the export processing zone authority can declare an area to be a 
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special zone by providing tax incentives to attract investments that aim to produce export 
products. This provides an example of a situation in which a national policy may create 
favours for some LGAs but not others. 
 
Changes in population within LGAs have been identified as influencing financial 
sustainability in two ways. The first is associated with population increase, which 
implies increased demand for public services. The second is population decrease which 
implies a lower tax base and hence reduction in revenue collection. Hendrick (2004) 
provides an example from the US where the movement of individuals and businesses 
from city centres to the suburbs in the 1950s greatly affected fiscal health. It increased 
service demand in the suburbs, which were not prepared to provide them, and drained 
the revenue base of the centre. Increase and decrease in population might be due either 
to migration or to natural increase/decrease through birth and death; whichever the 
reason, the change should be incorporated in fiscal system design. In African countries, 
for instance, urban areas experience rapid population increase, which is a major 
challenge for public service provision (Olowu and Smoke, 1992). The population growth 
in these cities is caused by immigration, especially of the workforce, in search of 
employment opportunities and better services. A well designed fiscal system would 
ensure that the availability of essential services is balanced, while simultaneously 
promoting economic activities across regions to discourage undesired movement. Also, 
a natural population increase/decrease can be integrated in central government revenue 
transfers and LGAs’ plans because they can be forecast. 
 
Moreover, financial management decisions have an impact on financial sustainability 
(Skidmore and Scoresone, 2011). It is those decisions which can enhance or impair the 
ability of LGAs to collect revenue. They may include decisions on identifying new 
revenue sources and on how to enforce collection, which can affect financial 
sustainability. For instance, Nelson (2012) found that one LGA out of the sixteen he 
studied decided to form a task force comprising employees and independent experts to 
increase the effort on uncollected amounts as part of addressing financial difficulties. He 
found another LGA which decided to lease its gaol spare-capacity to other municipalities 
as a new source of revenue. Another example of financial management decisions is on 
using debt finance, although its excessive use is risky and LGAs have to strike a balance 
with their payment capacity. Similarly, decisions on using unsustainable revenue 
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sources tend to have only a short-term positive impact on financial health. Nelson (2012) 
also found that some LGAs decided to sell land, part of its long-term assets, as a source 
of revenue to mitigate the financial difficulties they were facing. This decision clearly 
provides only a short-term solution and is likely to accelerate financial difficulties in the 
future. When an LGA disposes of long-term assets that would generate revenue over 
time, its revenue raising capacity in the future becomes impaired.  
 
In addition, the introduction of tax limitation can contribute to financial sustainability 
problems in LGAs. Limits might be established for good reasons, but their impact will 
be to reduce LGAs’ revenue raising capacity, and their autonomy in responding to 
increase in financial demands. Some sources might be completely restricted while others 
are limited through the imposition of a maximum tax rate. In both cases, LGAs will be 
unable to stretch their capacity to respond to any increase in service demand, especially 
when their collection capacity is exhausted. For instance, Nelson (2012) found state caps 
and valuation limitations restricted LGAs in Michigan and California in raising property 
tax during financial hardship. 
 
3.9.3 Measuring Financial Sustainability in LGAs 
The task of evaluating the financial sustainability of LGAs is well organised in some 
developed countries, to the extent of having specific bodies responsible for it. In the US, 
for instance, the American Advisory Commission took initiatives to systematically 
evaluate the fiscal condition of its LGAs in the 1970s. The Commission made a first 
attempt in 1973 by establishing six warning indicators of local financial emergencies 
(Dollery and Crase 2006). Similarly, in the UK the National Audit Office is responsible 
for evaluating the financial sustainability of its local authorities. Zafra-Gomez (2009b) 
notes that, in February 2007, the UK Audit Commission published a paper which 
emphasises the need for councils to have sound financial resources to support services 
provision. Similarly, in 2013 the National Audit Office assessed the impact of a 26% 
gradual reduction in central government transfers to LGAs from April 2011 to March 
2015, as part of establishing their financial health. Meanwhile, Australia has financial 
sustainability boards which have been established as part of public sector reforms. 
According to Dollery and Crase (2006), such boards are responsible for setting financial 
indicators and evaluating the financial sustainability of LGAs. According to Cabaleiro 
et al. (2012) and Casal and Gomez (2011), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
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Canada has established a framework for assessing financial sustainability which also 
applies to LGAs. South Africa, too, established the Financial and Fiscal Commission in 
1994 which provides independent, technical advice on intergovernmental fiscal relations 
to central government. In its 2013 technical report, the Commission recommended that 
the government should develop an early warning system for evaluating financial distress 
in LGAs. Generally the trend shows governments are concerned with the financial 
sustainability of their local authorities. 
 
In the academic literature there are various studies that have attempted to assess financial 
sustainability of local authorities in different countries. To mention but a few: Brown 
(1993) developed a 10-point test for smaller cities in the US; Kloha et al. (2005) 
developed another 10-point scale for providing early warning in US states; Murray and 
Dollery (2005) developed a financial sustainability model in Australia; Zafra-Gomez et 
al. (2009a and 2009b) established financial sustainability models for Spanish LGAs; 
Cohen et al. (2012) measured financial sustainability of Greek LGAs; Jorge et al. (2006) 
and Alfonso and Fernandes (2008) assessed the financial sustainability of Portuguese 
LGAs; Ritonga et al. (2012) assessed the financial condition of local authorities in 
Indonesia; and Huang and Ho (2013) analysed the financial health of Taiwanese LGAs. 
The focus of many of these studies has been to establish models and techniques for 
evaluating LGAs’ financial sustainability independently of fiscal system design. 
However, they offer a very useful insight in terms of measurement indicators and 
approaches that can be considered in assessing the financial sustainability of LGAs in 
the context of decentralisation reforms. 
 
3.10 Measurement Indicators of Financial Sustainability 
Financial ratios have been key inputs in financial sustainability analysis. As Feroz et al. 
(2003) state, financial analysts have commonly used ratios to measure organisations’ 
performance over a number of years. Similarly, Modell (2004) concludes that reliance 
on quantitative indicators, primarily based on accounting information, has been common 
in performance measurement of public sector programmes. Ratios express the 
relationships between variables, and although the number of ratios from financial data 
sets is only limited by the scope of the analyst, just a subset can be meaningfully 
interpreted (Feroz et al., 2003). Thus, usefulness of ratios depends on the analyst’s 
objectives, which determine what should be measured.  
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In the private sector, ratios have been used for many years to analyse financial 
performance and assess the risk of corporate failure. Similarly, the use of financial 
indicators to analyse the financial health of LGAs has been in practice for over 30 years 
(Rivenbark et al., 2010), and they are valuable for analysing, interpreting and 
communicating financial. Financial ratios are used to develop quantifiable measures of 
financial health, developing an overall system that provides relationships between 
indicators and determining the overall financial health of an entity by tracking the 
direction and speed of the changes that take place in financial characteristics of an entity 
(Groves, Godsey and Shulman 1981; Rivenbark et al., 2010).  
 
Thus, a vast range of indicators has been used by different authors in analysing the 
financial health of LGAs in different countries and contexts (see appendix A). Some of 
these indicators are similar, while others differ from study to study. Factors and 
dimensions affecting LGAs’ fiscal condition in particular study settings have been major 
determinants of the measurement indicators used (Jung, 2008). The dimensions referred 
to are either short or long term, social-economic, political or demographic features. 
There is no single indicator which captures all the different dimensions that influence 
the financial sustainability of LGAs (Groves et al., 1981; Jung, 2008).  
 
The possibility of more than one factor influencing an organisation’s financial 
performance explains the existence of multiple indicators in financial sustainability 
studies. Financial health can be measured using short-term or long-term indicators 
(Kloha et a.l, 2005). The former consider the mismatch between committed expenditure 
and the resources available, while the latter consider revenue raising capacity relative to 
expenditures and commitment. CICA (2013) identifies three groups of measures: 
sustainability, flexibility and vulnerability. Sustainability refers to LGAs’s ability to 
maintain the existing service level and creditor requirements without increasing the debt 
burden on the economy. Flexibility refers to the ability to raise additional finance to 
respond to additional commitments. Vulnerability refers to the extent of dependence on 
external sources of finance which are outside LGAs’ control. In the US, the Government 
Accounting Standard Board considers the financial condition on the basis of net assets 
position, budget balance or the net cash position (Zafra-Gomez et al., 2009b). 
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In spite of the use of multiple variables, there are four common categories of 
measurement indicators for financial sustainability: cash solvency, budget solvency, 
long-term solvency and service-level solvency (Justice and Scorsone, 2012; Padovan 
and Scorsone, 2011; Honadle et al., 2004). Cash solvency measures liquidity, cash 
management and the ability to meet current liabilities; budgetary solvency measures the 
ability to generate sufficient revenue to finance the current services offered; long-term 
solvency measures the impact of existing long-term obligations on future resources; and 
service solvency measures the ability of the local authority to offer and sustain a service 
level desired by its citizens. The same four common dimensions are also promoted by 
the International City/County Management Association (Casal and Gomez, 2011); 
however, there is no consensus on which dimensions or indicators to use, although the 
conceptual framework and information availability are the main drivers of variable 
choice. Likewise, Jacob and Hendrick (2012) note the absence of a single best strategy. 
Instead, they insist on the ability of the analyst to understand the interrelationship 
between different dimensions that influence financial health, which should guide them 
in determining the best approach to measuring the financial condition. 
 
Cohen et al. (2012) used six financial ratios to evaluate the financial health of Greek 
municipalities. These ratios were obtained on the basis of the literature on both public 
and private sectors, and the underlying characteristics of the municipalities’ financial 
structure. Casal and Gomez (2011) used 34 indicators obtained on the basis of CICA 
and ICMA, while Zafra-Gomez et al. (2009b) used 13 financial indicators reflecting cash 
solvency, flexibility, independence, sustainability and service level. Cabaleiro et al. 
(2012) used 20 indicators in their assessment of the financial health of Spanish 
municipalities, based on the CICA framework. Ritonga et al. (2012) used 18 indicators 
to assess the financial condition in Indonesia. Lewis (2003) used only one indicator, 
surplus or deficit, to measure financial performance. 
 
3.11 Chapter Summary 
The review of the literature has shown that, through redistribution of resources, 
decentralisation offers the prospect of reducing poverty, enhancing equity and 
improving public services in general. In addition, decentralisation promotes social 
cohesion and poverty reduction through enhanced and equitable public services. Despite 
these promising benefits, studies suggests that the success of decentralisation is limited, 
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especially in developing countries, to the extent of questioning its desirability and the 
approach used. However, in response to this Litvack et al. (1998) decided that the debate 
on whether decentralisation is good or not is unproductive, because it is a worldwide 
phenomenon whose form varies significantly within and between countries. However, 
due to the failure of centralisation strategies to promote development and reduce poverty 
levels (Johnson, 1999), it is difficult to abandon decentralisation as long as the prospect 
exists. The emphasis should be on appropriate design and execution of reform 
programmes in order to realise the benefits, and this is the common view derived from 
the literature. Cabral (2011), for instance, states that the overall impact depends on the 
design of a particular decentralised government system. Similarly, Salman and Iqbal 
(2011) argue that whether fiscal decentralisation brings positive or negative results, it 
depends on the distribution of expenditure responsibilities among different levels of 
government and their ability to execute them. Meanwhile, Widmalm (2008) argues that 
decentralisation should consider devolving power in terms of responsibilities, resource 
allocation and revenue raising options, and institutional autonomy in designing own 
policies. 
 
Generally, the literature recognises the importance of decentralisation which matches 
devolved responsibilities with the availability of resources if the executing agents are to 
succeed. The significance of matching resources with responsibilities is imperative in 
determining the financial sustainability of LGAs, which are the implementing agencies 
of reform programmes. Stone (2015) states that decentralisation could influence 
financial sustainability of LGAs both positively and negatively. In considering this, the 
chapter also discusses the role of fiscal relations in shaping the financial sustainability 
of LGAs. The discussion covers the importance of intergovernmental transfers, own 
source revenue and borrowings in enhancing financial sustainability, which enables not 
just service delivery but also equity. This forms the basis of this research: to evaluate 
the financial sustainability of LGAs in Tanzania within the context of decentralisation. 
It aims to identify whether the design and implementation of decentralisation offers the 
prospect of improving service provision in an equitable manner. Moreover, the chapter 
presents the importance of evaluating the financial sustainability of LGAs, reviewing 
the practices of assessing financial sustainability and its measurement indicators.  
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CHAPTER 4 : BACKGROUND OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
AUTHORITIES IN TANZANIA 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the background of local government in Tanzania. It explains the 
history of LGAs, their current structure and institutional settings, their functions, and 
details the ongoing reform of decentralisation by devolution. It also explains the 
meaning of equity and the government’s efforts towards it since independence in 1961, 
details of local government finance and the budgeting process, and it ends with a chapter 
summary. 
4.2 History of Local Government 
In Tanzania, LGAs have a long-standing history throughout different administrative 
regimes. According to URT (undated), the history can be traced back over more than 
100 years covering the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. In the pre-colonial 
era, LGAs took the form of chiefdom administrations. Such administrations had power 
and control over a certain geographical area as demarcated by tribal presence, but had 
no clear boundaries. Geographical boundaries for districts were established during the 
German colonial era in the 1890s. The German administration abandoned chiefdoms and 
introduced the post of district commissioner. However, when the British colonial 
administration took over in 1918, some changes were made by introducing urban 
administrations, while districts were adopted in rural areas. In 1926, the British rule 
restored the native administration parallel to the district and urban system. Also in that 
year, 11 provinces were established (URT, 2007b), followed by the introduction of 
provincial commissioners in 1928 (URT, undated). In 1953, the British rule enacted a 
local governance ordinance which laid down the structure of local government that 
persisted until independence in 1961.  
After independence, the post-colonial government inherited the local government 
structure left by the British colonial rule, but provinces were reorganised into 18 regions 
(URT, 2007b). A number of key decisions were made soon after independence, intended 
to have a major impact on rural development and people’s participation, but they were 
made centrally (Picard, 1980b), at a distance from the people. The government also 
struggled to align the implementation of such decisions with the inherited structure, 
because they were designed for a different purpose (Picard, 1980a). During colonial rule, 
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the structure of LGAs aimed to facilitate native involvement in their administration 
(Reed, 1979). Due to the limitations of this system, LGAs were abolished in 1972 and 
the central government changed modalities of development planning and service 
provision.  
At the time of the abolition, there were 81 councils comprising 15 urban and 66 rural 
councils. Development plans for the new arrangements were made through committees 
from villages, wards and regional committees to enable people’s participation (URT, 
undated). The new arrangements were introduced through a “decentralisation umbrella” 
in the absence of LGAs. The changes were in line with the country’s national 
development strategy, which followed the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The original 
declaration emphasised rural development for reducing urban-rural income inequalities, 
but later considered inter-regional disparities within the rural economy as well (Belshaw, 
1982).  
By design, the decentralisation arrangements of 1972 had good intentions but were 
difficult to execute in practice, which led to their failure after 10 years. There was 
insufficient knowledge for the regional committees to organise and consolidate 
development plans, and a lack of donors’ funding commitments (Belshaw, 1982). 
Regional development plans had to be made with the help of technical assistance from 
international aid organisations, and their financing depended on specific donors’ 
commitment for each region. It was taking longer to consolidate regional plans, and the 
commitment of donors diminished so that some regions could not obtain the funding to 
finance their plans. All these factors contributed to the demise of the “new” system. 
Also, in the absence of LGAs, the provision of public services deteriorated and 
development projects could not be sustained due to lack of democratically elected 
representatives (URT, undated). 
The history of LGAs in Tanzania does not seem to differ from that of many developing 
countries. Smoke (2001) commented that it was the colonial rules and development 
assistance programmes which introduced local government in many developing 
countries. Nevertheless, they neither fulfilled their purpose nor gained acceptance by the 
local community. After independence, local governments were seen as inconsistent with 
local culture and needs. Moreover, central governments were reluctant to strengthen 
LGAs because of legitimacy, building a state unit over different ethnic societies, and 
macroeconomic control. This was partly attributed by early economists to favour 
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centralisation over the development of LGAs; government officials were advised to 
maximise growth through centralising economic power. LGAs were used only for 
administrative and control reasons by post-independent governments, rather than 
enhancing their autonomy, democracy and economic wellbeing. Nevertheless, the 
former British colonies have a more semi-autonomous local government than do the 
French. Smoke offers another reason for the slow development of LGAs in developing 
countries, the lack of sufficient managerial and technical resources immediately after 
independence. Central governments feared stiff competition from local government over 
qualified human resources. Similarly, training and educational facilities were 
insufficient to fill the human resources requirement gap.  
 
In 1982 local governments were reintroduced through parliamentary acts no. 7 and 8 of 
1982, in 1984 enshrined through constitutional amendments. These acts reintroduced 
both rural and urban councils, which became operational in 1984. By 2014, there were 
134 LGAs and 21 regions on the Tanzania mainland,6 comprising 28 urban and 106 rural 
councils. Nevertheless, reintroduction of the LGAs could not produce all the anticipated 
benefits because of a number of shortfalls7. As a result the government introduced 
reform initiatives known as Decentralisation by Devolution (D by D) in the late 1990s. 
The reform programme aims at strengthening and transforming LGAs into effective 
vehicles for social and economic development of the communities within their areas.    
 
The lessons learnt from previous reforms should provide useful insight into 
implementing new reforms. The abolition of LGAs in favour of the previous 
decentralisation policy (1972-1982) could never have succeeded because there were no 
LGAs to coordinate its implementation. Similarly, the re-introduction of LGAs (1982-
1998) had only limited success because power remained largely under the control of the 
central government. Thus the operationalisation of D by D is expected to benefit from 
experiences drawn from previous reforms, but these need to be revisited while it is still 
in progress in order to address any weaknesses that may limit its success.    
                                                          
6 The country is made up of Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar which has its own local government 
system 
7 History of Local Governments in Tanzania (URT, undated) provides more details 
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4.3 Current Structure of LGAs and Intergovernmental Institutional Settings  
In Tanzania, LGAs are rural and urban councils which make up the second tier of 
government and their corresponding lower levels. Rural councils comprise district 
councils, and their sub-tiers are town authorities, wards, villages and vitongoji (sub-
villages), while urban councils comprise municipal and town councils, with wards and 
mitaa (streets) as sub-tiers (Njunwa, 2006). Planning decisions and budget execution 
functions are carried out by the council at district or higher level in urban councils. 
Wards operate as administrative units while mtaa/village government, headed by an 
elected chairperson, have power to plan and execute approved policies through 
assembly. The council, which is the superior organ is made up of elected councillors 
from each ward, with one third special seats for women councillors and members of 
parliament whose constituencies fall within the council area.  
For the purpose of this study, the term LGA refers to either rural or urban councils, but 
not to their sub-tiers. They were established through the District Authorities Act no. 7 
and Urban Authorities Act no. 8 respectively, both of 1982. The Local Government 
Finance Act no.9 of the same year governs the financial matters of LGAs; together with 
its amendments, it identifies revenue sources of LGAs and provides guidance over the 
management of funds and resources. The Prime Minister’s Office, Regional 
Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) is the parent ministry of LGAs 
which coordinates their operations. The ministry is also in charge of Regional 
Administration/Secretariats and it provides the link between LGAs and other 
government ministries whose operations are delivered through LGAs. The Regional 
Secretariats are not considered as local government since they do not have 
democratically elected officials. Instead, they are representatives of central government. 
Their role with regard to LGAs as established in Act no. 19 of 1997 is to provide 
advisory and supervisory services. 
4.4 Functions of Local Government in Tanzania 
In Tanzania, LGAs play a vital role and they are an integral part of the public sector that 
influences people’s lives. They have three main functions, as identified in the District 
Authorities Act no 7 of 1982: maintenance of laws and good governance, promoting 
economic wellbeing and social welfare of people within their area, and furthering 
economic and social development that conforms to national policies and plans within 
their areas. Some of the functions are offered in collaboration with sectoral ministries 
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under the coordination of the PMO-RALG, the parent ministry. These are known as 
concurrent functions and they are funded and regulated by the central government 
ministries (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010).  
The functions of LGAs in Tanzania can be classified into two groups, mandatory and 
permissive (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). Mandatory functions are those which are 
performed by local government, although it is the central government which is 
responsible for policy making and regulating through sectoral ministries. These fall in 
five prioritised sectors: education, health, water, agriculture and roads. Permissive 
functions are those which can be performed by LGAs at their own discretion. LGAs 
have power to decide and regulate such functions. The funding of permissive functions 
is exclusively from internally generated revenues, contrary to mandated functions which 
receive the support of central government funding. Examples of permissive functions 
are land use planning and management, management of market places, fire brigade 
operations, and waste and sanitation management.  
In general, LGAs in Tanzania have dual allegiance, one to the central government and 
the other to their community. They act as agents of central government in the delivery 
of key responsibilities which affect the wellbeing of people and the prosperity of the 
nation as a whole. They have responsibilities for overseeing and executing the policies, 
laws, procedures, regulations and guidelines of the central government (URT, 1998). 
Sectoral services such as education, health, water, agriculture (which is the backbone of 
the national economy) and road infrastructure delivered through LGAs are crucial to 
both human development and the national economy. On the other hand, LGAs’ 
permissive functions enable provision of public services which are specific to each LGA. 
LGAs have to plan and execute such services according to local needs, as their second 
agency role to the community.  
The significance of LGAs in the implementation of national policies and strategies is 
enhanced by the huge area of the country. They provide an important link between the 
central government and its people in the development process, and particularly in 
poverty alleviation. The country’s 883,6008 square kilometres of land area is too large 
to deliver some public services in the absence of LGAs. The detailed list of the functions 
of LGAs is provided in the first and second schedules of the Local Government Act 
                                                          
8 National Bureau of Statistics (2013) Tanzania in Figures 2012 
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number 7 and 8. These include, but are not limited to, provision of primary and 
secondary education, promotion and provision of basic healthcare, provision, 
maintenance and control of water supplies, construction of local roads and streets, 
managing fire brigades, agricultural development, managing a range of natural 
resources, management of land use and provision of building permits, allocation and 
control of market places, and waste and sanitation management. Provision of all such 
services requires sufficient resources, both financial and non-financial, including human 
resources. 
4.5 Decentralisation by Devolution - Local Government Reform Programme 
The post-colonial history of LGAs in Tanzania involves significant interventions to their 
existence and operations. All such interventions are aimed at improving delivery of 
public services to local communities, and contributing to the achievement of national 
targets. The most recent reforms are the ones introduced by the local government reform 
agenda of 1996, and the local government policy paper of 1998. These reforms are just 
part of long-term efforts by central government and development partners towards 
improving delivery of public services. As previously noted, soon after independence the 
government intended to bridge the interregional development gaps between urban and 
rural areas and within the rural sectors. In addition, it intended to involve people in 
planning decisions within their areas. These objectives remain, and they are congruent 
with fiscal decentralisation theory which discourages interregional development 
disparities and emphasises community participation.  
The restoration of LGAs in 1982 was expected to improve performance in service 
delivery and development initiatives through people’s participation, but until 1990s this 
was not the case (URT, undated). LGAs had poor human resource capacity, weak 
management, insufficient financial resources and lack of accountability and 
transparency. These deficiencies prompted the new local government reform 
programme identified as Decentralisation by Devolution (D by D), which is still 
ongoing. The long-term goals of these reforms are similar to those stated in the previous 
decentralisation reforms of 1972. They include poverty alleviation, improving the 
quality and access to public services, especially for the poor, and to ensure equitable 
public services.   
As the decentralisation policy paper of 1998 identifies, D by D comprises four main 
aspects of reform. The first is political decentralisation, which aims to devolve decision-
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making power to LGAs within the national legislation framework. The second is 
financial decentralisation, to provide LGAs with discretionary power over financial 
decisions and own-source revenue generation. The third is administration 
decentralisation, to provide LGAs with discretionary power over staff recruitment and 
local decisions and to make their staffs accountable to their local councils. The fourth is 
the changed central-local relations which aim at setting a clear communication link 
between LGAs and central government ministries and departments. The minister in 
charge of LGAs coordinates with other central government ministries in communicating 
regulations and guidelines to LGAs concerning the devised central-local relations. 
4.6 The Concept of Equity in Public Services and Financial Sustainability 
Equity is a crucial aspect in the design and execution of government policies that affects 
provision of public services. The meaning of equity encompasses fairness and equal 
treatment, resource allocations towards reducing inequalities in universal programmes 
and redistribution of services and resources geared to specific programmes that address 
marginalised groups (Norman-Major, 2011). In contrast, inequity refers to differences 
that are unnecessary and avoidable, and that can also be regarded as unfair or unjust 
(Whitehead, 1985). Thus unfair and unjust treatment of some individuals/groups of users 
with similar requirements should be avoided in the provision of public services. 
Governments should consider not only economy and efficiency in service provision but 
also equity, because it addresses the recipients of the services delivered (Norman-Major, 
2011). This aspect is embedded within fiscal decentralisation theory through 
discouraging regional disparities, and decentralisation reforms worldwide have 
attempted to achieve it. The consequences of inequity include perpetuation of poverty 
in areas with poor services, inducing migration to areas with better services, and social 
unrest in areas with poor services (Hofman and Guerra, 2007).  
Tanzania has been striving for equity in the provision of public services since its 
independence in1961. Basically, there are two main reasons contributing to spatial 
inequalities in Tanzania (Maro, 1990). The first is the ecological differences among 
regions and the second is the historical factors related to colonialism and capitalism. 
Consequently, equity was one of the major objectives of the Arusha Declaration of 1967, 
a major objective in the decentralisation reform of 1972, and it is still a major objective 
in the ongoing reforms. The ongoing reforms specifically aim to improve the quality and 
access of public services, particularly to the poor, and to ensure equity in public services. 
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The involvement of central government in decentralisation reforms, by formulating 
policy and regulating key public services through its ministries, makes prioritisation of 
equity viable. It would be difficult to embed equity in service provision if policy making 
and regulating functions were left entirely to LGAs, as rich LGAs would be able to offer 
better services than their poorer counterparts.  
Considering the role of central government in ensuring equity, it is expected that 
development plans including the budgets of LGAs reflect equity in public services 
throughout the country. Thus, how LGAs’ budgets are set and implemented forms a 
crucial component towards equity in public services. If the equity aspect is embedded in 
the allocation of resources to LGAs from central government, proper execution of such 
budgets will eventually result in equity in the services offered. Similarly, if during 
budget implementation the financial resources are insufficient to cover the grants 
allocated to LGAs, reallocation should also consider equity. This will contribute to 
giving LGAs similar financial sustainability relative to each other, because they have 
similar functions. 
4.7 Local Government Finance 
D by D has brought major changes in intergovernmental fiscal relationships. These 
changes are geared towards improving public sector performance and financial 
management practices in LGAs. Among the objectives of fiscal decentralisation in 
Tanzania are to improve intergovernmental fiscal transfers, to improve own-source 
revenue generation in LGAs, and to improve efficiency in service delivery and make 
them equitable (World Bank, 2013). Prior to D by D, the LGAs’ financing system was 
uneven. There was no sufficient financial commitment, either from internally generated 
funds or from central government that would allow LGAs to execute their functions 
effectively (World Bank, 2013). Moreover, the allocation of central government grants 
to LGAs was based on ad hoc and discretionary decisions resulting in some LGAs 
receiving more than others (Boex 2003; Allers and Ishemoi, 2011a). Thus reforms were 
intended to correct such misshapen in local government financing. As a result the 
government asserted in 2006 that “substantial progress has been made in recent years on 
transforming the previously highly discretionary transfer system into a more objective, 
transparent, stable and pro-poor funding mechanism for local governments” (URT, 
2006: 3). 
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 4.7.1 Intergovernmental Grant System 
As identified above, before reform there was no adequately established allocation 
mechanism. Boex (2003) identifies the process as complex, and he found some LGAs 
were unjustifiably receiving more than others, while wealthier LGAs were getting 
greater allocations. This implies that the allocation process was perpetuating differences 
between rich and poor LGAs in their ability to deliver public services. This was contrary 
to the long-term goals of discouraging interregional imbalances between urban and rural 
areas and within the rural areas, which was initiated by the government just after 
independence. Thus, the reforms of 1998 aimed to address such shortcomings in the 
distribution of central government grants to LGAs. 
In 2004 the government introduced a formula-based grant allocation system which 
became operational in 2005/06 (URT, 2007a). The formula is used to allocate recurrent 
block grants and capital development grants (Venugopal and Yilmanz, 2010). Recurrent 
block grants are specific to priority sectors which are education, health, water, 
agriculture and roads. Meanwhile, capital development grants are non-sectoral 
discretionary grants allocated for the provision of new and rehabilitation of existing 
infrastructure and capacity building activities. In addition, LGAs receive ministerial 
subventions which are sector specific, and general purpose grants (Allers and Ishemoi, 
2011b). General purpose grants are distributed to LGAs as compensation for local 
taxation revenue sources abolished in 2003 due to being considered inappropriate. They 
are used for general administrative purposes and LGAs have discretionary autonomy, 
unlike for block grants.  
The design of the intergovernmental grant allocations in Tanzania is intended to equalise 
fiscal disparities in spending needs, which is essential in maintaining equity in financial 
sustainability across LGAs. The background paper on local government finance states 
that: 
The formula allocates greater resources to poorer local government authorities, 
as well as to geographically larger local government districts (in other words, 
rural district authorities). This is consistent with a needs-based equalization 
approach. As the CDG system evolves over time, the allocation formula should 
be reviewed from time to time to assure that the formula achieves the policy 
objectives that it is intended to secure (URT, 2006: 10-11). 
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There are minimum conditions to be met in order for an LGA to qualify for central 
government grants. These acts as control mechanisms embedded in the grant allocation 
system to discourage slackness in LGAs’ financial management practices. LGAs are 
assessed by external independent teams annually, based on a predefined set of criteria. 
These criteria are categorised into Financial Management; Fiscal Capacity; Planning and 
Budgeting; Transparency and Accountability; Interaction between Higher Local 
Government Level (District/Municipal Councils) and Lower Local Government (Wards 
and Villages); Human Resource Development; Procurement; Project Implementation; 
Council Functional Processes. The aim is to ensure that LGAs exercise financial 
management discipline and attain good governance. Minimum conditions are based on 
the minimum total scores an LGA has to attain after being assessed. LGAs failing to 
meet minimum conditions receive only 25% of their discretionary capital development 
grant, 50% of sector specific grants and 100% of their capacity building grants (URT, 
2008). They are then placed under strict monitoring by the parent ministry and regional 
secretariats. 
4.7.2 Own Source Revenues 
In 2003/04 the government reformed regulations governing LGAs’ arrangements for 
revenue generation from own sources. The aim was to harmonise the local government 
financing system. The reform affected the distribution of revenue sources between 
central and local governments. As a result, LGAs were given discretion to set bylaws 
and collect their own revenues, but within a specified limit set by central government. 
In general, they have a mandate to collect revenues from more than 50 sources as 
published on the website of the Ministry of Finance (summarised in table 4.1).  
However, there are two contrasting views regarding LGAs’ ability to mobilise revenues 
from such sources. On the one hand, it can be construed as McCluskey (2005) reports 
that many of the revenue sources available to LGAs in Tanzania are insignificant in 
revenue terms and hence are rarely collected. The collection process tends to have higher 
administration costs than the actual proceeds. However, this can be construed 
differently, and Bird (2011) argues that LGAs may collect revenues from fewer sources 
than those allowed because they are considered as service providers. They act as agent 
in providing devolved services of the central government resulting in reliance on central 
government grants instead of generating their own finances. Thus, the design control 
mechanisms in the local government financing system need to be sufficient to discourage 
slackness in generating revenues from own sources.  
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Based on the Local Government Finance Act, the list of revenue sources which can be 
collected by LGAs as published on the website of the Ministry of Finance is provided in 
table 4.1. The Ministry strictly limits LGAs from going beyond the list by saying “Local 
Governments are not allowed to levy any taxes, levies or fees which are not on this list”.   
 
Table 4.1: Sources of Revenue of LGAs in Tanzania 
Taxes on Property  Administrative Fees and Charges 
Property rates Market stalls / slabs dues  
Taxes on Goods and Services  Magulio (on markets) fees  
Crop cess, (a tax levied on farm produce, 
maximum 5% of farm gate price)  
Auction mart fees  
Forest produce cess Meat inspection charges  
Taxes on Specific Services Land survey service fee  
   Guest house levy Building permit fee  
 
Business and Professional Licences 
Permit fees for billboards, posters or  
hoardings  
Commercial fishing license fees  Tender fee  
Intoxicating liquor license fee  Abattoir slaughter service fee  
Private health facility licence fee  Artificial insemination service fee  
Taxi licence fee  Livestock dipping service fee  
Plying permit fees  Livestock market fee  
Other business licence fees  Fish landing facilities fee  
Motor Vehicles, Other Equipment and 
Ferry Licences 
Fish auction fee  
Vehicle licence fees  Health facility user charges  
Fishing vessel licence fees Clean water service fee  
Other Taxes on the Use of Goods, 
Permission to Use Goods  
Refuse collection service fee  
Forest produce licence fees  Cesspit emptying service fee  
Building materials extraction licence fee  Clearing of blocked drains service fee  
Hunting licence fees  Revenue from sale of building plans  
Muzzle loading guns licence fees  Building valuation service fee  
Scaffolding / Hoarding permit fees  Central bus stand fees  
Turnover Taxes Sale of seedlings  
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Service levy Insurance commission service fee  
Entrepreneurial and Property Income Revenue from renting of houses  
Dividends  Revenue from renting of assets  
Other domestic property income  Parking fees 
Interest  Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures  
Land rent Stray animals’ penalty  
 Share of fines imposed by Magistrates   
Court  
 Other fines and penalties 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Tanzania) - 
http://www.mof.go.tz/mofdocs/revenue/revlocal.htm accessed on 11th September, 2015. 
 
4.7.3 Borrowing  
LGAs in Tanzania rarely use debt finance, and it has an insignificant contribution in 
financing their activities (Ishemoi, 2011). The limited use of debt seems to correspond 
with suggested measures against soft budget practices (discussed in chapter 3). Usually 
central governments lay out strict conditions towards use of borrowings in LGAs, so as 
to discourage soft budget practices. Hence, LGAs can only raise debt finance if they are 
capable of repaying it from internally generated funds. The same applies to Tanzania, 
where debt finance to LGAs is allowed only for financing capital development projects. 
The borrowing procedures are also strict and centrally regulated by the Local 
Government Loan Board. On the other hand, the private financial market considers 
LGAs as non-creditworthy because they lack sufficient autonomy, and hence their 
interest rates are very high (Ishemoi, 2011).  
 
4.8 Budgeting Process  
In any organisation, the budget and the budgeting process are essential components for 
success. They form the basis of attaining long-term targets as identified in mission and 
vision statements, being broken down into short-term implementable targets. However, 
“budgets in the public arena are often considered the definitive policy document because 
an adopted budget represents the financial plan used by a government to achieve its goals 
and objectives” (Allison and Johnson, 2015: p.14). They serve as a means of allocating 
resources according to established priorities, to attain objectives. In addition, they serve 
as a means of controlling the accountability of organisational management. The 
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budgeting process in public sectors such as LGAs is complicated because of the 
difficulties in striking a balance between the multiple objectives they are required to 
meet. On one hand, LGAs are expected to meet the need of the communities they are 
serving, through a range of services which may have varying degrees of importance for 
the recipients. On the other hand, they are simultaneously required to fulfil national 
priorities as predefined by central government through various policies. “Unlike most 
private-sector organizations, governmental entities must be responsive to a number of 
different groups and organizations—including elected officials, other governmental 
entities, investors, creditors, and citizens—that monitor their activities” (Allison and 
Johnson, 2015: p.27). Private sector organisations are usually striving to meet 
shareholders’ interests. It is the budget guidelines and procedures that can help to reduce 
the complexity in LGA budgeting process. 
In Tanzania the budgeting process of LGAs is guided by the Local Government Finance 
Act (1982) and a number of guidelines issued from time to time. The Act stipulates 
procedures for the preparation of revenues and expenditure estimates, while other 
guidelines provide practical procedures, such as format, timing and ceilings to be 
adhered to. The procedures and processes involved in LGAs’ budgeting have been well 
summarised by HakiElimu and Policy Forum (2008). The budgeting exercise involves 
processes that link national development goals and policies with local priorities. While 
the PMO-RALG is responsible for issuing policies and guidelines to be followed, 
individual ministries are responsible for issuing policy guidelines specific to each 
particular sector and they are consulted for resource allocation. These guidelines are 
aligned with the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, Millennium 
Development Goals 2020, International Agreements, Goals and Targets, Ruling Party 
Election Manifesto and situational analysis from LGAs in the form of opportunities and 
obstacles to development (O&OD) (URT, 2012). Generally, the central government sets 
national targets and budget priorities, which incorporate inputs from LGAs, to be 
achieved annually for the next two years through the Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF).  
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Figure 4.1 LGAs’ Budgeting Process in Tanzania 
 
Source: HakiElimu and Policy Forum (2008) 
 
Regional secretariats provide the link between central government and LGAs to 
facilitate communication of guidelines on planning, budgeting and implementation. In 
the upper LGA level (district/municipal councils), council directors are responsible for 
formulation and execution of their budgets in accordance with issued guidelines, 
including the budget ceiling. Departmental heads provide their budget inputs and are 
responsible for execution of departmental budgets. Budgets of LGAs are reviewed and 
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approved by the council comprising councillors and local members of parliament. After 
approval at the council level, LGA budgets are submitted to the parent ministry for 
approval and consolidation into a national budget. On the other hand, the ward 
development committee provides a link by consolidating the budgets of lower LGAs 
(villages, vitongoji and mitaa) and upper LGAs. They consolidate the budgets of the 
lower levels before submitting them to the upper LGAs for approval and consolidation 
in the upper LGA budgets. 
 
The budgeting exercise in Tanzania LGAs involves two-way opposing traffic (as 
presented in 4.1), which is in line with financial management practices. The first 
communicates policies and procedures from top to bottom levels; and the other is from 
bottom to top, communicating requirements. The budgeting process indicates the 
importance of LGA budgets in meeting people’s requirements in terms of public services 
as well as meeting the country’s overall objectives. Both the requirements of the local 
communities and national targets are incorporated in the budgeting process. Thus, proper 
execution of LGA budgets should lead to successful attainment of both service delivery 
and national targets. Nevertheless, the process is complicated and the budget cycle takes 
too long, about a year, to prepare. 
4.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides the background of LGAs in Tanzania. It covers the history of 
LGAs from the pre-colonial era to the current ongoing D by D reforms. Generally, the 
history of LGAs in Tanzania can be broken into three phases, pre-colonial, colonial and 
post-colonial. The roles and significance of LGAs throughout these phases differs. 
However, the importance of LGAs in facilitating implementation of government plans 
towards service provision has been significantly increasing since attainment of 
independence in 1961. A number of challenges have forced various reforms designed to 
improve provision of public services to be revised. The most recent reform, which is still 
ongoing, was introduced in 1998 with a similar view to previous reforms, enhancing 
access to public services particularly by the poor. The programme is known as 
Decentralisation by Devolution; it aimed to devolve political, administrative and 
financial power to LGAs and to improve central-local relations.  
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CHAPTER 5 : METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research philosophy underpinning the design and processes 
involved in meeting the research objectives. It starts by presenting philosophical stances 
for social science research and how this study fits in. This is followed with the details of 
the research design, sampling and data used in quantitative analysis in seeking responses 
to the first research question regarding variations in financial sustainability and 
corresponding explanatory factors. Also, the discussion covers the detail of financial 
indicators used and analytical tools. The chapter then discusses case study selection for 
answering the second research question, regarding the impact of financial difficulties, 
mitigating approaches and associated challenges. This discussion includes processes 
involved in collecting interview data from the selected cases, and the corresponding 
analysis. The chapter ends with a summary.   
 
5.2 Research Philosophy 
According to Saunders, Lewis et al. (2012) research philosophy is concerned with 
knowledge development and its nature. It is related to the way in which the researcher 
develops knowledge and the belief vested in the nature of that knowledge. It is vital to 
be aware of the philosophical stances in undertaking research as these determine how it 
is conducted. It is the set of implicit or explicit assumptions over the nature of the social 
world and how it has to be studied that establishes the bases of social science studies 
(Burrell and Morgan, 2011). This provides justification for the kind of methodology and 
research methods to be used.  
As presented in figure 5.1, there are two philosophical stances which explain the nature 
of knowledge and how it has to be developed. The first is epistemology which is 
concerned with what is considered to be acceptable knowledge within a discipline, and 
the second is ontology which is concerned with whether the social reality is internal or 
external to the social actors (Bryman, 2008). The latter explains whether the social 
reality is objective or subjective to the actors. The objectivism ontological position 
considers the social reality to exist independently of the social actors, while 
constructionist ontological assumptions view the social reality to be embedded to the 
social actors (Gill and Johnson, 210). On the other hand, epistemology is further divided 
into two main stances, positivism and interpretivism. Positivist considers the acquisition 
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of knowledge by following the same principles and procedures as natural sciences 
(Bryman, 2008). The knowledge developed through the positivist approach involves 
examining the objective reality that exists external to the actors (Creswell, 2014). In 
contrast, the interpretivist approach considers reality to be socially constructed by 
human behaviour, hence it requires different research procedures to those applied in 
natural sciences (Bryman, 2008). This study aims to acquire knowledge about the 
financial sustainability of local governments within the context of decentralisation 
through pragmatism, whereby positivist and constructivist epistemological stances are 
used together.  
5.2.1 Pragmatism Research Approach 
This study undertakes a pragmatist approach by mixing the positivism and interpretivism 
paradigms (mixed methods) as discussed in Morgan (2007), Feilzer (2010), and Teddlie 
and Tashakkori (2010). It uses positivism in assessing variations in financial 
sustainability against fiscal decentralisation theory, and interpretivism in understanding 
the impacts of financial difficulties within decentralisation settings and the approaches 
used to mitigate them. It is the nature of research questions that determines whether to 
use qualitative or quantitative methods (Sounders et al., 2012). As summarised in figure 
5.1, the researcher employs quantitative analysis in accomplishing the first research 
objective and qualitative analysis for the second (chapter one offers details of the 
research objectives). The quantitative analysis utilises financial information from 
performance reports and demographic data, while the qualitative analysis utilises 
interview data from the three case studies.  
Figure 5.1: Research Philosophical Stance 
Epistemology Ontology
Interpretivism Postivism
Objectivism
(Social reality is 
Objective)
Constructionism/
Subjectivism
(Social reality is 
subjective)
Quantitative Research 
Methods
(Research Question 1: 
Response in Chapter 6)
Qualitative Research 
Methods
(Research Question 2: 
Response in Chapter 7)
Pragmatism/Mixed 
Research Methods
(Research Design of 
the Thesis)
 
Source: Author 
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5.3 Comparative Research Design 
The study uses a comparative research approach to evaluate the financial health of LGAs 
with reference to decentralisation reforms. As Boddewyn (1965, p.261) explains, the 
comparative approach involves “systematic detection, identification, classification, 
measurement and interpretation of similarities and differences” among the units 
investigated. It is commonly used in studies analysing fiscal conditions of local 
governments. Such studies include Krueathep (2010), Casal and Gomez (2011), Cohen 
et al. (2012), Huang and Ho (2013) and Krueathep (2014), which involved ranking 
LGAs according to their financial performance. Also, studies by Nelson (2012) and 
Krueathep (2014) provide examples of the usefulness of the approach in case study 
analysis. As the ILO (2001) explains, when evaluating municipal functioning with 
reference to reforms it is necessary to analyse each unit singly and in comparison with 
others. This study makes a comparative analysis of LGAs with reference to each other 
over a five-year period, which helps to identify similarities and differences among 
evaluated units. On the other hand, Pennings et al. (2006) believe that comparative 
design is suitable when it is inappropriate to use experimentation or to apply statistical 
based techniques because of an insufficient number of observations comprising the 
sample. This study exhibits these conditions. The total number of LGAs is too limited 
to apply sampling-based statistical analysis and it is impossible to undertake 
experimentation due to the nature of the study.  
 
The comparative approach in sub-national studies has two main strengths, the possibility 
of including a large number of cases and the possibility of easily constructing controlled 
comparisons (Snyder, 2001). It also allows the analysis to start with a large number of 
cases in the initial stage, narrowed down to a few cases for detailed evaluation of 
financial sustainability and revenue collection with reference to system design. 
Likewise, the comparative design can accommodate mixed methods either through 
triangulation, facilitation or in complimentarity. A good example is the study of 
Krueathep (2010) which applied a mixed analytical approach in analysing 14 LGAs 
quantitatively, then narrowed this down to four cases for qualitative analysis. When 
comparative design is used, there are three dimensions on which the comparison can be 
based (Wollmann, 2008). The first is territory analysis, which may involve comparison 
between countries or between different levels of government within a country. The 
second is the sector or policy dimension, which may involve multi-sector analysis or 
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policy areas across sectors either within a country or across more than one country. The 
third is the time frame, which may involve analysis within one or more countries over 
time. This study undertakes territorial comparative analysis of financial sustainability of 
local governments within a single country over time.  
 
Wollmann (2008) notes that the comparative approach is useful when the study 
undertakes either descriptive, explanatory or evaluation comparisons. Descriptive 
comparative studies seek to assess divergence/convergence in LGAs’ institutional 
developments within/across countries, or classification of the countries under 
investigation according to local government systems. Explanative comparative studies 
build upon descriptive comparison by incorporating causal relations analysis among 
variables that influence institutional change. Meanwhile, evaluation comparative studies 
involve assessment of key profiles of LGA systems based on chosen dimensions such 
financial, political, organisational or functional performance. This study encompasses 
all three aspects. It uses evaluative comparisons by ranking LGAs according to their 
financial sustainability. This is followed by explanatory comparison which involves 
identifying factors that explain variations in financial sustainability. Lastly, it undertakes 
descriptive comparison regarding the conformity of the fiscal decentralisation 
design/operationalisation to the theory. 
 
5.4 Data and Sampling for Financial Performance Analysis 
The study uses purposive sampling, whereby two groups of LGAs comprising 
communities which differ in terms of income and poverty level. The composition of 
LGAs in the sample corresponds with the first research objective of examining financial 
sustainability within the context of decentralisation, in which horizontal equity of 
service access is a priority. Nevertheless, the availability of data regarding the income 
poverty level of the people within LGAs limited the number of LGAs into the sample to 
40 out of 134 nationwide9. These LGAs have been identified through the Poverty and 
Human Development Report of 2005, which is the only available source that provides 
the ranking of councils based on the income poverty level of their people. The report 
was issued as part of a government initiative on monitoring poverty and it provides a list 
of the top twenty and bottom twenty LGAs, as presented in figure 5.2. After screening, 
                                                          
9 The number of LGAs has changed from time to time, but this is the total number in 2008/09, the first 
year for data inclusion in the sample 
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four LGAs were dropped because of being considered as outliers. Thus, the quantitative 
analysis involved 36 LGAs (listed in appendix C), of which 19 were ranked at the bottom 
in terms of people living below the income poverty line, and 17 at the top.  
 
Figure 5.2: Sample Composition 
Total LGAs
(134)
Poverty Level Status 
Unknown
( 94=70%)
Poverty Level 
Status known, 
hence made the 
Sample 
(40=30%)
Relatively poor 
communities
(20 LGAs)
Well-off 
communities
(20 LGAs)
Sa
mp
le 
Co
mp
os
tio
n
Source: Author 
 
It is essential for the sample to consider the living standards of the people within the 
LGAs because, under the horizontal equity assumption, LGAs comprising a large 
proportion of people living below the income poverty line require extra efforts to 
improve access to public services. People living below the income poverty line, for 
instance, are less capable of affording similar services offered through private sector 
organisations, compared to those above the line. Hence, the financial sustainability of 
their LGAs should be equal to those of LGAs comprising relatively well-off 
communities. It is vital for reforms in Tanzania to consider this because private sector 
organisations participate in the provision of a number of public services, such as 
education and health, in parallel with government institutions. Nevertheless, the cost of 
such services is significantly higher in the private sector than the same services offered 
by the government. 
 
The population in selected LGAs is 10,178,255, which is equivalent to 23.33% of the 
country’s mainland population of 43,625,354 as per the 2012 national census. Their total 
geographical area is 202,695 square kilometers, 23.5% of the total country’s land area 
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of 883,600 square kilometers. All LGAs included in the sample have populations of 
more than 50,000 people as per 2012 census report. 
 
5.5 The Use of Accounting Information 
In government institutions, accounting information can be used to monitor and enforce 
accountability and hence improve their performance (Chan, 2003). They provide 
information on revenue generation and expenditure transactions. To LGAs, such 
information includes but is not limited to tax collection, intergovernmental transfers, 
lending and borrowing, as well as purchasing transactions. This justifies the wide use of 
financial information in assessing the financial health of LGAs, because these elements 
reflect financial undertakings. Some countries, like the US and Australia, have bodies 
which employ financial information to develop financial health measurement indicators 
for their LGAs. These bodies are ACIR and Australian Financial Sustainability 
respectively. As discussed in chapter 3, the practice of using financial information for 
assessing the financial health of LGAs has also extended to academic studies. 
 
Financial reports are the main channel used to disseminate accounting information, 
which makes them an important source of accounting-based performance measurement 
analysis conducted at organisational levels (Kihn, 2005). Considering the value of the 
information contained in financial reports of LGAs, various standards have been devised 
worldwide to regulate reporting practices. In the US, for instance, the Government 
Accounting Standard Board issued financial Statement No. 34 in 1999 for instituting a 
robust model of financial reporting to states and local governments. Similarly, the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants issues standards that regulate the financial 
reporting of their LGAs. In addition to specific national regulatory bodies, the 
International Public Sector Accounting Standard Board issues financial reporting 
standards for public sector institutions that also apply to LGAs, and the majority of 
developing countries use these standards. The aim of developing standards is to provide 
guidance in the preparation of financial reports so as to enhance their usefulness.  
 
Tanzania is one of the countries whose LGAs use International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards (IPSAS) in the preparation of financial reports. The use of IPSAS became a 
mandatory requirement for LGAs in the financial year 2008/09, through a directive of 
the parent ministry (CAG-T, 2010). Prior to adoption of IPSAS, LGAs implicitly used 
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International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in preparing their financial reports 
from 2005. The Accountancy Professional Body in collaboration with the government 
decided to adopt IFRS wholesale in July 2004. However, the accrual basis of accounting 
has been in practice since 1997 when the government released Local Authorities 
Financial Memorandum No. 52 (CAG-T, 2009). The use of the accrual basis of 
accounting and adoption of IFRS then IPSAS makes information contained in financial 
reports of LGAs ideal for assessing their financial sustainability. 
 
For quantitative analysis, the study uses financial performance reports which include 
LGAs’ budget information. Data has been extracted from reports for five years (2008/09 
– 2012/13). The time frame is influenced by data availability because the formula-based 
allocation system, which is a key component in reform execution, became 
comprehensively applied in 2006/07. The provision of one year is provided for such 
programme to be effective, which is why the data starts in 2008/09. This also 
corresponds with the year in which the usage of IPSAS in financial reporting became 
mandatory to LGAs. On the other hand, 2012/13 is the year with the most current data 
at the time this study began (2013). The reports have been obtained from the parent 
ministry, although for the last three years (2010/11-2012/13) have been available from 
the online database (http://lginf.pmoralg.go.tz/lginformation/monitor.php). Other 
information, such as the type of audit report LGAs received and council types (district, 
municipal or town council) have been extracted from Annual Audit reports issued by the 
National Audit Office. These reports are available online 
(http://www.nao.go.tz/?cat=34). In addition to financial information, the study used 
statistical data, such as population and distance, from the National Bureau of Statistics, 
available online from the website of the Bureau (http://www.nbs.go.tz/).  
 
5.6 Choice of Indicators in Relation to Decentralisation 
The study utilises financial indicators that best suit the intended objectives of measuring 
financial sustainability within the context of decentralisation. Specifically, the concern 
has been on budgetary and service solvency as these reflect long-term capacity of LGAs 
in providing public services. The two categories are considered appropriate in the 
decentralisation context, which aims to enhance horizontal equity, because this objective 
is long-term in nature (Beckett-Camarata, 2004). Becket-Camarata (2004) believes that 
it is suitable to evaluate the long-term fiscal behaviour of LGAs whenever assessing 
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long-term impacts of fiscal condition. For this reason, cash solvency indicators are 
ignored because they reflect short-term fiscal behaviour. Similarly, indicators for long-
term solvency are not considered because, as Ishemoi (2011) notes, debts make an 
insignificant contribution to LGA finances in Tanzania. The inclusion of indicators from 
the two groups, budgetary and service solvency, is based on the literature, and in some 
cases customised to suit analysis.  
 
In addition to other indicators derived from the literature, this study considers resource 
requirements for providing the planned activities to be reflected in budgeted 
expenditure. Budgets always incorporate the short- and long-term targets of each LGA 
implemented on an annual basis. The use of budgets eliminates ambiguity in establishing 
a standard package of public services across LGAs. As Bahl et al. (1992) suggest, it is 
very difficult to establish a standard package because determinants like cost of services 
may differ, and the composition of service requirements is not always similar from one 
LGA to another. Thus budgeted expenditures provide a good proxy for the bundle of 
public services the council is determined to deliver, after considering both the 
preferences and requirements of the public and respective costs. This implies that if an 
LGA can raise sufficient finance to cover its budgeted expenditure, it is considered to 
be solvent enough to delivery public services as planned, holding other things (such as 
changes in price and service demand) constant. On the other hand, an LGA is considered 
to experience budget insolvency/difficulty if resources collected from all revenue 
sources are insufficient to cover its planned activities as reflected by budgeted 
expenditure.  
 
The concept of using budgeted expenditure to assess budget solvency is similar to the 
definition of “resource requirement gap” used by Bahl et al. (1992) in assessing fiscal 
disparities. However, their resource requirement gap was expressed in per capita terms, 
while in this study the indicator for ex-ante surplus/deficit is expressed in ratio terms. 
The concept also matches the criteria used to measure financial difficulties in some 
previous studies (such as Lewis, 2003; Dollery and Crase, 2006). The exception is that 
these studies used only actual expenditure in establishing surplus/deficit, hence they 
could not capture the financial difficult that would have been dealt with by cutting down 
expenditure. Thus, the ex-ante surplus/deficit indicator is used in addition to indicators 
commonly used in previous studies. It is defined as Yi = OSi + GRi – BEi. Where Yi 
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represents ex-ante surplus or deficit of the ith LGA, OSi represents total revenues 
collected from own sources by the ith LGA, GRi represents total grant received from 
central government by the ith LGA, and BEi represents total budgeted expenditure of 
the ith LGA. Hence, when expressed in ratio terms, an LGA is budgetary solvent when 
the outcome of total revenues (OSi + GRi) divided by budgeted total expenditures (BEi) 
is greater than or equal to 1.  
 
5.6.1 Meaning Attached to Measurement Indicators Used 
As discussed in the literature review, a number of indicators can be used to evaluate 
financial sustainability, but relevance and usefulness are the key criteria for inclusion in 
this study. Previous publications form a foundation for the identification of the 
indicators, and in some cases adjustments have been made to make them more useful 
for the purpose. Following extraction of information from financial performance reports 
and demographic data, a total of 22 indicators was established (see appendix B). Some 
of the indicators are used for evaluating the pattern of financial sustainability and others 
as explanatory variables of the variations in financial sustainability.  
The first indicator is the total expenditure per person as a measure of the LGA’s ability 
to provide service per person (Groves et al., 1981; Merrifield, 2000; Zhao, 2009). For 
example, Zhao (2009) used this indicator primarily for assessing disparities in service 
provision among Chinese provinces. It is a measure of service level solvency. Ceteris 
paribus, the higher the total expenditure per person, the better the ability to provide 
service and vice versa. In addition, as Dollery et al. (2006) indicate, lower expenditure 
per person may imply low quality of services offered. The indicator for expenditure 
needs per person has been used for distributing equalisation grants in local councils in 
the UK (Andrews et al., 2005). Considering the emphasis in fiscal decentralisation 
theory is on promoting horizontal equity, the indicator is aimed to assess any 
discrepancies in LGAs’ ability to provide services to their citizens.  
The second indicator is the central government grant per capita (Doamekpor 2007), 
which reflects the extent of central government support to LGAs. In central-local 
relations, the central government grant is used for equalising vertical (between central 
and local governments) and horizontal (between LGAs) fiscal imbalances. Thus the 
higher the value of this indicator, the better the financial sustainability position of an 
LGA. Arguably, this might be considered to be conflicting with the notion of 
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discouraging LGAs’ dependence on central government. In response, three distinct 
financial independence indicators have been included in the analysis.  
The three financial independence indicators are own source revenues to total expenditure 
(Ritonga et al., 2012), own source revenues to recurrent expenditure, and total 
government grant to own source revenues. The first assesses the ability of an LGA to 
finance its expenditure from its own resources, the second to finance at least its own 
recurrent expenditures, and the third the comparability of its own revenues over the 
amount of grant disbursed to an LGA. For these indicators, the higher the independence 
level the better the financial sustainability of an LGA since it can dictate a large part of 
its expenditure from its own resources.  
Another indicator is the total own source revenues per capita (Groves et al., 1981; 
Merrifield, 2000), which is used as a measure of the amount that an LGA raises per 
person. Ceteris paribus, the higher the value of this ratio, the better the financial 
sustainability of the LGA. An LGA which is capable of raising a higher amount per 
person is less likely to experience financial difficulty than an LGA that can only raise a 
smaller amount. Generally, in this study the indicator is used to assess revenue 
contribution of the people residing within the council area.  
Own source collection effort, customised from Hy et al. (1993), has also been used as a 
measure of LGAs’ efficiency in mobilising resources. The unmodified version of this 
indicator from Hy and colleagues used total taxable value versus the actual amount 
collected. However, given the limitations in establishing the total taxable value available 
to LGAs in Tanzania, the budgeted value replaces the total taxable value in the formula. 
The budgeted value provides the true picture of the amount that an LGA can realise, 
provided that the budgeting process is properly done. Nevertheless, Brodjonegoro and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2005) discourage the use of a budgeted estimate if it is for deciding 
grant allocations, because LGAs can manipulate the estimates. The indicator may suffer 
from a moral hazard problem whereby LGAs may lower enforcement and administration 
efforts or the tax rates or manipulate the tax base provided that such options exist. 
However, grant allocation in Tanzania still considers this indicator when LGAs are 
assessed if they have met minimum conditions, but its weight is minimal, at just ten 
points out of one hundred. The indicator is calculated based on the actual amount that 
an LGA has realised versus the budgeted amount. This variable assesses the extent of 
administration efforts exerted by LGAs in collecting their own revenue, based on their 
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budget. Ceteris paribus, the higher the effort in resource mobilisation, the higher the 
likelihood of an LGA having better financial sustainability. The variable is also used as 
a control check over the soft budget constraint practices in LGAs. As the literature says 
(chapter 3), whenever there is higher dependence on central government grants, there is 
the danger of LGAs becoming careless in mobilising their own revenues unless 
sufficient control is incorporated in grant allocation.  
Meanwhile population, population density and the council area in square kilometres 
have been used as a measure of council size. The use of population as an indicator of 
council size can also be seen in Doamekpor (2007) and Merrifield (2000). Population 
density has been applied in Merrifield (2000) and council area in Casal and Gomez 
(2011) and Merrifield (2000). These indicators are used as drivers of the level of services 
required within the council. Hence, the higher the population and/or population density, 
the higher the pressure associated with service demand. Similarly, the greater the council 
area, the greater the pressures on service demand. Nevertheless, council size can also 
have a positive impact in mobilising resources.  
Venugopal and Yilmaz (2010) argue that, in Tanzania, LGAs experience a significant 
difference between the amount of central government grant allocated at the beginning 
of a budget period and the actual amount disbursed. Thus, the researcher established 
three new indicators to reflect the flow of government grants. These are established by 
comparing the actual amount disbursed versus the amount allocated for recurrent 
expenditure, development expenditure and the total intergovernmental grant. These 
indicators assess the predictability of the flow of the central government grant in each 
respective category, and they are expected to have a positive impact on the financial 
sustainability of LGAs.  
Other indicators include total expenditure over total revenue (Ritonga, et al., 2012; 
Cohen et al., 2012; Dollery and Crase, 2006; Dollery and Murray, 2005) and total actual 
revenue over budgeted total expenditure as measures of budgetary solvency. The total 
actual expenditure to total actual revenue assesses the extent to which collected revenue 
has been consumed in financing expenditure. When revenue exceeds expenditure, the 
difference of the indicator from 1 is surplus, otherwise it is a deficit. Since LGAs may 
manipulate the pattern of their expenditure so as to avoid reporting deficit (Skidmore 
and Scoresone, 2011), the ratio is designed to measure the extent of surplus. From the 
financial management perspective, deficit in financial reports tends to attract audit 
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queries that may consequently have an impact on the final audit report, so there are 
strong motives for LGAs to avoid it by restricting their expenditure pattern. Meanwhile 
the total revenue to budgeted expenditure is intended to assess whether the extent of 
revenues mobilised would be sufficient to cover the expenditures as planned.  
Furthermore, council type, whether urban or rural; type of audit report, whether clean 
on not; and degree of wealth, whether the council comprises relatively poor or rich 
people, are involved in assessing the variations in financial sustainability. The council 
type is meant to check whether there is any relationships between financial sustainability 
and being urban or rural. The type of audit report is used to capture LGAs’ financial 
management practices in assessing variations in financial sustainability. The wealth of 
the people is meant to assess whether the ability of the LGA to raise revenue differs, 
hence contributing to variations in financial sustainability. It also measures whether the 
two groups have the same capacity to provide the required level of public services, and 
the extent of government support provided to the two groups. LGAs comprising poor 
communities are likely to experience more financial difficulty if sufficient support is not 
provided, because their ability to raise their own revenue is likely to be low, while at the 
same time the level of service demand is likely to be high.  
The study used the distance of the council from Dar es Salaam city, where many 
government offices are located, to assess whether distance matters in LGAs’ financial 
sustainability. Lastly, the research includes three indicators which provide an overall 
picture of the way LGAs manage to implement their expenditure budgets. These are the 
total expenditure ratio, recurrent expenditure ratio and development expenditure ratio. 
After establishing composite score of financial sustainability, the model for explanatory 
variables aims to discover whether financial sustainability is influenced by any of the 
following factors, and if so in which direction:  
(i) The variation in poverty level of the people in LGAs, comprising a large 
population of poor people versus relatively well-off people 
(ii) Council type, whether urban or rural  
(iii) The variations in own source revenue collection  
(iv) The variations in population size  
(v) The variations in council size in square kilometres  
(vi) The variations in population density  
(vii) The variations in the flow of central government grant  
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(viii) The variations in the LGAs’ distance from the region which forms the key 
point for financial decisions, Dar es Salaam 
(ix) Adherence to financial management practices as reflected by the type of audit 
report attained (clean or unclean).  
 
5.6.2 Standardisation of Measurement Indicators 
Before undertaking the analysis, the financial indicators have been standardised as Rees 
(1995) recommends. Rees states that it is suitable to standardise financial indicators 
when analysing a large group of financial ratios so as to attain normality, and hence 
ensure valid conclusions. Similarly, as Ezzamel and Mar-Malinero (1990) stipulate, the 
raw values of financial ratios are unlikely to have a normal distribution. Thus, indicators 
used to establish financial sustainability composite scores have been normalised into a 
similar scale range so that they can have similar weighting in the aggregation process. 
Other indicators were standardised within their scale range, except for categorical 
variables, which maintained their values.  
5.7 Data Analysis Tools 
The study employed Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) in aggregating financial 
indicators into composite financial sustainability scores, and regression analysis (panel 
data liner regression models and Tobit regression model) in identifying explanatory 
variables. These tools are explained in details in the following subsections. 
5.7.1 Aggregating Measurement Indicators of Financial Sustainability 
DEA is employed in aggregating financial measurement indicators to establish overall 
performance scores for financial sustainability. As Groves et al. (1981: p.9) point out, 
the process of measuring the financial condition of LGAs requires aggregating various 
pieces of information because “no single piece tells the whole story”. The pieces of 
information include those which reflect cash solvency, budget solvency, long-term 
solvency and service-level solvency. The ACIR, for instance, established a financial 
trend monitoring system which involves identification of various factors which can be 
analysed, measured and organised, and hence evaluate the financial health of LGAs. The 
practice in academic studies is similar to the financial trend monitoring system, with the 
exception of the variety of aggregation methods. A number of studies, as discussed in 
chapter three, have attempted to establish models for evaluating the financial health of 
LGAs, mainly based on a scoring system after aggregating measurement indicators.  
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Some of the methods developed for assessing financial health (such as Dollery and 
Crase, 2006; Cabaleiro et al., 2012) were based upon the explicit distinction of 
financially healthy and non-financially health LGAs before analysis. The definitions 
have been derived from regulations governing financial matters of LGAs specific to the 
country involved in developing such models. This made it possible to use discriminant 
analysis to identify characteristics of financially poor LGAs as opposed to strong LGAs. 
However, the applicability of such models to other countries which have no clear 
definition of financial health is limited, especially when there are no specific 
requirements for evaluating the financial health of their LGAs. In such cases, the 
definition derived from the theoretical background becomes applicable, and different 
approaches have been used to aggregate financial measurement indicators into a 
comprehensive measurement index. Casal and Gomez (2012) used cluster analysis, 
while Cohen et al. (2012) used simulation/scenario analysis to aggregate financial 
indicators into ratings of LGAs’ financial health.   
 
Methods like the 10-point test developed by Kloha et al. (2005) and Brown (1993) can 
be applied in different contexts since they are not bound to the definition of financial 
health. Huang and Ho (2013), for instance, used Kloha’s 10-point scale to establish an 
aggregate measure for evaluating 21 Taiwan LGAs. Nevertheless, their relevance 
depends on the availability of information that fits the measurement indicators’ 
definitions. They are dependent on the way information is presented in financial reports. 
Moreover, the approach of Kloha et al. (2005) suffers from the problem of arbitrary 
weights/scales assigned to measurement indicators, because they were established by 
the authors’ judgement. Meanwhile, the 10-point test of Brown (1993) suffers the 
limitations of using a historical benchmark which is likely to become obsolete with the 
passage of time and changes in LGAs’ operating environment. In some cases, only one 
indicator (financial surplus/deficit) has been used to rank the financial health of LGAs, 
but this indicator did consider different variables of cost and revenue. Other examples 
include Lewis (2003), who used surplus/deficit derived from financial reports; Skidmore 
and Scorsone (2011), who used surplus/deficit derived from the LGA’s service cost 
index and revenue index; and Krueathep (2010), who used an index derived from 
differences in revenue raising capacity and expenditure needs.  
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Thus, no unified technique dominates previous studies to measure the financial health 
of LGAs, despite the commonalities of the factors considered. The concern has been 
mainly to establish a score/ranking to compare LGAs with others before further analysis 
is done. In many studies, including the present one, establishing the ranking/score of 
LGAs’ financial health is not the ultimate objective. It is simply an intermediate process 
towards analysis of either the factors influencing it (like Casal and Gomez, 2011; Cohen 
et al., 2012; and Huang and Ho, 2013) or the impact of financial difficulties (like 
Chamel, 2007; and Skidmore and Scorsone, 2011).  
 
Evaluating the financial health of LGAs is similar to assessing any other type of 
organisational performance: it requires a benchmark as reference point. The benchmark 
in evaluating financial health can be the same organisation but at different periods of 
time, or a comparison with others, or professional standards promoted by regulatory 
bodies (Rivenbark et al., 2010). In Tanzania, however, there are no specific requirements 
or standards for LGAs or any other body to assess financial health, apart from the normal 
financial audit which evaluates the “going concern10” of LGAs. The only feasible 
benchmark in Tanzania is either trend analysis or comparison with others, or both. These 
two approaches match the objectives of this study and have therefore been adopted. The 
financial health of LGAs is assessed both relative to others and with reference to their 
own performance over time.  
 
5.7.2 The Uses of DEA in Performance Evaluation 
Data Envelopment Analysis is a non-parametric technique used to evaluate the relative 
performance of a set of organisations performing similar tasks and consuming multiple 
inputs to attain multiple outputs or goals (Feroz et al., 2003; Edirisinghe and Zhang, 
2007). The approach analyses the organisation’s technical efficiency based on 
predefined input and output indicators. Organisations involved in performance 
evaluation with the use of DEA are usually referred to as Decision Making Units 
(DMUs). The approach is very useful in evaluating efficiency of both private and public 
sector organisations (Ogawa and Tanashi, 2008). However, initially the technique was 
used in public sector organisations before being applied to the private sector. DEA is 
considered appropriate in the public sector because of its capacity to consider non-
                                                          
10 Financial accounting concept which requires Auditors to establish whether an organisation can 
operate in the foreseeable future without being in financial trouble 
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market priced outputs in evaluating performance (Smith, 1990). This is contrary to 
private sector organisations which aim to maximise the shareholder’s wealth as their 
main objective; thus, as Smith (1990) notes, the performance measure of private sector 
organisations can be established based on their earnings. Moreover, public sector 
organisations usually have more than one objective and they use multiple inputs, making 
the approach more appropriate. As Halkos and Salamouris (2004: 204) point out “the 
technique’s main advantage is that it can deal with the case of multiple inputs and 
outputs as well as factors, which are not controlled by individual management”. 
 
DEA measures relative efficiency of DMUs, the LGAs in this case, without requiring 
assumptions about the form of production functions. It is an alternative method to 
traditional ratio analysis that is dependent neither on pre-set weights nor on validation 
assumptions, as in traditional regression techniques (Emrouznejad and Cabanda, 2010). 
DEA uses linear programming to establish an efficient frontier based on best performers 
as a benchmark for other organisations being evaluated. The technique was developed 
by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978. Their model computes the efficiency scores 
based on the fraction of the weighted sum of outputs to the weighted sum of inputs (i.e. 
Efficiency= 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ). Its objective function specifies variables that can 
be either maximised or minimised. Mathematically the formula for maximising the 
efficiency of a DMU, as provided by Charnes et al. (1978), is as follows: 
        
Maximise  ℎ0 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟0𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖=1∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖0𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1    
Subject to  
  ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖=1
∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟
𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
 ≤ 1,   𝑗𝑗 = 0, 1, 2, … . ,𝑛𝑛, , 
 𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑊0 ≥ 0,   𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, … . ,𝑚𝑚, , 
 𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟0 ≥ 0,   𝑟𝑟 = 1, 2, … . , 𝑠𝑠.  
Where n is the number of homogeneous organisations to be evaluated, m is the number 
of input variables (𝑥𝑥1 … . , 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠), s is the number of output variables (𝑦𝑦1 … . ,𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠), and u and 
v are the weighted values of input and output variables. 
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The approach is a commanding tool for multivariate ratio analysis in comparative 
studies. It can aggregate measurement indicators of different dimensions to establish the 
overall performance score of an organisation relative to best performers. Its applicability 
is not limited to the presence of physical inputs and outputs but can be extended to 
financial indicators (Edirisinghe and Zhang, 2007), making the technique applicable to 
the appraisal of both financial and non-financial performance. Financial variables are 
used as inputs and outputs in the DEA model in the absence of physical performance 
indicators. Since performance evaluation in the model is based on input minimisation 
and output maximisation, the most important aspect is identification of inputs and 
outputs before analysis. However, it is not always straightforward to identify whether an 
indicator is an input or an output; the option is to use undesirable indicators as inputs 
requiring minimisation and desirable indicators as outputs requiring maximisation 
(Smith, 2000; Morita and Avkiran, 2009). Nevertheless, the technique requires caution 
in the total number of measurement indicators involved in performance evaluation. 
When the number of indicators is larger than the number of organisations to be 
evaluated, the degree of freedom becomes higher in combining their weights; hence 
average efficiency scores becomes higher, and vice versa (Ogawa and Tananshi, 2008). 
The number of measurement indicators has to be balanced. In response to this, 
Nunamaker (1985) suggests the number of measurement indicators should not exceed 
one third of the total number of organisations involved in performance evaluation.   
 
Several studies have used DEA to evaluate financial and non-financial performance both 
in private and public sector organisations. They include Cielen et al. (2004), who used 
DEA to establish a corporate failure prediction model through aggregating financial 
indicators of bankrupt and surviving organisations, and Halkos and Salamouris (2004), 
who used it to evaluate the efficiency of commercial banks in Greece through 
aggregating financial indicators. The findings of the latter suggest that DEA can either 
complement or be used as an alternative to traditional ratio analysis in performance 
evaluation. This concurs with the commendation of Nyhan and Martin (1999) on DEA’s 
ability to eliminate problems of traditional ratio analysis, which cannot deal with a large 
number of input and output variables in establishing an overall comparative performance 
measure. Zafra-Gomez et al. (2010) applied DEA in analysing financial health of small 
suburban municipalities in Spain. Ogawa and Tanansh (2008) used it to evaluate the 
productive efficiency of LGAs in Japan, before running Tobit estimation in their second-
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stage analysis. Other studies include Nyhan and Martin (1999), who used DEA to 
evaluate service performance of municipal police; Thore et al. (1994), who applied DEA 
and a financial reports data set to evaluate the US computer industry; and Moore et al. 
(2005), who used it to establish a performance score for municipal services of the 46 
largest US cities before using second-stage analysis to examine factors explaining their 
differences. Da Cruz and Marques (2014) used DEA to establish efficiency scores used 
as input in Tobit and OLS analysis in the course of identifying explanatory variables of 
municipal performance in Portugual. DEA is also used in Korea for assessing the 
financial health of its LGAs (Padovan and Scorsone, 2011) and in Japan for evaluating 
the performance of public organisations (Ogawa and Tanashi, 2008). 
 
This study uses DEA as an aggregation technique for financial sustainability 
measurement indicators. These indicators reflect the financial performance indicators 
extracted from financial reports of LGAs, as explained in previous sections. It is used to 
establish an overall financial health performance index/score of LGAs that is then used 
as input in the second-stage analysis. Since identification of the inputs and outputs 
depends on the context in which the performance evaluation is made, input/output 
indicators are based on the context of equitable service provision in decentralisation 
settings. They have been identified on the basis of maximising an LGA’s service 
provision while simultaneously ensuring its financial solvency. 
 
5.7.3 Independent Samples T-Test 
In order to distinguish the financial sustainability positions of the two groups of LGAs 
which represent communities with different poverty levels, the researcher uses the 
independent samples t-test. The test is performed in addition to graphical visualisation 
on the trend of financial sustainability composite scores, in order to determine whether 
the means of the two groups are significantly different, in the same way as applied by 
Deno and Mehay (1987) and Faguet (2004). The comparison extends to individual 
indicators used in constructing a financial sustainability composite score so as to 
establish which group of LGAs performs better for each financial indicator. The t-test is 
undertaken before running regression analysis to identify explanatory variables of 
financial sustainability.  
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5.7.4 Regression Analysis 
After aggregation of financial indicators into financial sustainability composite scores, 
the study uses pooled ordinary least squares regression and random effects regression 
model which is specific for panel data to identify explanatory variables of financial 
sustainability. Then the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test suggested by Torres-
Reyna (2007) is used to crosscheck the suitability of the random effects model over a 
pooled linear regression model. Pooled OLS and random effects model are commonly 
used in the presence of time invariant independent varibles, but the later should work 
better than the first (Plumper and Troeger, 2004). The fixed effects regression model 
which is also applicable to panel data is considered irrelevant because some of the 
independent variables are time invariants (Plumper and Troeger, 2007).  
 
The use of regression in identifying explanatory variables of financial sustainability is 
consistent with the experience drawn from previous studies in this area. Da Cruz and 
Marques (2014), for instance, used OLS and Tobit model to analyse explanatory 
variables of financial sustainability after establishing composite scores through DEA. 
Jones and Walker (2006, 2007) use regression to identify explanatory variables of 
financial conditions in Australian LGAs. Meanwhile, the use of tobit for second-stage 
analysis of DEA scores is recommended by Ji and Lee (2010). Skidmore and Scorsone 
(2011) also applied Tobit regression in conjunction with panel data regression models 
to analyse the impact of financial difficulties and various municipal expenditure 
categories. Other studies applying Tobit regression include Kwon (2012) and Moore et 
al. (2005).  
 
The general formula for the panel data estimation model, as Green (2005, p.385) 
specifies, is as follows: 
𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡   
Where:  t =1,…, T and i =1,…, N  
  𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is the dependent variable observed for individual i in time t.   
𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 are the independent variables  
𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊𝛼𝛼 is unobserved individual specific effect  
𝜀𝜀𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is the error term  
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Green (2005) continues that, in instances where the heterogeneity or fixed effect 𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊𝛼𝛼 
contains a constant term 𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊 for a set of individual or group-specific variables which are 
observable or unobservable, all are taken to be constant over time t. When 𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊 is observed 
for all individuals, the entire model can be seen as an ordinary regression model that fits 
by least squares. On the other hand, the random effect model assumes individual specific 
effects are uncorrelated with independent variables while the fixed effect model assumes 
individual specific effects correlate with independent variables. Thus, the formula for 
fixed effect and random effect regression models can be summarised as follows:  
𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇𝑊𝑊+𝛼𝛼𝑊𝑊 + 𝜀𝜀𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡   
Where:  t =1,…, T and i =1,…, N  
  𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is the dependent variable observed for individual i in time t.   
𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 are independent variables 
𝜇𝜇𝑊𝑊 are the time-invariant independent variable; observed and 
cannot be estimated directly by the fixed effect model but can be 
estimated by the random effect model  
𝛼𝛼𝑊𝑊 is the unobserved individual effect  
𝜇𝜇𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is the error term    
 
Along with the random effects model which became preferable after running the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, the Tobit model is used to crosscheck 
consistency of results because the dependent variable, the financial sustainability 
composite scores, is somehow censored. Tobin (1958) testifies that whenever the 
dependent variables contains observations representing maximum or minimum 
likelihood, least squares regression methods may become inappropriate. This is the case 
for the dependent variable, the financial sustainability composite scores have a 
maximum limit of one (1) and minimum limit of zero (0). The general Tobit regression 
model in which the dependent variable y is left censored at zero is presented in Greene 
(2005) and Henningsen (2010), as follows:  
𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊
∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊′𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑊𝑊  
𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊 = � 0 if 𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊∗ ≤ 0𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊∗ if 𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊∗ >  0  
 
The generalised version of the formula for censored regression which incorporates either 
upper limit, lower limit or both is presented by Henningsen (2010) as follows:  
𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊
∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊′𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑊𝑊     
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 𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊 = � 𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊∗ ≤ 𝑎𝑎  𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎 <  𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊∗ < 𝑏𝑏
𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊∗ ≥ 𝑏𝑏    
Where:  i = 1,...,N indicates the observation, 𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊∗ is an unobserved (“latent”) 
variable  
𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊 is a vector of explanatory variables  
𝛽𝛽 is a vector of unknown parameters, and 𝜀𝜀𝑊𝑊 is an disturbance 
term. 
a is the lower limit and b is the upper limit of the dependent 
variable.  
If a = −∞ or b = ∞, then the dependent variable is neither left-
censored nor right-censored, respectively. 
 
In addition to estimating the explanatory variables of financial sustainability, the study 
uses regression to establish relationships between grant distribution and the poverty level 
in LGAs, and the level of effort in LGAs’ own revenue collection. This is in response to 
the importance of grant allocation to consider poverty level in order to enhance 
horizontal equity in service access, and the need for decentralisation to discourage soft 
budget constraints. Both aspects are essential is establishing a sustainable fiscal system 
that promotes the fiscal health of LGAs.  
Table 5.1: Summary of Stages Involved in Quantitative Financial Sustainability 
Analysis 
Stage Process/Analysis Objective/rationale 
1st  Extraction of financial information 
from financial performance reports 
and computation of financial 
indicators from extracted data 
To obtain indicators for assessing 
financial sustainability 
2nd Standardising and running 
correlation test of variables 
To establish normality and establish 
basis of  controlling multicollinearity 
of the variables 
3rd  Establishing financial sustainability 
composite scores 
To assess comparative financial 
performance over time and in 
comparison to others  
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Stage Process/Analysis Objective/rationale 
To establish dependent variable for 
regression analysis 
4th  Running independent T-test on 
composite scores and variables  
To compare financial performance of 
LGAs with poor communities vs LGAs 
with well-off communities 
5th Running regression analysis  To establish explanatory variables of 
the variations in financial sustainability 
within decentralisation 
6th  Running regression on grant 
distribution versus poverty level and 
revenue efforts 
To assess whether grant distribution 
considers poverty level of the people 
and revenue collection efforts 
Source: Author 
 
5.8 The Use of Case Study Analysis 
In accomplishing the second research objective, the study uses a case study approach to 
evaluate the impact of financial difficulties on LGAs’ operations, mitigating strategies 
employed and corresponding challenges. It aims to establish emerging influences on 
achieving the overall decentralisation goal of improving public services. Case study 
analysis is a useful approach for an in-depth investigation of a contemporary 
phenomenon within the real-life context, particularly when there is no clear boundary 
between the incidence and the context (Yin, 2009). Moreover, the case study method is 
an effective way of identifying causes and effects of changes in the state of affairs, 
attached to policies to substantiate the validity of original claims related to the policy 
(Leo, 2009). For these reasons, and the context of the investigation, the use of case 
studies proves valuable.  
 
The use of case study in financial sustainability studies is not a new approach, although 
infrequent. Studies using this approach include Krueathep (2010), Carmel (2008) and 
Nelson (2012). The approach has the advantage of involving wide sources of evidence 
to enquire into the reality of the issues being investigated (Leo, 2009). It may involve 
secondary sources, official documents, informal documentary sources such as personal 
letters, interviews and/conversations, participant observation as well as direct 
observation. As Leo (2009) notes, variety in the sources of information is very useful 
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especially when the actions of power holders are among the issues being investigated; 
the power holders may be unable or unwilling to reveal an accurate account of their 
actions, especially if unfavourable outcomes result from such actions.  
 
Nevertheless, despite its value, the case study approach faces one frequently and 
challenging question regarding the generalisation of its research findings. The question 
is considered to be relevant for establishing external validity of the findings. However, 
as Yin (2009) notes, although the findings of the case study are not generalisable to the 
population or the universe, they are of value when interpreted against theoretical 
propositions. Moreover, to enhance the validity of the findings it is considerably 
worthwhile to include more than one case in the analysis. Here, three case studies are 
involved in seeking answers to research objective two.   
 
The use of case study faces another challenge which is related to the selection of 
evidence from the multiple sources that might be available. It is sometimes criticised 
because sources of evidence may not have been fairly selected, but rather are made on 
the basis of the researcher’s bias. However, a systematic and critical approach to 
establishing validity curbs this challenge (Leo, 2009). This study is conducted 
systematically, especially in the selection of data sources, in order to reduce the 
identified problem. It involves interviews with council officials, in which the same 
instrument comprising the same set of questions is used to probe information.  
 
5.8.1 Case Study Selection and Data Collection Process 
As presented in earlier sections, the study involved three councils as case studies to 
accomplish the second research objective. The number of cases corresponds with the 
recommendation of Yin (2009), to include more than one case study in order to enhance 
the external validity of the outcome. The researcher picked cases after the initial 
quantitative analysis of financial sustainability carried out just before upgrading the 
study programme from MPhil to PhD. The initial analysis utilised a data set of three 
years (2010/11-2012/13), and the results showed that all 36 councils examined 
experienced financial difficulties in at least one of the three years. This was reflected by 
the inability of the LGAs to realise sufficient revenues to finance their annual 
expenditure according to their budgets. Based on the initial analysis, the researcher 
selected one case from top performers, one from the middle and one from the bottom, 
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while simultaneously considering council status (district, municipal or town), council 
size (by population and geographical area), and income poverty level (at least one case 
from each of the two groups described in subsection 5.4).  
 
The interview involves local government officials who are informative on the matter 
enquired into. As Vaismoradi et al. (2013) identify, qualitative research seeks to 
understand a particular phenomenon from the viewpoint of those experiencing it. The 
officials involved in this study range from the operating staff dealing with revenue 
mobilisation to decision-making staff involved in budgeting, execution and monitoring, 
and council governance. They included council treasurers, council planners/economists, 
councillors and operating staff from finance departments. The number of interviews 
conducted was five in the first case study, four in the second, and five in the third, all 
averaging one hour each. The knowledge obtained prior to the field visits from various 
guidelines on how to conduct a good interview equipped the researcher with the 
necessary skills to complete the task successfully. Consequently, the researcher 
managed to collect rich information from participants. Morse and Richards (2002) 
believe that good data is extracted carefully through recognising the interviewee’s 
perspective, and to adhere with this, the researcher guided the participants to give their 
views with minimum interruptions. The interviewer probed with more questions as the 
participants responded.  
 
5.8.2 Instrument Validity and Reliability 
The design of the interview guide was made after the initial quantitative analysis 
described in the previous subsection (the interview guide is in appendix G). As Berg 
(2001) recommends, the researcher was aware of the nature and objectives of the study 
before designing the interview schedule. This facilitated inclusion of questions that 
probe deeper into the impact of financial difficulties, mitigating approaches and 
challenges to improving financial sustainability. Moreover, the background knowledge 
acquired through reviewing the literature enhanced the relevance and validity of the 
interview questions resulting in the acquisition of rich information. The supervisory 
team reviewed the instrument before field visit. We avoided closed-ended questions 
(Jacob and Ferguson, 2012), in order to avoid yes/no responses.  
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5.8.3 Ethical Considerations and Confidentiality 
Before undertaking the fieldwork, ethical considerations and confidentiality were 
considered and adhered to throughout the research process. The researcher secured 
ethical approval from the University, and permission from the ministry in charge of 
LGAs, from the specific councils and from the participants themselves. Kaiser (2009) 
states that, whenever data collection cannot be anonymised, the researcher must process 
and report the data without compromising participants’ identities. Accordingly, the 
confidentiality and anonymity of respondents was ensured, from data collection to 
handling the gathered information. Pseudonyms are used for councils and participants.  
 
5.8.4 Interview Data Processing  
Processing the qualitative data started by transcribing the recorded interviews, followed 
by annotation of the transcripts and then coding with the help of NVIVO software. The 
study employs thematic analysis in which themes were derived from previous literature 
corresponding with the topic and from issues that emerged in the course of the research 
process. These new themes emerged as the researcher became familiar with the data 
through interviewing, transcribing and his own interview notes. As DeSantis and 
Ugarriza (2000) iterate, thematic analysis involves the search for and identification of 
issues that unifies the nature or experiences from interview or set of interviews into a 
meaningful account. Thus, the coding of the interview transcripts is based on themes 
that provide meaningful interpretation regarding the experiences of local government 
officials on enquired matters.   
 
Table 5.2: Summary of Processes Involved in Case Study Analysis and Reflection 
Stage Activity and reflection 
1st  Designing interview guide and securing ethical approval 
2nd  Securing access from the Ministry in charge of Local Government. The follow 
up process was challenging since the Ministry office is located at some distance 
(Dodoma) from the researcher’s base (Dar es salaam). Thus, it took a month to 
secure permission, and this was after submitting another letter which 
introduced the researcher by the Institute to which he is affiliated.   
3rd  Securing access from three specific local government authorities. The process 
went smoothly and took about two days for each case study.  
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Stage Activity and reflection 
4th  Interview arrangements with participants and conducting interviews. The 
exercise took place in August and September, just after the end of the financial 
year (July), so officials were busy preparing reports. This was a challenge, and 
as a result interview arrangements with participants had to be rescheduled in 
some instances. 
5th  Transcribing recorded interviews; the process is time consuming and it took 
about three months to accomplish.  
6th  Coding and analysing transcribed scripts using NVIVO software; this took 
about two months, especially as the process required learning new skills in 
using the software. 
7th  Reporting the findings in the thesis. 
Source: Author 
5.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the philosophical underpinning of the research design and the 
methodology used. The study uses pragmatism in seeking answers to research questions, 
in which the positivist and interpretivist paradigms are used concurrently. As Saunders 
et al. (2012) recommend, it is the nature of research questions explored which 
determines the use of mixed methods. In attempting the first research question, 
quantitative methods are sought because it involves assessing variation in financial 
sustainability and its relationship with explanatory factors. In contrast, a qualitative 
approach is employed in attempting the second research question because explored 
matters regarding the impact of financial difficulties and approaches used to mitigate 
require experience-based account of LGA officials. The chapter provides details of the 
sample and data used in quantitative analysis and case study selection. Details cover the 
financial indicators used in assessing financial sustainability, and the corresponding 
analytical tools, and explanations of the processes involved in collecting and analysing 
interview data from the three case studies.  
The methodology employed facilitates the analysis of LGAs’ financial sustainability in 
the context of decentralisation reforms. It fosters evaluation of the factors that contribute 
to variations in financial sustainability of LGAs in Tanzania with reference to the 
context. Also, it facilitates exploring the impacts of financial difficulties on LGAs’ 
operations, how LGA officials strive to mitigate the difficulties and strengthen their 
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financial sustainability, and the corresponding challenges. The approach chosen 
provides an additional avenue to the existing body of knowledge on evaluating 
decentralisation design and its implementation.  
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CHAPTER 6 : ANALYSIS OF LGAS’ FINANCIAL 
SUSTAINABILITY 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the quantitative analysis and discusses the financial sustainability 
of LGAs in Tanzania with reference to decentralisation reforms. It starts by presenting 
details of the correlation test, followed by constructing the financial sustainability 
composite scores. These scores are used in assessing LGAs’ performance over time and 
by comparing the two groups of LGAs through independent sample t-tests. After 
comparing performance, the financial sustainability scores are used as dependent 
variables in regression analysis aimed to identify explanatory variables. The regression 
analysis is followed by discussion of the results for the explanatory variables in relation 
to reform. Moreover, the chapter provides analysis and discussion of the relationship 
between the flow of government grants, poverty level and the extent of LGAs’ revenue 
collection efforts, and it ends with a summary. 
 
6.2 Correlation Test 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, the analysis starts by establishing a total of 
twenty two (22) variables before undertaking the correlation test. Several indicators with 
the highest degree of correlation are not suitable to be included in evaluating the 
financial condition (Altman, 1968; Pedraja-Chaparro et al, 2005). Inclusion of these 
variables would imply that they are measuring the same thing, which is redundant and 
may cause distortions. Similarly, higher correlation between independent variables is a 
problem in regression analysis, posing the risk of obtaining coefficients with very high 
standard errors and low significance level, although the overall goodness of fit might be 
good (Greene, 2005; Walker and Jones, 2006). Also, the coefficients may take wrong 
signs and incorrect magnitudes which are likely to distort the inferences about the 
relationships between dependent and explanatory variables.  
While Simkiss et al. (2011) and Grewal et al. (2004) consider the correlation between 
variables to be appropriate when it does not exceed 0.8, Tabachnick et al. (2001) 
consider to be appropriate when it does not exceed 0.7. Based on a 0.8 cut-off point, the 
correlation results in table 6.1 show 4 pairs of indicators with correlation values above 
the limit and which are significant at <1% p-value. The first is own source revenue per 
person and own sources to total expenditure, at 0.86, implying that the ability to raise 
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revenue per person moves together and in the same direction with LGAs’ ability to 
finance their total expenditure by 80.6%. The second pair is total expenditure per capita 
with actual government grant per capita, with a correlation value of 0.854. This implies 
that the ability to spend per person moves together and in the same direction with the 
amount of grant disbursed per person by 85.4%. Although correlation does not measure 
causality, the higher correlation does provide an indication of the extent of dependence 
on central government grants. The third pair is the own source revenue to recurrent 
expenditure with own source revenue to total expenditure, which correlates by 0.981. 
The fourth is budgeted transfer per capita, which correlates with actual transfer per capita 
by 83.7%; the correlation value of this pair provides an overview of discrepancy in grant 
disbursement per person. If the amount of grant disbursed matched the amount of grant 
allocated, then this pair would have a perfect correlation of 100%. 
In addition there are other 6 pairs of variables which have slightly high correlation of 
between 0.6 and 0.8. The first is the ability to raise revenue per person with own source 
revenue to recurrent expenditure, which has a value of 0.768. This means the ability to 
raise revenues moves together and in the same direction with the ability of LGAs to 
finance their recurrent expenditure from own revenues by 76.8%. The second pair is the 
ability to raise revenue per person with population density, which has a correlation value 
of 0.628. The third is total expenditure per capita with budgeted grant per capita which 
correlates by 0.672. Thus, the ability to spend per person moves together and in the same 
direction with budget amount of grant per person by 67.2%. The fourth pair is 
government grant to own source revenues with own source revenues to total expenditure, 
which has a correlation value of -0.719; and the fifth is government grant to own source 
revenues with own source revenues to recurrent expenditure, with a correlation value of 
-0.739. This implies that the extent of financial dependence moves together with but in 
a different direction from the ability of the council to finance their total expenditure and 
recurrent expenditure by 71.9% and 73.9% respectively. The last pair is the actual 
government disbursement ratio with total revenue to budgeted expenditure which has a 
correlation value of 0.665, implying that the proportion of government grant disbursed 
moves together and in the same direction with the LGAs’ ability to cover their budgeted 
expenditure from total mobilised revenues by 66.5%. 
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Table 6.1: Correlation Test 
  
ZOwnSo
urceRevs
.ratio 
ZActualT
otalTrans
fersratio 
ZOSp
ercapi
ta 
zGovt 
grnt/OS 
ZSqK
m 
ZPop
persq
km 
OST
Texp 
OS/R
ec 
Exp 
ZPopul
ation 
TTex
pTTR
ev 
zTTEx
ppercap
ita 
Toto
RevB
gtExp 
ZTTtra
nsfersp
acapita 
ZBudT
ransPer
capita 
ZROA
DDIST
ANCE 
ZOwnSo
urceRevs
.ratio 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .242
** -.121 -.085 .152* .025 -.059 -.049 -.059 .115 -.070 .177* -.231** -.324** -.080 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .001 .106 .254 .042 .742 .435 .516 .433 .125 .347 .018 .002 .000 .287 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
ZActual
TotalTra
nsfersrati
o 
Pearson 
Correlation .242
** 1 -.026 .093 -.021 .083 -.079 -.085 -.079 .049 .148* .665** .050 -.439** .015 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001   .733 .213 .782 .267 .291 .259 .293 .514 .047 .000 .502 .000 .846 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
ZOSperc
apita 
Pearson 
Correlation -.121 -.026 1 -.592
** -.385** .628
** .806** .768** -.084 -.015 .415** -.042 .438** .402** -.120 
Sig. (2-tailed) .106 .733   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .260 .845 .000 .575 .000 .000 .108 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
zGovt 
grnt/OS 
Pearson 
Correlation -.085 .093 
-
.592** 1 .096 
-
.394** 
-
.719** 
-
.739** -.102 -.044 .139 .097 .185
* .107 -.062 
Sig. (2-tailed) .254 .213 .000   .199 .000 .000 .000 .175 .560 .062 .196 .013 .152 .410 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
ZSqKm Pearson 
Correlation .152
* -.021 -.385** .096 1 
-
.425** 
-
.269** 
-
.216** .150
* .016 -.368** -.038 -.316** -.275** .113 
Sig. (2-tailed) .042 .782 .000 .199   .000 .000 .004 .045 .831 .000 .616 .000 .000 .131 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
ZPoppers
qkm 
Pearson 
Correlation .025 .083 .628
** -.394** -.425** 1 .544
** .485** -.099 .001 .237** .092 .188* .117 -.088 
Sig. (2-tailed) .742 .267 .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .187 .991 .001 .220 .012 .118 .238 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
OSTTex
p 
Pearson 
Correlation -.059 -.079 .806
** -.719** -.269** .544
** 1 .981** .113 -.147* -.051 -.042 -.032 .034 -.039 
Sig. (2-tailed) .435 .291 .000 .000 .000 .000   .000 .130 .050 .498 .578 .670 .653 .601 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
OS/Rec 
Exp 
Pearson 
Correlation -.049 -.085 .768
** -.739** -.216** .485
** .981** 1 .120 -.098 -.079 -.070 -.088 -.016 -.010 
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ZOwnSo
urceRevs
.ratio 
ZActualT
otalTrans
fersratio 
ZOSp
ercapi
ta 
zGovt 
grnt/OS 
ZSqK
m 
ZPop
persq
km 
OST
Texp 
OS/R
ec 
Exp 
ZPopul
ation 
TTex
pTTR
ev 
zTTEx
ppercap
ita 
Toto
RevB
gtExp 
ZTTtra
nsfersp
acapita 
ZBudT
ransPer
capita 
ZROA
DDIST
ANCE 
Sig. (2-tailed) .516 .259 .000 .000 .004 .000 .000   .109 .191 .291 .348 .238 .836 .891 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
ZPopulat
ion 
Pearson 
Correlation -.059 -.079 -.084 -.102 .150
* -.099 .113 .120 1 .058 -.518** -.157* -.456** -.395** .338** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .433 .293 .260 .175 .045 .187 .130 .109   .438 .000 .035 .000 .000 .000 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
TTexpT
TRev 
Pearson 
Correlation .115 .049 -.015 -.044 .016 .001 -.147
* -.098 .058 1 .208** -.433** -.115 -.132 .198
** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .125 .514 .845 .560 .831 .991 .050 .191 .438   .005 .000 .124 .078 .008 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
zTTExpp
ercapita 
Pearson 
Correlation -.070 .148
* .415** .139 -.368** .237
** -.051 -.079 -.518** .208** 1 .099 .854** .672** -.256** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .347 .047 .000 .062 .000 .001 .498 .291 .000 .005   .188 .000 .000 .001 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
TotoRev
BgtExp 
Pearson 
Correlation .177
* .665** -.042 .097 -.038 .092 -.042 -.070 -.157* -.433** .099 1 .123 -.219
** -.103 
Sig. (2-tailed) .018 .000 .575 .196 .616 .220 .578 .348 .035 .000 .188   .100 .003 .169 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
ZTTtrans
ferspacap
ita 
Pearson 
Correlation -.231
** .050 .438** .185* -.316** .188
* -.032 -.088 -.456** -.115 .854** .123 1 .837** -.278** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .502 .000 .013 .000 .012 .670 .238 .000 .124 .000 .100   .000 .000 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
ZBudTra
nsPercap
ita 
Pearson 
Correlation -.324
** -.439** .402** .107 -.275** .117 .034 -.016 -.395
** -.132 .672** -.219** .837
** 1 -.245** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .152 .000 .118 .653 .836 .000 .078 .000 .003 .000   .001 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
ZROAD
DISTAN
CE 
Pearson 
Correlation -.080 .015 -.120 -.062 .113 -.088 -.039 -.010 .338
** .198** -.256** -.103 -.278** -.245** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .287 .846 .108 .410 .131 .238 .601 .891 .000 .008 .001 .169 .000 .001   
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Source: Author derived from analysis  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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6.3 Financial Sustainability Composite Score 
The study uses four indicators to construct the composite score of financial sustainability 
after correlation screening. These are total expenditure versus the total revenue realised 
by the LGAs, the amount of revenue realised versus the total budgeted expenditure, the 
total expenditure per capita and total government grant versus own source revenues. The 
first measures service-level solvency, the second and third measures budgetary solvency 
and the fourth measures financial independence. The number of indicators fits the 
recommendation of Nunanamaker (1985) regarding the usefulness of DEA, as explained 
in the methodology chapter. The number of indicators should not to exceed one third to 
the assessed organisations for effective DEA results. Thus, four is less than one third of 
the 36 LGAs involved. Before establishing the composite score, variables were 
normalised to bring them into the same scale range. The combination of indicators used 
to establish the composite score leads to a meaning of financial sustainability that 
translates as follows:  
An LGA is better off if it has relatively higher expenditure per person, relatively 
lower dependence on central government grant and relatively larger surplus 
without manipulating its planned expenditures in order to match collected 
revenues.  
The meaning satisfies the main objective of analysing financial sustainability with 
reference to decentralisation reforms. Thus, the comparative performance of LGAs was 
analysed for each of the five years before establishing an average score for overall 
performance.   
The results of the financial sustainability composite score, as presented in figure 6.1, 
indicate that the financial condition of individual LGAs fluctuates in a non-consistent 
pattern over time throughout the period of analysis, except for three LGAs. The three 
LGAs are Kondoa district, Babati Town council and Mwanza city council. The first two 
had declining trend and the third steady performance, which is also the best performance 
throughout the period of analysis. Thus, out of 36 LGAs only one has consistently 
performed better throughout the five year of analysis. 
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Figure 6.1: Variations in LGAs’ Financial Sustainability Composite Score 
  
Source: Author derived from analysis
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However, the general observation on figure 6.1 shows that LGAs with lower financial 
sustainability have higher variations over time compared to those with higher 
performance. Based on components in the composite score, the variations in individual 
LGAs’ financial sustainability suggests one of four implications, or any combination. 
First, individual LGAs have varying capacity to raise revenue compared to their 
expenditure need as reflected in their budgets, or the vice versa. Secondly, individual 
LGAs have varying capacity to offer service to their citizens. The third is that LGAs 
have varying dependence levels in financing their budgets, and the last is that LGAs 
have varying budgetary surplus. 
6.3.1 Financial Sustainability of the Two Groups of LGAs: Independent Samples 
t-Test 
Based on the graphical presentation of composite financial sustainability scores in figure 
6.1, LGAs with relatively well-off communities seem to have better financial 
sustainability compared to the other group. Out of 19 LGAs comprising relatively poor 
communities, only six have an overall performance in the top half of the graph; the rest 
are in the bottom half (see appendix C for councils’ poverty level status). In contrast, 12 
LGAs out of 17 with relatively well-off communities have a performance score above 
average, and only five are in the bottom half of the graph. In order to establish whether 
there is any statistical significance in the differences between the two groups, the 
independent samples t-test is done.  
Before undertaking the t-test, however, the data sets are checked if they meet the 
required assumptions of the t-test. Such assumptions include presence of independent 
samples, normal distribution of dependent variables in each group, and homogeneity of 
the variance between the two groups. Thus, the normality assumption for both groups, 
LGAs with poor communities and those with well-off communities were checked. The 
descriptive statistics presented in table 6.2 indicate financial performance scores are 
considerably normally distributed for each of the two groups. The respective values of 
skewness and kurtosis for a group of LGAs with well-off communities are -0.334 and -
0.718 and for a group comprising a large proportion of poor people are 0.217 and -1.060. 
These are within the range of ±2 suggested by George and Marley (2010).  
The results of Levene’s test, presented in table 6.3, show that the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances holds. The test has a significance p-value of 0.341, which is 
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above the acceptable level of 5%. Thus, it is appropriate to interpret the results of the 
independent t-test based on the “equal variances assumed”. The interpretation of the 
results of independent samples t-test is that there is significant difference in the mean 
score of the two groups of LGAs. The significance value in the t-test for equality of 
means is less than 1%. As shown in table 6.2, the mean score value for the group of 
LGAs with well-off communities is 0.718, which is higher than that of the other group, 
0.575.  
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics for Financial Sustainability Composite Score  
   Statistic Std. Error 
Scores 
LG
A
s w
ith
 R
el
at
iv
el
y 
W
el
l-o
ff
 c
om
m
un
iti
es
 
Mean 0.71780 0.02385 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower 
Bound 0.670371 
 
Upper 
Bound 0.765222 
 
5% Trimmed Mean 0.727071  
Median 0.729854  
Variance 0.048  
Std. Deviation 0.219873  
Minimum 0.168913  
Maximum 1.000000  
Range 0.831087  
Interquartile Range 0.348575  
Skewness -0.334 0.261 
Kurtosis -0.718 0.517 
LG
A
s w
ith
 R
el
at
iv
el
y 
Po
or
 C
om
m
un
iti
es
 
Mean 0.57465 0.02404 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
0.52693  
Upper 
Bound 
0.62238  
5% Trimmed Mean 0.571095  
Median 0.561770  
Variance 0.055  
Std. Deviation 0.234290  
Minimum 0.196719  
Maximum 1.000000  
Range 0.803281  
Interquartile Range 0.403447  
Skewness 0.217 0.247 
Kurtosis -1.060 0.490 
Source: Author derived from analysis 
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Table 6.3: Independent Samples t-Test - Financial Sustainability Score 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
Difference 
 
 
Rich 
 
Poor 
Score Equal 
variances 
assumed 
 
0.910 
 
0.341 
0.000 0.71780 0.57465 
 
 
0.14315 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    0.000 0.71780 0.57465 
 
0.14315 
Source: Author derived from analysis 
 
6.3.2 Independent Samples T-Test on Indicators of Financial Sustainability 
The two groups of LGAs are further analysed based on financial indicators making up 
the composite scores in addition to comparison made on financial sustainability 
composite scores. This is to gain further insight into which group performs better in each 
of the financial indicators making up the composite scores. Thus, the researcher 
performs independent samples t-tests for each variable; the results are presented in table 
6.4. 
The first indicator is total expenditure per person, which assesses the ability to offer 
services. The independent samples t-test for this variable indicates that there is 
significant difference in the average amount spent per person by the two groups of 
LGAs. LGAs with well-off communities have higher average expenditure per person 
than their counterparts. The average normalised expenditure per person (on a scale of 0 
to 1) is 0.463 for LGAs with well-off communities and 0.334 for LGAs with poor 
communities. This implies that the former have a higher capacity to spend per person in 
service provision than the latter. Also, Levene’s test signifies that the variation is 
statistically significant since its p-value is less than 1%.  
The second variable is total expenditure over total revenues, which assesses budgetary 
solvency. The difference of this variable from 1 indicates either surplus if it is positive 
or operating deficit if it is negative. The result of the t-test shows that there is no 
statistical difference in their level of operating surplus despite a slight difference in their 
mean values. On average, LGAs with well-off communities consumed 79.3% of their 
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revenue while the other groups consumed 82.2%, but the p-value is 0.139 which is not 
significant. Thus, the difference in their level of ex-post operating surplus is not 
statistically evident.  
Table 6.4: Independent Samples T-Test - Indicators Making Up Composite Score  
  
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Mean 
Differe
nce 
      Rich Poor   
Total 
Expenditure 
per capita 
(normalised) 
Equal variances 
assumed 1.283 0.259 .000 0.463 0.334 0.129 
Equal variances 
not assumed     .000 0.463 0.334 0.129 
Total 
Expenditure 
to total 
Revenues 
Equal variances 
assumed 0.224 0.637 0.139 0.793 0.822 -0.029 
Equal variances 
not assumed     0.138 0.793 0.822 -0.029 
Total 
Revenue to 
Budgeted 
Expenditure 
Equal variances 
assumed 1.508 0.221 0.499 0.996 0.970 0.026 
Equal variances 
not assumed     0.505 0.996 0.970 0.026 
Total 
Government 
grant to Total 
Own Source 
Revenue 
(normalised) 
Equal variances 
assumed 0.14 0.709 .000 0.2295 0.364 -0.1345 
Equal variances 
not assumed     .000 
 
0.2295
  
0.364  -0.1345 
Source: Author derived from analysis 
The third indicator used to establish an overall performance score is total actual revenues 
mobilised over budgeted total expenditures. The results of independent samples t-test in 
table 6.4 shows that there are no statistically significant differences in the proportion of 
revenues raised compared to their budgeted expenditures. LGAs with well-off 
communities seem to have a higher proportion of actual revenue to budgeted expenditure 
(0.996 versus 0.970) but the p-value is insignificant (0.449). This implies that the 
difference happened by chance, because the Lavene’s test p-value as shown in table 6.4 
is above 5%. The interpretation is that, on average both groups of LGAs could not 
manage to raise sufficient revenue to cover their budgeted expenditure. This implies that 
LGAs have to adjust their expenditure to fit revenue raised. Despite both groups of 
130 
 
LGAs having an operating surplus on their actual performance (ex-post), they 
experienced a slight ex-ante budgetary deficit.   
The fourth indicator is government grant to own source revenues, which is used as an 
indicator of financial independence. The analysis on this indicator shows LGAs with 
well-off communities are less dependent on central government grants than those with 
poor communities. As shown in table 6.4, the average dependence ratio on central 
government grants is 0.2295 for the first group and 0.3640 for the latter. The p-value in 
Lavene’s test is less than 1% which implies that the difference between the two groups 
is statistically evident. The interpretation is that LGAs with relatively poor communities 
are heavily dependent on government grants, despite having lower expenditure per 
person.  
6.4 Analysis of Explanatory Variables of Financial Sustainability 
The following analysis of the way financial sustainability varies among LGAs examines 
variables which provide explanations for the variation. Knowing how the financial 
sustainability varies between LGAs provides less information for those who wish to 
know the reasons. Also, it does not show its relationship with variables that are related 
to the design and implementation of decentralisation reforms. Thus, this section 
examines factors that are likely to explain the reasons for variation, while simultaneously 
referring to decentralisation reforms. In this analysis, the composite financial 
sustainability score becomes the dependent variable, and other variables, identified 
according to the literature and relevance to the study, are involved as independent 
variables.  
6.4.1 Regression Analysis and Results 
As explained in the methodology chapter, subsection 5.7.4, the regression analysis on 
explanatory variables of financial sustainability utilises pooling regression model and 
the random effects regression model. The explanatory variables in both models, pooling 
OLS and random effects model, have similar signs but they slightly differ in terms of 
magnitude (see table 6.6). Thus, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test helped in 
choosing the more appropriate model out of these two options. The results of this test, 
shown in table 6.5, indicate a significant p-value of 0.02876. The test rejects the null 
hypothesis that there is no panel effect, hence random effect is preferred. This 
corresponds with Plumper and Troeger’s (2004) argument that in the presence of time 
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invariant independent varibles, the random effects model should work better than pooled 
OLS. As explained in the methodology, the study employs Tobit regression model along 
with the random effects model for crosschecking the consistency of the estimated results.   
Table 6.5: The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier: Testing the Presence of Random Effects in panel 
(Pooling Least Squares regression Vs Random Effects Regression Model) 
p-value = 0.02876 
chisq = 4.7816, df = 1, p-value = 0.02876 
Alternative hypothesis: significant effects 
Source: Author derived from analysis 
 
Validation tests, such as residual plot, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity tests show 
that the model is robust. The visualisation of the residual plot shows that the normality 
assumption is not violated, while the result of the Breusch-Pagan test indicates an 
insignificant p-value of 0.2412 which implies that there is no heteroscedasticity. 
Similarly, the result of the Breusch-Godfrey test indicates an insignificant p-value of 
0.214 which implies that there is no serial correlation in the model. The variables in the 
estimated model are considered exogenous because the dependent variable is just an 
aggregation of four different indicators. On the other hand, multicollinearity has been 
controlled from the initial stage of analysis by examining correlation values among 
variables. All variables in the final model have a correlation of less than 0.6. Also, as 
presented in table 6.6, the result of the random effects model corresponds with that of 
the Tobit regression. 
The final model identifies five significant variables out of six with p-values of less than 
5%. The first is the level of richness of the people living in LGAs, i.e. whether an LGA 
comprises relatively well-off communities or not. Others are population size, the council 
size in square kilometres, variations in the flow of central government grants and the 
type of audit report. However, the model has r-square of only 34.89% which leaves part 
of the variations in financial sustainability unexplained. The results indicate that the 
efforts in own source revenue collection has no influence on variations in financial 
sustainability among LGAs. The discussion of explanatory variables and their 
implications for decentralisation follow in the next subsection.
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Table 6.6 Results of Regression Analysis 
   
Pooled OLS Random Effects Regression Model 
Tobit Regression Model 
(Censored Regression) 
Coefficients Pr(>|t|) Coefficients  Pr(>|t|) Coefficients  Pr(>t) 
(Intercept) 0.565451 < 2.2e-16*** 0.581639 < 2.2e-16 *** 0.55324 < 2e-16 *** 
Richness -0.076262 0.015918 * -0.07661 0.012992 * -0.08897 0.015497 * 
ZActual TotalTransfers ratio 0.079239 3.13E-07 *** 0.076513 6.34E-07 *** 0.09097 2.07E-06 *** 
ZPopulation -0.066025 1.81E-05 *** -0.064528 1.42E-05 *** -0.07223 1.75E-05 *** 
ZSqKm -0.051916 0.001177 ** -0.051332 0.001193 ** -0.05718 0.000459 ** 
ZOwn Source Revenue ratio 0.024251 0.11332 0.017768 0.248123 0.02223 0.214398 
Auditreport 0.086346 0.00592 ** 0.07454 0.015114 * 0.1127 0.001303 ** 
 R-Squared:      0.37414 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.35959 
F-statistic: 17.2363 on 6 and 
173 DF,  
p-value: 1.4001e-15 
  
R-Squared: 0.36299, Adjusted 
R-Squared: 0.34888 
F-statistic: 16.4305 on 6 and 
173 DF,  
p-value: 6.0747e-15 
Right censored observations 
are  25 out of 180 
Log-likelihood: -5.103795 on 
8 Df 
Source: Author   derived from analysis 
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6.4.2 Discussion of the Results: Explanatory Variables of Financial Sustainability 
In line with the literature reviewed in chapter three, the observed explanatory variables 
of financial sustainability can be classified as internal or external to LGAs. The results 
identify one internal and four external factors that contribute to variations in the financial 
sustainability of LGAs in Tanzania. The internal factor is the audit report status, which 
represents financial management practices; and the external factors are relative poverty 
level, the flow of central government grants, population size, and council size in square 
kilometres. The classification is summarised in figure 6.2, while the discussion of these 
factors follows in next subsections. 
Figure 6.2: Explanatory Factors of LGAs’ Financial Sustainability in Tanzania 
Source: Author derived from analysis 
 
6.4.2.1 The Influence of Financial Management Practices on Financial 
Sustainability 
The results show that the type of audit report, which reflects financial management 
practices, contributes negatively to variations in financial sustainability. Contrary to the 
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financial sustainability, LGAs with unclean audit reports seem to have stronger financial 
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conditions for grant allocations, this seems insufficient to discourage malfunction in 
financial management practices. Usually before receiving grant allocations, LGAs are 
assessed by independent consultant teams based on a number of indicators, of which the 
type of audit report is one (URT, 2008).  
Moreover, along with internal and external auditing, the government introduced a 
computerised management information system in 2002 in order to improve the planning 
process and financial management of local government. However, the existence of 
malpractice in LGAs’ financial management, as reflected in the regression results, 
suggests that all such controls embedded in the decentralisation set-ups are either 
insufficient or ineffective. The interpretation is that LGAs override financial 
management procedures in the course of maximising their financial sustainability 
position. In confirmation of this, the number of LGAs which have been receiving 
unclean audit reports provides additional evidence. For instance, about 36% of the 180 
LGA financial reports (36 LGAs for 5 years) had unclean audit report status. Similarly, 
the average number of councils with unclean reports for the whole country (133 LGAs) 
over the five years is 36.54%. The findings support Tsui’s (2005) claim which states that 
LGAs can use devious means to enhance their fiscal position whenever possible. 
6.4.2.2 The Influence of Relative Poverty Level on Financial Sustainability  
The results of regression analysis shown in table 6.6 indicate that the difference in 
poverty level of the people within LGAs contributes to variations in financial 
sustainability. LGAs comprising a large proportion of poor people are more likely to 
have lower financial sustainability scores. Similarly, the analysis of independent 
samples t-test, in table 6.4, shows that councils with a large proportion of poor people 
also have lower average expenditure per person. Since fiscal decentralisation advocates 
horizontal equity, it is expected that LGAs with poor ability should receive favourable 
consideration in grant distribution. The evidence from Jurado et al. (2015) indicates that 
expenditure in public services significantly reduces inequality and the poverty level. 
Since councils which comprises a large proportion of poor people have lower financial 
sustainability, their ability to sustain service provision is also limited. Hence, the fiscal 
decentralisation system in Tanzania does not seem to offer the prospect of discouraging 
horizontal imbalance in service access.  
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6.4.2.3 The Flow in Central Government Grants and Financial Sustainability 
Another factor identified as contributing to variations in financial sustainability is the 
subsequent release of the grants versus the amount promised at the beginning of financial 
year. The results show that variation in the flow of central government grants contributes 
positively to the variations in financial sustainability, implying that those LGAs which 
received a higher ratio of what had previously been allocated have higher financial 
sustainability. It seems unfair for some LGAs to receive a smaller proportion of what 
has been allocated than do others, as this is likely to perpetuate the variations in financial 
sustainability. As Skidmore and Scoresone (2011) say, decline in revenue share from 
top level (state/central government) affects underlying financial health at the lower level.  
The tendency of attaching allocated grants to specific projects or sector expenditure 
seems to contribute to variations in grant release. Shah (2004) states that it is better for 
decentralisation to distribute central government grants through formulae rather than 
through projects. However, despite the country’s use of formulae, the allocation of 
central government grants for recurrent and development expenditures gives priority to 
five sectors: health, education, water, agriculture and infrastructure. Thus, whenever the 
central government experiences difficulty in meeting its promise for each sector, the 
actual release vary from one LGA to another depending with how much each LGA had 
budgeted for each sector, resulting in variations in financial sustainability. Furthermore, 
Allers and Ishomoi (2011a) have questioned even the ability of formulae to offer 
equitable expenditure to LGAs. 
6.4.2.4 The Influence of Council Size on Financial Sustainability 
The results of quantitative analysis identify that council size in square kilometres has a 
negative relationship with variations in financial sustainability. There has been sufficient 
literature documenting the impact of geographical location on municipal financial 
capacity (Andrews et al., 2005). The results suggest that those LGAs which have larger 
areas are more likely to experience financial sustainability difficulties. This means that 
as the council size increases, the LGAs’ ability to discharge their entrusted functions 
declines. This outcome is congruent with the study of Casal and Gomez (2011) who 
found geographical size to have a negative influence on financial condition. Despite the 
formula for grant allocation in Tanzania to incorporate council size (Allers and Ishemoi, 
2011), it is not enough to have a positive influence on the financial sustainability of 
LGAs.  
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6.4.2.5 The Influence of Population Size on Financial Sustainability 
Population size has a negative relationship with the level of financial sustainability. This 
implies that, as population size increases, the ability of the council to sustain service 
provision declines. Therefore, those councils with relatively large populations are more 
likely to experience lower financial sustainability difficulties. Surprisingly, population 
size is one of the criteria used in the allocation of the central government grants in 
Tanzania (Allers and Ishemoi, 2011a). In this case, LGAs with relatively large 
populations would be expected to receive sufficient central government grants to sustain 
service provision, and to generate sufficient revenue from their internal sources, given 
that the population constitutes the tax base. Casal and Gomez (2014), for instance, found 
a positive relationship between population and budgetary solvency in Spain, because the 
law recognises population size in determining the level of services. However, based on 
our results, we can argue that the impact of population size on service demand is higher 
than its corresponding impact on revenue generation.   
6.4.2.6 Own Source Collection Efforts and Financial Sustainability 
The results of regression analysis show that efforts in own source revenue collection 
have no influence on variations in financial sustainability. These results are contrary to 
the findings of Casal and Gomez (2014), which indicate that tax collection effort is 
capable of providing an early warning sign of the financial condition of municipalities. 
Thus, our findings suggest that the level of effort offered by LGAs makes no difference 
to their financial sustainability.  
6.5 Relationship between Government Grant, Poverty Level and Revenue 
Efforts 
The results of the independent samples t-test, described in section 6.3, have shown that 
LGAs with poorer communities have lower expenditure per person. The question arises 
as to whether grant allocation from the central government considers poverty level of 
the people, as claimed. Further to this, the results of the correlation test indicate that 
expenditure per person and grant per person move together and in the same direction by 
85.4%. It is imperative for grant distribution to consider the level of poverty, because 
this would help to enhance horizontal equity in service access. Along with this, it is 
essential for grant distribution to discourage complacency in LGA budgetary 
responsibilities for the better fiscal performance of the whole country (Hy et al., 1993). 
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Thus, the analysis also aims to identify whether grant allocation discourages soft budget 
practices in terms of revenue collection. 
To examine these two issues, we performed regression analysis on two models. The first 
uses grant allocation per person as dependent variable and the second uses actual 
disbursed grant per person. Both models use revenue collection efforts and income 
poverty level of the people as explanatory variables. In addition, we use population, 
council size in square kilometres, and the type of audit report obtained in the previous 
year as control variables. The aim in involving two models is to assess if the explanatory 
variables have a similar influence on both the amount allocated at the beginning of the 
year and the actual grants disbursed. This reflects Plekhanov’s (2005) and Bahl’s (2000) 
propositions, that central government may transfer the fiscal burden to local government 
whenever it experiences financial difficulties. Consequently, the meaning attached to 
grant allocations can be altered during disbursement. Similarly, Keefer and Khemani 
(2005) state that expenditures aimed to benefit the poor can be deliberately diverted by 
policy makers for political motives, especially when there is weak democracy. In this 
regard, it is important to analyse both grant allocations and actual releases concurrently, 
to identify if there is consistency in grant allocation decisions.  
The analysis employs two regression models which can also incorporate time-invariant 
independent variables in a panel data. These are pooling ordinary least squares and the 
random effects regression model. Then, the study uses the Breusch Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier test to identify the more suitable model. The test results shown in table 6.7 
identify preference for the random effects model, for both the analysis of allocated grants 
and the analysis of actual disbursed grants. Nevertheless, the two models differ in terms 
of significance level of the variables and their r-square values.  
Table 6.7: The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test    
Allocated Grant Disbursed Grant 
p-value= 0.0001379 
chisq =14.53,    df= 1 
p-value = 5.099e-08 
chisq = 29.679, df = 1 
Alternative hypothesis: significant effects  
Source: Author derived from analysis 
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The model for allocated grant per person, as presented in table 6.8, has the adjusted r-
square value of 0.31599 and four significant variables at a p-value of less than 5%. The 
significant variables are weatlh of the people within a council, own source revenue 
collection efforts, population, and council size in square kilometres. In contrast, the type 
of audit report attained by the council in the previous financial year, whether clean or 
not, is not statistically significant. Similarly, the model for actual grant disbursement per 
person in table 6.9, has four significant variables at the p-value of less than 5% and 
adjusted r-square of 0.36512. The significant variables are the same as those in the first 
model, which are wealth of the people within the council, own source revenue collection 
efforts, population, and council size. The type of audit report received by the council in 
the previous financial year is also statistically insignificant.  
The results of both models show that the amount of grant per person is negatively related 
to the poverty level of the people in the councils. This implies that LGAs with a larger 
proportion of people living below the income poverty line have been receiving less 
financial support per person from central government, from allocation to disbursement.  
Table 6.8 Allocated Grant Per Capita 
 Pooled OLS Random effects model 
 Coefficients Pr(>|t|) Coefficients Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.14941 0.47812 0.107235 0.623383 
Richness -0.31972 0.01928* -0.28573 0.005635** 
ZOwnSourceRevs.ratio -0.34501 2.22E-07*** -0.25721 2.30E-05*** 
ZPopulation -0.37814 2.07E-08*** -0.38799 1.97E-10*** 
ZSqKm -0.11036 0.10721 -0.12439 0.006691** 
PrevAuditreport 0.013974 0.91471 0.031494 0.794599 
 R-Squared: 0.32631 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.31543 
 
F-statistic: 16.8555 on 5 
and 174 DF, p-value: 
1.43E-13 
R-Squared: 0.32689     
Adj. R-Squared: 0.31599 
 
F-statistic: 16.9 on 5 and 
174 DF, p-value: 1.33E-13 
Signif. Codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
* Indicates significance at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
** Indicates significance at the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
*** Indicates significance at the 99.9 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
Heteroscedasticity and Serial Correlation consistent Random Effects Models  
Source: Author derived from analysis 
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Table 6.9 Actual Disbursed Grant Per Capita 
Heteroscedasticity and Serial Correlation consistent Random Effects Models  
Source: Author derived from analysis 
However, the coefficient of wealth indicator for the actual grant model (-0.24449) is 
slightly lower than that of the allocated grant model (-0.28573). The implication is that 
the impact of less support per person to LGAs with relatively poor people is slightly 
reduced in the actual grant per person model than in grant allocations. Along with these 
results, the independent samples T-test results in table 6.10 show that, on average, LGAs 
comprising relatively poor people have lower revenue raising capacity per person than 
their counterparts. Therefore, LGAs with a large proportion of poor people are not only 
marginalised by the grant allocation system, but also have lower average ability to raise 
own revenue per person. In this regard, the danger of enhancing inequity in LGAs’ 
ability to offer services to their citizens becomes high. It is contrary to the fiscal 
decentralisation theory, which emphasises grant allocation to motivate horizontal 
balance. The findings are in line with limitations of the grant allocation system identified 
by Allers and Ishemoi (2011a), who identified that the grant allocation formula is based 
on expert opinion rather than on research, and that some grants which are allocated 
through ministerial subventions are subjected to the influence of politicians. 
 
 Pooled OLS Random effects model 
 Coefficients Pr(>|t|) Coefficients Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.122724 0.555606 -0.00915 0.963858 
Richness -0.31535 0.019578* -0.24449 0.042392* 
ZOwnSourceRevs.ratio -0.24795 0.000127*** -0.13539 0.026406* 
ZPopulation -0.42708 2.58E-10*** -0.42858 1.51E-12*** 
ZSqKm -0.15942 0.019107* -0.19515 0.001908** 
PrevAuditreport 0.031598 0.806515 0.099895 0.389544 
 R-Squared: 0.3413  
Adj. R-Squared: 0.32994
  
F-statistic: 18.0327 on 5 
and 174 DF,  
p-value: 2.16E-14 
R-Squared: 0.37771           
Adj. R-Squared: 0.36512
   
F-statistic: 21.1221 on 5 and 
174 DF, p-value: < 2.22E-16 
Signif. Codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
* Indicates significance at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
** Indicates significance at the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
*** Indicates significance at the 99.9 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test. 
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Table 6.10: Independent Samples t-Test for Own Source Revenue Per Capita 
  
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Mean 
Differen
ce 
      Rich Poor   
Own source 
revenues per 
capita  
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
94.69 .000 .000 7132.87 2892.15 4240.72 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    .000 7132.87 2892.15 4240.72 
Source: Author derived from analysis 
 
The results of both models show that there is a significant negative relationship between 
the amount of grant per person, and the level of own source revenue collection efforts. 
This implies that LGAs which have been exerting less effort in revenue collection were 
still receiving large grant allocations and disbursements. Therefore, grant allocations and 
disbursements do not discourage complacency in own source revenue mobilisation. The 
design and operationalisation of the intergovernmental grant system seems to lack 
sufficient control to discourage soft budget constraint practices in LGAs. This poses the 
danger of LGAs always depending on central government transfer, which is not good 
for the long-term sustainability of the fiscal system of the whole country. DeMello 
(2000) and Roden (2002) state that LGA officials consider intergovernmental transfers 
differently from their own source revenues. This makes LGAs feel that their expenditure 
is financed by non-residents, which may escalate their overspending behaviour. Thus, if 
the system does not discourage soft budget practices in LGAs, even the spending of 
money may deviate from the interest of the community served. 
For decentralisation to succeed, imposing fiscal discipline on subnational governments 
is a crucial prerequisite (DeMello, 2000; Shah, 2004). The country has three main 
controls which are supposed to offer protection over the financial performance of LGAs. 
These are external audit undertaken by the Controller and Auditor General- Tanzania 
(CAG-T), council baraza comprising councillors, and the annual assessment for 
minimum conditions undertaken by an independent team of consultants. The council 
baraza is LGA’s specific oversight body that functions simultaneously with council 
operations. The annual assessment for minimum conditions is the only control which is 
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specifically for allocating the development grant for the forthcoming year, although it 
incorporates the external auditing outcome. The assessment evaluates the LGAs’ own 
source revenue mobilisation capacity based on the previous year’s performance. The 
guiding manual (URT, 2008) for the assessment states that revenue mobilisation is 
assessed by actual collection percentage versus budgeted amount and the comparative 
trend against the previous year. If actual collection against budget is 80% or more, 5 
points are scored, if 50-79% the score is 3, and below 50% is 0. If collection exceeded 
the preceding year by 30% or more, 5 points are scored, 10-29% scores 3 and below 10 
is 0. The presence of soft budget practices as identified in the models suggests that the 
assessment for minimum conditions is insufficient to discourage moral hazard. After all, 
the total weight for own source revenue collection is only 10 out of 100 in the whole 
assessment exercise.  
Moreover, both regression models show negative relationships between the amount of 
grant per person, the council size in square kilometres and population. This means that 
those LGAs which have a relatively large area are allocated and receive less grant per 
person. Although the grant allocation formula incorporates council size, this seems to be 
insufficient to compensate for the impact of size. Similarly for population, the amount 
of grant per person, both actual and allocated, has been declining with an increase in the 
number of people. This might be due to the presence of a fixed component in the 
allocated grant: grant allocation comprises a fixed lump sum and a portion which varies 
according to different indicators. In Tanzania, LGAs receive general purpose grants and 
ministerial subventions in addition to recurrent block grants and capital development 
grants which are based on the formula (Allers and Ishemoi, 2011a). 
 
On the other hand, the type of audit report from the previous year was found to be 
statistically insignificant in both cases, the allocated and disbursed government grant per 
person. This result for the type of audit report is contrary to expectations. In the 
assessment for minimum conditions used to guide the allocation of government grants 
to LGAs, the type of external audit for the previous year is one of the criteria (URT, 
2008). However, it seems the weight of this criterion is not sufficient to have a 
significant impact on the amount of grant allocated to LGAs.  
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6.6 Chapter Summary 
The analysis and interpretation of the findings from this chapter suggest that financial 
sustainability of LGAs in Tanzania varies over time and relative to each other. However, 
the group of LGAs comprising a large proportion of poor people has been found to have 
lower financial sustainability performance than the group with well-off communities. 
Further analysis of explanatory variables identifies five factors that contribute to the 
variations: first, the poverty level, whereby LGAs comprising poor communities are 
more likely to have lower financial sustainability; council size in square kilometres 
which suggests that larger area constrains financial sustainability; and population size, 
which also constrains financial sustainability. In contrast, the flow of central government 
grants has been found to contribute to some LGAs having better financial sustainability 
than others; and the type of audit report, which indicates the level of financial 
management, also influences the variation in financial sustainability of LGAs but in the 
opposite direction. Councils with unclean audit reports are more likely to have higher 
financial sustainability, which is contrary to discouraging soft budget constraints. This 
implies that LGAs that tend to override financial management practices are more likely 
to have higher financial sustainability, which is a bad indicator of the effectiveness of 
decentralisation. 
 
The results of regression analysis on explanatory variables of grant distribution in 
subsection 6.4 show grant per capita favours LGAs which are better off. Both allocation 
and actual grant releases per person favour LGAs with more ability to generate revenue 
from their own sources. Based on these findings, the design and operationalisation of 
decentralisation seem to contradict decentralisation theory in relation to equity 
enhancement. The obvious impact of marginalising LGAs with lower ability to raise 
revenue, and which also have a large proportion of poor communities, is to perpetuate 
inequity is service provision. The evidence from Jurado et al. (2015) indicates that 
expenditure in public services significantly reduces inequality and the poverty level. 
Some literature, in section 2.3, suggests that the movement of people can stabilise 
differences in LGAs’ ability to offer services, but this option is not viable in Tanzania. 
The reason is that land, which is immobile, is a major factor of production and 
agriculture is the backbone of the national economy. Litvack et al. (1998) state that in 
many developing countries migration is limited because of the unavailability of a ready 
market for land, which is the main factor of production.  
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On the other hand, the interpretation of the findings suggests that the decentralisation 
system lacks sufficient controls to discourage creative financial management and soft 
budget practices. First, the results suggest that financial sustainability is negatively 
related to financial management practice; councils with unclean audit reports are more 
likely to have stronger financial sustainability. This suggests that LGAs which undertake 
creative financial management practices are more likely to improve their financial 
sustainability. Secondly, the analysis found that own source revenue collection efforts 
have a negative relationship with grant allocations and disbursements. The implication 
is that LGAs which receive higher allocations and grant releases per person tend to exert 
less effort in mobilising their own revenue, and vice versa. The logic is that officials of 
LGAs which receive large grants per person becomes relaxed and hence exert less effort.  
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CHAPTER 7 : CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES 
AND APPROACHES USED TO MITIGATE THEM 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the impact of financial difficulties on LGAs’ operations, ways 
used to tackle these difficulties, and associated challenges. The discussion offers 
feedback on the overall aim of decentralisation of improving service provision in 
general, using the qualitative information derived from interviews conducted with 
officials of three councils. As discussed in the literature review, the success of 
decentralisation in service provision depends on LGAs’ ability to deliver their functions. 
Thus, limitations in their operations arising from financial difficulties also imply 
impediments to the success of decentralisation. The chapter starts by presenting the 
consequences of financial difficulties for LGAs’ operations, followed by discussion of 
the ways used by LGAs to mitigate these difficulties and strengthen their financial 
sustainability. Thereafter, it presents the challenges experienced by LGAs in the course 
of improving their financial sustainability and ends with a chapter summary. 
Table 7.1:Chapter Coverage in Summary 
Stage Process Objective 
1st Discussing the impact of financial 
difficulties, whenever they arise, on 
budget execution  
To identify areas which are 
highly vulnerable whenever 
financial difficulty arises and the 
implications for service 
provision 
2nd Discussing approaches used by LGA 
officials to handle any financial difficulties 
and to improve financial sustainability 
To identify approaches used to 
mitigate difficulties, and their 
corresponding impact on service 
provision 
3rd Discussing challenges faced by LGAs in 
improving financial sustainability 
To identify obstacles that 
constrain LGAs’ efforts in 
improving financial 
sustainability 
Source: Author 
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7.2 Consequences of Financial Difficulties in LGAs’ Operations 
Despite the findings described in section 6.4 to show that some LGAs’ financial 
sustainability is relatively better than others’, all LGAs in the sample experienced 
financial difficulties at least once in the five years. Based on independent samples t-test 
of the ex-ante budgetary solvency indicator (table 6.4, subsection 6.3.2), neither of the 
two groups of LGAs involved in the quantitative analysis could finance their budgeted 
expenditure over the five years of analysis. Similarly, based on this indicator, none of 
the 36 LGAs could raise revenue to finance budgeted expenditure consistently 
throughout the five years. This implies that there are times when LGAs experience 
financial difficulties in financing their planned expenditure. The immediate impact of 
this difficulty is reflected in LGAs’ ability to execute expenditure budgets on service 
provision, although in the long term the impact may extend to the perpetuation of 
poverty.  
As Hastings et al. (2015b) observed, reduction in financial support from the central 
government affects LGA’s ability to offer services. The report of Hastings et al. (2015b) 
indicates that government’s austerity program has led to budget cuts in English 
municipalities that consequently started to affect services provision. Although an 
austerity program is not in effect in Tanzania, the reduction of fiscal support has a similar 
impact on LGAs’ ability to offer services. The official C who is a chairperson of council 
K, for instance, admitted that, “… this year [2014/15] we have many projects that we 
could not implement because the fund from central government could not be disbursed”. 
Similarly, official R2 who is the revenue accountant in case study T said that, “there are 
many development projects that are stacking up ... we are blamed that we are 
squandering the money but the reality is that the money is not coming [from the central 
government]”.  
Observation suggests that development expenditure is much more highly vulnerable 
than recurrent expenditure. A good example is provided by official C, the chairperson  
in case study K who identified that the flow of the recurrent grant is very good, “but it 
is in development projects that we have a headache”. The severity of the impact on 
development expenditure seems to be attributed to greater dependence on central 
government grants in this category. Official C, the chairperson in case study B explained 
that, “in development projects, to a large extent we are just waiting until the funds are 
disbursed [by the central government]”. This corresponds with the proposition of 
146 
 
Skidmore and Scorsone (2011) that decline in financial support from higher government 
level could have adverse effects on LGAs’ fiscal condition. On the other hand, the 
observation suggests own source revenue not only constitutes a small part of LGAs’ 
expenditure budgets (only 7.4% for 36 LGAs; see descriptive statistics relating to the 
previous chapter in appendix D), but also that councils have discretion over its 
allocation. For instance, the revenue accountant in case study T said, “own sources 
revenues are used for running offices ... to run offices involves many things, including 
paying allowances to staff, purchase of stationery, running meetings, purchasing office 
furniture. However, grants are for facilitating development projects”. This suggests that 
own source revenue is mainly allocated to recurrent expenditure, hence providing cover 
for any shock in the flow of the central government grant. Moreover, the group of 36 
LGAs involved in the quantitative analysis collected an average of 86.16% of their annul 
targets, which is slightly higher than the rate of total grant released for the same group, 
83.75%. 
Moreover, the sensitivity of cost components comprised in recurrent expenditure makes 
this category less vulnerable. Recurrent expenditure budgets comprise personal 
emoluments of LGAs’ staff, which is sensitive to any under-release of funding because 
of possible reaction from council staff. Therefore, whenever there are insufficient funds 
to finance both categories at once, recurrent expenditure supersedes development 
expenditure. In all three case studies, officials acknowledge that the flow of the recurrent 
grant is good. However, their concern is that recurrent grants cannot provide significant 
improvement in service provision as people expect. “The money we are getting is for 
normal expenses such as paying salaries ... This goes to all the staff in health centres and 
other areas; how can you expect results in improving services?” (official C, the 
chairperson in case study T).  
Given the under-release of government grants, LGAs’ officials admit that they have been 
struggling in executing their responsibilities.  In case study B, for instance, the official 
A who is in charge of budgetary coordination said that the council has difficulty even in 
providing sufficient explanations to citizens whenever approved grants are not received. 
This official noted that “people at lower levels have already sat down and agreed [on 
which projects to implement], so if the fund is not disbursed it becomes an issue”. The 
same situation was found in case study T, where the council chairperson felt that the 
grant allocation puts the council into discord with its people, because citizens always 
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think that funds have been received but not spent accordingly. “Once we have 
established targets, we are required to publish them on notice boards; it has to be open 
on notice boards. Now, once the ordinary citizens see a budget showing that we are 
going to construct a road of two, three or four kilometres, their understanding is that the 
fund is already available and the project is going to be implemented” (Senior finance 
official R, case study T). Similarly, official E who is in charge of planning department  
in case study K noted that due to the non-predictability of the grants, the council even 
refrained from publishing some budget figures on council notice boards. “There were 
times we were issuing notices, but even issuing projections had problems. We were 
projecting the distribution of the fund to villages based on population but when you issue 
a projection the villagers interpret this as the fund already being there”. Therefore, it 
becomes difficult for the council to explain to ordinary citizens when it receives a 
smaller amount than that published in the budget figures.  
While explaining the impact of financial difficulties to the council one official said, “we 
have started a health centre at [ward name withheld], but to date no fund has been 
received, after more than three years; it has ceased” (Council chairperson, case study T). 
Meanwhile the official in charge of budgeting coordination in case study B said that at 
the time the researcher was in the field, there was construction of health centres in two 
wards. However, this official noted that “they are also having some delays because for 
instance in the last year we expected to receive some funds but they were not disbursed”. 
He further noted that many projects in the health sector have stopped because there is 
no funding. “You plan in the budget but you can wait up to two years without getting 
funding, although every time you include it in a budget and citizens have already started 
contributing their efforts”. He also discussed the construction projects for agricultural 
extension resource centres in two wards, “but it reached a point where they stopped” 
because the funds were not released. However, he noted that, “this year a fund is 
provided, but I don’t think it will be sufficient to finish [the work]”.  
On the field visit, the researcher physically observed some unfinished buildings for 
classrooms in a school which is at the town centre of case study B. In the same school, 
one building was at the level which require roofing but it looked older than another one 
which was just at the foundation stage. This prompted the researcher to ask for 
clarification. In response, the official in charge for budgetary coordination said, “it is the 
contribution of the citizens which goes as far as the level of roofing; then they wait for 
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the government to fund the remaining part ... So it is the citizens who have done their 
part and have started on the new one”. Meanwhile in case study K, the council 
chairperson said, “this year we have many projects that we could not implement because 
the funds from central government could not be disbursed”. The official mentioned 
maintenance of school buildings and construction of five ward offices as examples of 
projects affected by such difficulties.  
Generally, LGA officials explained that the most affected projects are those which 
involve construction of buildings in the health and education sectors. However, other 
sectors such as water and agriculture, were also mentioned. As explained in chapter four, 
the allocation of grants in Tanzania is intended to consider five priority areas: education, 
health, water, agriculture and roads. Thus, if there is any shortage in fund disbursement, 
it implies that services in such sectors will be affected. The problem of under-
disbursement of grants has persisted throughout the five years of analysis (2008/09-
2012/13) in all LGAs. The CAG report (2014) shows under-disbursement for the whole 
country over the five years reaching an average of 39.2% of the approved development 
grant, and an average of 11.6% for the recurrent grant. Nevertheless, the report revealed 
that the under-release of grants is attributed to central government’s budget deficit. For 
the year 2012/13, for instance, donor withdrawal contributed to a deficit that caused 
under-release of 38% of the development grants to LGAs. This is consistent with the 
joint report prepared by Rutahiwa (2013: 41) which states that: 
The scale of Budget Support peaked during the three fiscal years 2007/08 – 
2009/10, and in nominal Tanzania shillings has since declined by 11% from that 
3-year average. The number of partners providing Budget Support has reduced, 
from 14 to 12, with the withdrawal of the Netherlands and Switzerland.  
 
Apart from under-release, the timing in the flow of such grants has been found to be a 
major concern, contributing to difficulties in implementing council activities. Officials 
in all three case studies showed dissatisfaction with the flow of the development grant, 
to the extent of failing to implement some projects as scheduled. In contrast, officials 
offered positive explanations regarding the flow and timing of recurrent grants. While 
explaining their concern over the timing of development grants, the official in charge of 
budgetary coordination in case study B said the money is sometimes released at the end 
of the year. As a result, “if we have to undertake the purchasing procedures, it takes 
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almost three months before the contractor starts the work”. This implies that the money 
will have to be carried forward, hence the expenditure will have to be made beyond the 
existing financial year. While clarifying why councils sometimes find themselves with 
huge account balances at the end of financial year, the official said, “someone gives you 
money at the end of the year, how can you say that the person has less capacity to 
spend?”.  
 
The impact of carrying forward received funds aimed to serve the community limits 
access to services. The Controller and Auditor General has also shown concern about 
the unspent amount in LGAs. The CAG report (2014:42) specifically states that, 
“unutilized development grants imply that some of the approved development activities 
in the respective LGAs were either partially or not implemented at all, and therefore the 
earmarked benefits to the intended community have not been achieved”.  
However, according to council officials, the central government has issued directives 
which require LGAs to allocate 60% of their own source revenue to development 
expenditure from 2015/16. This is expected to reduce the impact of the non-
predictability of government grants on development expenditure. Prior to this directive, 
LGAs were spending the money on a discretionary basis, hence mainly for recurrent 
expenditure. The policy seems to be a control tool for LGAs to exert more effort in 
enforcing revenue collection beyond that required to cover their running costs. 
Nevertheless, LGA officials appeared unconvinced that the remaining 40% would 
suffice to run the offices in some councils with limited own source revenues. The official 
in charge of budgetary coordination in case study B said that central government should 
have made an assessment before introducing the policy, since the capacity of councils 
differs. He feels that the policy will limit the ability of the council to cover its office 
expenses. Further, the view of the LGA officials is that the policy undermines LGAs’ 
autonomy in budgeting decisions.  
7.3 Approaches to Tackling Financial Difficulties and Enhancing Financial 
Sustainability 
Following the unpredictable trend in the flow of central government grants, LGAs have 
been striving to find ways to keep themselves financially sustainable. Generally, these 
methods can be grouped into two categories, short-term and long-term approaches. The 
short-term techniques include cutting down and/or postponement of expenditure and 
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harnessing contributions from individuals and other stakeholders. Long-term techniques 
aim at enhancing revenue generation, with greater emphasis on revenue sources which 
do not directly involve citizens.  
7.3.1 Involving People and Other Stakeholders in Project Financing 
The decentralisation policy insists on citizen participation from planning to 
implementation of council projects. As a result the study found LGA officials utilise 
such opportunities as a strategy to enhance their financial sustainability. “What we do is 
to use available opportunities and not just to rely on the government budget. To initiate 
fund rising, we sit down with the citizens in their respective areas, and tell them so that 
they can also help” (Council chairperson, in case study T). The findings from the three 
comparative case studies indicate that this strategy has been useful especially in 
implementation of development projects. According to the CAG-T report for the year 
2012/13, the contributions can be of two types, in cash and in kind. In the case of cash 
contributions, the LGA raises a specified amount of money from individuals or a group 
of individuals to finance part of a specified project. For instance, in case study T the 
chairperson said that in addressing the shortage of desks in schools “we have already 
informed them [citizens] of the arrangement, and they will contribute so much and the 
council will contribute so much ... that is our strategy for ensuring that we reduce the 
extent of the needs of our citizens so as to meet their demand”.   
Meanwhile, the contribution in kind encompasses individuals and other stakeholders in 
directly participating in providing services that would otherwise have to be offered by 
the council. Council officials just remain as coordinators. The use of contributions in 
kind is similar to the observation made by Nelson (2012), who found some 
municipalities in the US were using volunteers in some activities as a strategy for dealing 
with financial difficulties, instead of recruiting new staff. In case study T, individuals 
are involved in solid waste management by forming groups which take responsibility, 
for the cleanliness of their respective streets. “Our city is clean ... we are shaping our 
citizens in such a way that they are the ones who help us in keeping the city clean; we 
are encouraging them to initiate cleanliness groups” (Council chairperson, case study 
T). The council officials only provide coordination assistance through street 
chairpersons. Also, on every first Saturday of the month, council officials make physical 
visits to inspect cleanliness. This has resulted in the city having tidy streets. Similarly, 
in case study B official M who is a senior finance officer explained that the council 
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involved citizens in cleaning their streets, but that the contribution was in financial 
terms. “There is a fee for solid waste; we collect solid waste, but that is for residents 
who use such services”. Meanwhile the official in charge of budgetary coordination said 
that council B also involves private surveyors who enter into agreement with the citizens 
to survey their plots, because the council does not have sufficient capacity. This results 
in the council having buildings constructed on surveyed plots, except in village areas; 
without the involvement of private surveyors, the council would be attracting squatters 
to the town centre, which would hinder distribution of services such as water supply and 
waste collection. With unplanned building it is not easy to distribute networked services 
such as water, electricity and sewage systems. 
Most common in all three case studies is involvement which combines both financial 
and non-financial contributions, especially in the construction of community service 
buildings, including schools, health centres and ward offices. Citizens are asked to 
contribute basic materials which require a financial outlay to furnish such projects to a 
certain level, and to engage physically in the construction of such projects. In case study 
B, for instance, when explaining the involvement of citizens in the construction of school 
buildings and health centres official in charge of budgetary coordination said: 
all projects which are at lower levels require people to start themselves to 
undertake construction work, such as establishing the foundation, although 
engineers are also present to oversee that it is initiated correctly… It is the 
contribution of the citizens which goes to the level of roofing then waits for the 
government to fund the remaining part.  
In the planning and budgeting process, LGAs involve citizens through O&OD. This 
makes citizens aware that they will have to contribute to the construction of certain 
buildings as soon as the council budgets are approved. The same approach of involving 
people facilitated one council (case study K) to construct dispensaries in border areas 
and ward offices in seven out of fifteen wards. The number of dispensaries and health 
centres in the council increased from 17 in 2008 to 22 in 2012 (case study K and NBS11, 
2013). With the use of a similar strategy, the council has planned to construct at least 
two dispensaries in each financial year.  
                                                          
11 Council K’s Social Economic Profile: Jointly prepared with the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 
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Generally, the contribution of individuals in council activities throughout the country is 
invaluable. It would amount to a very significant sum if LGAs had to pay for. However, 
according to CAG-T (2014), until December 2013 the contribution had never been 
recognised in books of accounts, despite its relevance in enhancing LGAs’ financial 
sustainability. The LAAC committee had to recommend that the government recognise 
both contributions, in cash and in kind, in councils’ accounting records. “Cash 
contributions will have to be reflected in the LGAs’ accounts whereas contributions in 
kind will be disclosed in the financial statements by way of a note”, (CAG-T, 2014; 27).  
7.3.2 Postponing Expenditure 
LGA officials in Tanzania have relied heavily on cutting down expenditure whenever 
they experience financial difficulties. This corresponds to postponing some of the 
intended activities, provided that they remain a priority, and relevant, in the next budget 
period. Beckett-Camarata (2004) and Nelson (2012) observed similar techniques of 
postponing or cutting down expenditure in some US municipalities to cope with 
financial difficulties. When explaining the strategies the council uses when the 
government grant is not disbursed, the official in charge of planning department in case 
study K said “we suspend that project”. However, if the project is still relevant, the 
official said “because it is a priority project, we don’t cancel it, we carry it forward. So 
the project becomes a priority in the order of implementation”. It has been found that 
the approach of postponing expenditure, particularly for development projects, is also 
preferred by the central government. Official in charge of budgetary coordination  in 
case study B said that whenever the central government grant is not disbursed the council 
cuts off the expenditure, “except for development projects”. For such projects, the 
council has been advised to “re-budget them afresh for that amount which is not 
disbursed”. However, re-budgeting is similar to writing off in the books of accounting 
as non-recoverable. In addition, re-budgeting raises one more technical question, as to 
how such amount can be re-budgeted when the following year has its own ceiling. What 
if the amount to be re-budgeted is higher than the ceiling for the next year? Similarly, in 
case study T, official R who is senior finance officer said that grant allocation, “says 
how much we are going to get for which project, so whatever we will get for that specific 
project is what we are going to spend”. Thus, if an activity is not funded, it is either 
cancelled or carried forward to the next financial year.  
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7.3.3 Expanding Revenue Sources  
In the course of enhancing councils’ financial sustainability and in order to reduce 
reliance on central government grants, LGA officials have identified alternative ways to 
widen their revenue sources. As official in charge of budgetary coordination in case 
study B noted, the central government is reducing its support, hence ability to generate 
revenue is becoming a key for LGAs’ survival. It is the trend for under-release of grant 
disbursements, as explained in subsection 7.2, which makes them feel that the 
government is reducing its support to LGAs. Findings from all three case studies shows 
councils have a common focus towards the improvement of their financial condition. 
The creativity of specific councils’ management in identifying opportunities according 
to their environment has been found to be the key in identifying such alternatives.  
One of the ways the councils use to increase their revenue sources is through the sale of 
land. Officials in all three case studies identified the proceeds from the sale of plots and 
the consequent benefits will increase their financial sustainability. Despite the revenue 
from the sale of plots being short term in nature, because the sale is made only once, 
officials identified the benefits that accrued as significant. They include revenue from 
land rent, fees on issuance of construction permits and approval of architectural designs, 
property tax after construction of buildings, and service levy.  
Regarding the sale of plots, in case study K official RA who is in charge of revenue 
mobilisation said “the plan we have this financial year (2014/15) is to sell 6,000 plots; 
they are still in progress”. This official further noted that “once we have sold these plots 
it means people will engage in different activities; there are factory site areas, so 
factories will be established, and economic activities and houses will increase as well”. 
All these will boost revenue sources to the council. Similarly, in case study B officials 
identified that the council expected to sell plots for two consecutive years, which would 
bring revenue to the council. One senior finance official said, “we thought if we could 
sell plots we could get revenues; if we could sell plots consecutively in two years in 
areas where we are surveying it could be a good source of revenues”. However, the 
budgetary coordination official admitted that the council failed to sell these plots as 
expected because of a dispute with the land owners. The sale is expected to be continued 
as soon as the dispute is resolved. Meanwhile, in case study T, the official in charge of 
planning department said that the council has farms with long-term leases which pose a 
major challenge in surveying plots for sale; as a result the council misses some potential 
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revenue. This official said, “we fail to extend swiftly hence we miss revenues because 
if people build residential buildings we could get revenues from different ways; there is 
land rent, property tax, etc.”. 
Another strategy pursued by LGAs to enhance revenue sources is through engaging in 
investment projects. This option is similar to the one of the strategies Beckett-Camarata 
(2004) observed in Ohio, in the US. The only exception is that officials in Ohio made 
efforts to attract investments, while in this study LGAs are actively engaging in 
investment projects, some executed in collaboration with private investors. All three 
case studies are active in investment projects that aim to generate revenue without 
involving taxpayers. “We have started to establish other sources apart from those which 
depend on citizens; in the budget for this year (2014/15) we have included a shopping 
mall with a conference hall” (official A who is in charge of budgetary coordination, case 
study B). This official also explained that the council has a plan to improve business 
frames which surround the bus stands so that they can attract improved letting fees. “We 
were considering how we can write a proposal that will allow us to enter into a contract 
with someone to construct one-storey buildings around the bus stands, and then our 
revenue will come from leasing them instead of just following someone to ask for the 
money”. The bus stand is owned by the council but the existing frames are owned by 
individuals who are under contract to the council until after the lapse of a certain period. 
However, they are still paying fees to the council, although the amount was said to be 
very small. 
Similarly, the official in charge of planning department in case study T said that, “we 
want to construct a five-storey building in collaboration with another government 
agency... It won’t involve asking collection agents what we can do; we will know that 
our building is bringing money”. Beside the building project, officials explained that the 
council had set aside an area for factory sites so as to attract investors. Meanwhile in 
case study K, officials confirmed that the council had already allocated investment areas 
for various projects to be developed by private investors. According to official C who is 
a chairperson in case study K, the council lacked a reliable electricity supply for many 
years, which made it unattractive to investors, but “In the near future, the council will 
provide an electricity network to about 75% of the area”, which will facilitate the swift 
implementation of development projects.  
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Council officials also consider expanding revenue sources through investment projects 
as a way of reducing not only reliance on central government but also reliance on 
revenues directly charged from individuals. One official who is dealing with revenue 
mobilisation in case study B said that sometimes citizens are not happy when they see 
LGA officials in the streets enforcing revenue collection. They feel that they are victims. 
Nevertheless, LGAs official blamed bureaucratic arrangements and lack of policy 
support for constraining their ability to participate in investment projects. The official in 
charge of the planning department said that councils have to ask permission from the 
Prime Minister’s Office if they are to enter into partnership to implement investment 
projects and/or to acquire loans to finance such proposals. This is despite the central 
government having introduced a public private partnership policy in 2009. Regulation 
governing the implementation of the policy requires all projects that LGAs would like 
to collaborate with the private sector, must be reviewed and get approval of the central 
government. Thus according to LGA officials, their initiatives to expand revenue bases 
through investiment are limited by bureacratic procedures which are not coherent with 
reform execution.  
 
7.4. Challenges to Enhancing Financial Sustainability 
7.4.1 Own Source Revenue Enforcement  
All three councils involved as case studies are attempting to increase revenue collected 
from their own sources. In the course of doing this they use both agents and their own 
staffs to enforcing collection. For sources which have been outsourced, councils seem 
to be assured that these amounts meet the expected targets. In order to ensure the council 
does not lose revenue from these subcontracted revenue sources, officials in all councils 
confirmed that contractual agreements include a specific clause to bind agents. The 
official in charge for budgetary coordination in case study B, for instance, said that the 
council requires all agents to meet or exceed the budgeted amount. This requirement is 
enforced by a clause which requires agents to deposit a certain amount in advance at the 
beginning of the contractual arrangement, to hedge against potential loss. The amount 
required is equivalent to two months’ revenue collection targets, as agreed between the 
two parties. The official further noted that if the agent “doesn’t remit in the first month 
we deduct one month’s collection from the security; if he/she doesn’t submit in the 
second month, we deduct from the balance of the security”. Thereafter the contract 
ceases and the council starts to collect through its own staff. Meanwhile in case studies 
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K and T, the use of penalties to enforce remittance of revenues from outsourced sources 
is common. In case study T, one of the conditions to own source revenue collectors is to 
remit the agreed amount within the first five days of the month following the collection 
month. Otherwise, a 20% penalty will apply for a delay of five days. This is similar to 
case study K, where the senior finance officer said “we have a clause in the contract we 
are signing with them [agents]; it says once you delay one day there will be a certain 
percent as a penalty”.  
However, there are still challenges to the council associated with the use of agents in 
enforcing collections. The first is the trustworthiness of the agents. As explained by 
senior finance officer M in case study B, the revenue collection from outsourced sources 
is not problematic, except for some agents who are not trustworthy and who tend to 
terminate their contract before its completion. This official said that this is because they 
bid to collect large amounts without undertaking sufficient research. As a result, when 
the agent goes into the field to execute the contract, the reality is different from what the 
agent perceived when the bid was submitted. Official R who is responsible for revenue 
mobilisation in case study B said that despite the council undertaking a feasibility study 
before outsourcing, the procurement law requires them to award the tender to the highest 
bidder. If the council decides otherwise, it may attract investigation from the corruption 
prevention bureau. However, councils still have the opportunity to adjust outsourced 
revenue targets through negotiation during the process of awarding the tender. Official 
RA who is responsible for revenue mobilisation in case study K said, “we can’t award a 
contract just on the amount agents have proposed unless it is fine... if the amount is not 
reasonable, we will invite them to negotiate; once we reach agreement then we sign the 
contract”. However, this is very likely to happen when the amount indicated by the 
highest bidder is still low and not appealing to the council. 
Another challenge associated with revenue collection through agents is the ability of 
councils to administer and manage the contracts entered into with the agents. According 
to the senior finance officer M in case study B, some agents are reluctant to submit 
copies of their receipt books to the council after the collection exercise, although they 
submit the agreed amount. He noted that “…you give agents receipt books; now in order 
to know exact collections, [copies of] those books are supposed to be returned, but when 
it gets to the point of submitting them for verification, for some of them it is a challenge”. 
These copies of the receipts are the basis for comparing the amount collected versus the 
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amount submitted to the council, and hence any difference can be accounted as a cost 
associated with revenue enforcement to the council. In such instances it is likely that the 
agents are benefitting considerably, which is why they do not want to expose the actual 
amount collected as it will prompt the council to demand more in the next period. 
Generally, these challenges can be seen to reflect the council’s weakness in drafting and 
enforcing contracts, and the dishonesty of the revenue collection agents. The same 
challenge is found in case study K. The senior finance officer to the council K said, “we 
had an audit query last year; they [the agents] delayed for some days, so we were told 
that we should make a charge for the delay”. Therefore, despite the council having a 
penalty clause in the contract, it could not enforce it until after receiving the audit query. 
Meanwhile, the CAG report (2014: 21) stated that, “58 LGAs were noted to have a sum 
of Shs.6,710,548,469 being revenue collected from various centres by collecting agents 
but apparently not remitted to the respective LGAs”. The report also identified the 
problem of non-remittance as one of the reasons 27 LGAs received unclean audit reports 
in the financial year 2012/13.  
For the collection of revenues from sources which are not outsourced, LGAs use their 
own staff. Business development officers in collaboration with finance staff coordinate 
the exercise. All three case studies utilise street/village executive officers in 
administering collection from some of their sources. In the hierarchy of LGAs’ 
personnel, street and village officers report to the directors of their respective councils. 
Such officers work very close with the community in their daily routine. Thus, the 
councils feel it is convenient to use them to enforce some of the taxes within their areas. 
In case study B, street executive officers are involved in the administration of property 
tax. In case study K, the official RA who is responsible for revenue mobilisation said 
village officers are involved in mobilising revenues such as “fees on the sale of land, 
auctions and fines to bylaw defaulters within their areas”. Similarly in case study T, 
street executive officers were involved in a feasibility study when the council had to 
establish taxpayers’ records in each street. To encourage their morale, all three councils 
reward the staff who are directly involved in enforcing revenue collection in the field, 
with a certain amount from the proceeds.  
Nevertheless, the cost of mobilising resources has been found to constrain LGAs’ ability 
to collect revenue from their own sources. As Bird (2015) says, in developing countries 
administration and compliance costs pose challenge in revenue mobilisation and can 
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account for up to 80% of the revenues collected. In case study B, for instance, the senior 
finance official R said the costs of enforcing revenue collection are sometimes higher 
than the amount recovered. “It reaches a point where the person hides to evade payment, 
closing the door because of Tsh. 2,000; if you check the cost of arresting that person and 
taking them to court it becomes larger than the money you are enforcing”. This is similar 
to the details provided by revenue mobilisiation official RA in case study T regarding 
enforcement cost versus benefit. “Someone may evade paying Tsh. 200,000, you go 
there to make all the follow-ups until you get to the court, but in the end the person will 
pay only Tsh. 50,000 as a fine plus the 200,000”. In case study K, revenue mobilisation 
official RA admitted that tax evasion exists, although the council charges fines to those 
who are caught. “Those dealing with forest products sometimes look to escape on remote 
roads to avoid paying”. Obviously the cost of dealing with such evaders in remote areas 
is very high compared to the benefit to be accrued once they are caught. The council, for 
instance, gets Tsh. 800 per charcoal bag, which is less than half the fuel cost per litre for 
visiting these areas. These concerns of the LGA officials are in line with the economic 
canon of taxation which requires the cost of tax collection not to exceed its benefits. It 
seems the design of the local tax system for some sources does not conform to the canons 
of taxation.  
In addition to the above challenges, at the time of the field visit all three case study 
councils had no electronic system to synchronise their local revenue data and to act as a 
control tool in enforcing revenue collection. Revenue collection and issuance of receipts 
are done manually, which makes the collection exercise difficult and the collected 
revenues susceptible to misappropriation. However, officials in all three case studies 
said that they are in the process of instituting electronic databases for synchronising 
revenue collection. According to the responsible official for budgetary coordination in 
case study B, with the help of donors (the World Bank) who are funding the “Urban 
Local Government Strategic Cities Project”, the council is in the process of establishing 
an electronic system for revenue collection. The case is similar to case study T. The 
project will help the council in monitoring revenue and mobilising own source revenue, 
particularly from property tax and business licensing. It will involve establishment of an 
electronic database to store statistics relating to business, plots and their corresponding 
owners. Meanwhile in case study K, according to revenue mobilisation official RA, the 
council is implementing an electronic system in accordance with the directive from 
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central government. The official RA further noted that councils are required “to make 
sure that all revenues must be collected through an electronic system”. He acknowledged 
that the system which is about to be installed will be very useful; there will be a server 
in the council’s office which will show the amount collected by the collection centres 
promptly. 
7.4.2 Politics at the LGA Level 
One of the main challenges affecting the ability of councils to improve their financial 
sustainability is local politics, resulting from the multiparty system and conflicts of 
interest of councillors who are also political figures. Just as Casal et al. (2014) observed, 
the territorial political situation influences some local government decisions, although 
the nature of the decisions differ. Casal et al. (2014) found that the local political 
situation influences the ratio of transfer received and transfers made, real investment and 
urban policies in Spain. Meanwhile, in this study the influence was found to affect 
revenue mobilisation decisions. LGA officials in all three case studies admitted that the 
influence of local political leaders on their communities hinders council efforts to 
improve financial sustainability. “Currently there are many political parties, so 
democracy has gone beyond the normal system; it contributes to persuading citizens to 
reject those issues which, if implemented, will help to strengthen a certain political 
party” (Official C who is a councillor, case study B). When explaining this challenge, 
official R who is responsible for revenue mobilisation in the same council confirmed 
that political leaders “are telling us that we are disturbing their voters, and once the 
taxpayers realise this they report it to the councillor or the MP who raises his voice”.  
Similarly, the council chairperson in case study T said, “when you increase tax from 
some source, let’s say the market place, your fellow [politician] tells people not to accept 
it, so opposition sometimes becomes an obstacle”. This corresponds with Poterba’s 
(1994) observation which identifies that whenever state government and corresponding 
LGAs are controlled by the same part, there is more likelihood of responding quickly to 
unexpected fiscal troubles than the opposite. Meanwhile official C in case study B, who 
is a councillor and also a politician, said, “as a community leader I will try to motivate 
people to contribute to the extent that I think is appropriate”. Obviously, two or more 
political leaders will have different understandings of “appropriate” in influencing 
people about council activities. As a result, this official noted that, “this is a problem 
when it comes to own source revenue; the same leader who is supposed to seeing the 
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council generating sufficient revenue is the one who is going to oppose decisions he/she 
had approved; that is a big challenge”. Due to the governance power of the councillors 
who are also politicians, permanent staff sometimes agree with the views of such leaders 
only because of the fear of being penalised. Official R who is responsible for revenue 
mobilisation in case study B, expressing this concern, said, “currently you have given a 
councillor wide authority, to sanction the council director, to sanction any employee who 
will be executing those bylaws, so in order to avoid being sanctioned it is better to remain 
silent”. These findings add insight to the observations of Allers and Ishemoi (2011b) 
who found regional differences in political representation contributed to diversions in 
grant distributions from the national grant formula. The influence of the local political 
situation extends to local government revenue mobilisation.   
Apart from the influence of local politicians, council officials are not satisfied with the 
role of members of parliament (MPs) in the governance of their respective councils. 
According to regulations, MPs are also members of council baraza in their specific 
jurisdictions. The concern of local government officials is that the MPs do not participate 
effectively in council meetings which deliberate important matters.  Hence, they are not 
well informed on LGA matters, which make them raise poorly researched questions 
relating to LGAs in parliamentary sessions. According to the senior finance official M 
in case study B, ineffective participation of MPs in council issues results in the 
enactment of laws which are not practicable or which adversely affect citizens. The 
official said “… that is why even when they go there in the parliament to set laws they 
fail to understand that the law will come back to be implemented in their areas; other 
laws fail to be implemented or they don’t work properly, hence people are tortured”. 
This argument is supported the way the Tourism Act no. 29 of 2008 has been enacted. 
It disowns the hotel levy, which had been a reliable source of revenue from LGAs to the 
central government. Its enactment repealed the sections of the previous Hotels Act which 
had given LGAs a mandate to collect a hotel levy. 
7.4.3 Policy and Regulations 
LGA officials expressed that the design of policies and regulations constrained their 
efforts towards improving financial sustainability and dealing with financial difficulties. 
Specifically, they are concerned about the distribution of revenue sources between 
central and local governments, autonomy in setting revenue rates and autonomy in 
spending the proceeds, as explained in the following subsections.  
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7.4.3.1 Distribution of Revenue Sources 
One of the factors that affect the ability of LGAs to deal with financial difficulties and 
improve financial sustainability is the extent of the revenue sources they can access, 
which provide LGAs with flexible revenue mobilisation and the ability to handle 
financial difficulties (Reschovsky, 2003). This concerns not only the amount of 
resources available within a council but also its distribution among the levels of 
government. If LGAs have limited exposure to resources, their ability to cope with the 
danger of financial difficulties becomes limited. The observation from case studies is 
that LGA staff feel that the distribution leaves them with limited resources which are 
difficult to enforce. For instance the senior finance official M in case study B said “all 
lucrative sources” are controlled by the central government while those sources which 
are “not collectible” or are a “headache” to enforce are the ones given to LGAs. Officials 
in all three case studies identified land rent as an example of a revenue source that would 
ideally enhance their ability to raise revenue. However, currently the source is under 
central government control, while LGAs simply remain collection agents. “For land rent 
we are just agents, at the end of the day we get back 30% so as to facilitate the 
sustainability of that source so that we can continue to collect” (official RA who is 
responsible for revenue mobilisation, case study T). Furthermore, official M in case 
study B said that despite council bylaws for mobilising revenue, the sources are “weak” 
and are insufficient even to cover office expenditure.  
The LGA officials are especially concerned about the introduction of policies and 
regulations that revoke revenue sources which have already been useful to them. 
Introduction of such policies and regulations by the central government has been found 
to affect the distribution of revenue sources, moving them from LGAs to central 
government. As a result, officials feel that LGAs are guinea pigs for testing the 
applicability of various policies relating to revenue sources. “When the government 
recognise there is something good and significant they take it” (senior finance official 
M, case study B). The example provided by that official to support this claim is the 
property tax, which was “initially shifted to the central government” before being 
returned to LGAs. This is also in line with the concern raised by officials in two case 
studies regarding the shifting of the hotel levy from LGAs to central government, 
although it was not found in case study K as the hotel levy is not among its significant 
revenue sources. As previously stated, the enactment of the Tourism Act in 2008 
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repealed the Hotels Act and its amendments of 2006. Section 10 (1) of the Tourism Act 
(2008) requires all activities classified as “tourism facility or activity” to be registered 
to the director under the Ministry of Tourism.  Section 17 (1) gives power to the Minister, 
after consultation with the director, to “declare any premises, place, facility or activity 
which affords amenities to tourists, to be a designated tourism facility or activity”. 
Consequently, LGAs are prevented from collecting the hotel levy. The Hotels Act had 
allowed LGAs to collect 20% of hotel charges per guest. As a result, official C who is a 
councillor in case study B complained that “for about two years now the hotel levy has 
not been collected because of the introduction of the Tourism Act”.  
Despite the central government’s compensation for revenue lost with the abolition of 
various inconvenient sources in 2004, the senior finance official M in case study B 
provided a different view. The official argued, “how can someone come and say that this 
tax is unlawful or it is a nuisance to citizens while we have seen that the source will help 
us to collect revenues? We are at the source, we sit down with citizens in our meetings 
and we agree together that we are going to charge tax on certain sources”. LGAs are 
required to involve their citizens in identifying new sources and rates, so the view of the 
official is that as long as the citizens who are the taxpayers are involved and consent to 
the revenue sources to the council, then the tax cannot be a nuisance. Also, the 
unpredictability of the grants made the official feel that such sources would enhance 
LGAs’ ability to raise revenue to finance their budget needs. These views support the 
findings of Gao et al. (2014), that decentralisation of revenues improves life satisfaction, 
especially in underdeveloped areas. Thus, limiting revenue autonomy reduces the 
chance of attaining such benefits. Generally, LGAs’ staff are not comfortable with the 
allocation of resources within the design of the decentralisation system.  
7.4.3.2 Autonomy in Setting Rates of Own Source Revenue 
The views of LGA officials is that the design of the decentralisation system limits them 
in setting own source revenue rates. As a result, it is difficult for LGAs to adjust them 
according to needs and the environment, which is very important for a sustainable 
financial condition. A good example is found in Nelson’s (2012) study, which observed 
that limitations on adjusting property tax rates to have limited ability of LGAs to respond 
to fiscal difficualties in Michigan and California, in the US. In Tanzania, as discussed in 
chapter four, most of the rates for own source revenue collection are prescribed in 
various regulations set out by central government. However, according to senior finance 
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official M in case study B, it is the LGA officials who are in a better position to 
understand the ability of their citizens to pay tax on certain sources than central 
government officials. This view corresponds to the fiscal decentralisation theory, which 
considers LGA officials to be more aware of their local environments than central 
government officials (Salman and Iqbal, 2011). Furthermore, official RA who is 
responsible for revenue mobilisation in case study T suggested that it would be better if 
LGAs could be able to adjust the tax rates for some sources, such as business licences 
according to business size. “The rate is established by central government but we are the 
ones who know the real situation; we know the economic power of the people.”  
LGA officials also identified instances of central government reversing decisions made 
earlier to restrict LGAs from collecting revenues from certain sources, affecting their 
ability to generate revenue. This contributes to making citizens resistant to such taxes, 
hence constraining LGAs’ financial sustainability. According to senior finance official 
M in case study B, taxpayers sometimes question the genuineness of such taxes, which 
makes them reluctant to accept. An example is the business licence fee which was 
abolished in 2004 but reintroduced in 2011. Before its abolition, the business licensing 
fee contributed between 20 and 30 percent of own source revenue of urban councils 
(Fjeldstad et al., 2010). The senior finance official M asked, “in reintroducing the tax to 
the citizens, what are you prepared to tell them?”. He noted that, as a result, there was a 
delay from when the fee was re-introduced to its actual operationalisation because of 
grey issues related to the reintroduction. The official M said “it was delayed for about a 
year from reintroduction to implementation; we budgeted for it but the budget didn’t 
work”.  Both the abolition and the delay during its reintroduction affected LGAs’ fiscal 
position. As Brueckner (2000) warns, limited revenue autonomy in LGAs endangers the 
realisation of the full benefits of decentralisation reforms. 
7.4.3.3 Council Type  
The findings from the three comparative case studies suggest that national regulations 
are a challenge to rural LGAs because they limit some revenue sources which are 
allowed in urban councils. Under regulations in Tanzania, urban councils are allowed to 
collect property taxes while rural councils are not. Official RA who is responsible for 
revenue mobilisation in case study K, which is a rural council, said, “there are some 
revenues that we are losing. An example is the property tax and that is why we are 
becoming a township authority, so that we can collect those taxes which we are currently 
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not allowed according to the laws”. This sheds light on Smoke’s (1993) argument which 
suggests that the type of LGA, whether urban or rural, makes a difference in their 
revenue bases. However, the observation from this study suggests the difference is partly 
attributable to regulations. The property tax makes a significant contribution to the own 
source revenues of urban councils. In 2012/13, for instance, the contribution in case 
study T was about seven percent of the total collected own revenues, and in case study 
B about one percent.  
On the other hand, the observation suggests that limitations in LGAs’ autonomy over 
human resource functions is a challenge in resource allocation within a council. LGAs 
do not have autonomy over functional departments and their respective personel. 
According to official E who is in charge of planning department in case study T, there 
are some human resource functions/departments, especially in urban councils, which 
consume significant financial resources but their contribution in LGAs’ operations is 
limited. While explaining this with reference to public services, the official said:  
you can’t have significant results [in service delivery];  the problem is that we 
have created job posts [according to regulations] which are unnecessary. We 
could have few posts which comprises competent people, that’s all… for instance 
you create bee keeping section in city councils, what is it for?   
The challenge highlights poor coordination in reform execution, in which LGA 
functions have not been streamlined properly towards decentralisation. Moreover, the 
official E iterated another challenge associated with poor coordination in reform 
execution, which is the changes in priority areas in LGA operations because of changes 
in country’s administration regime. He said that “when everyone gets in power, for 
instance when Mr. Pinda took charge [as a prime minister] he is talking about bee 
keeping, there is no continuity” from one regime to another. Consequently, LGAs lose 
operational focus because ot the need to adjust to new requirements hence constrain their 
abilities to improve service provision. As DeMello (2000) cautions, coordination failure 
in executing decentralisation reforms endangers attainment of the underlying benefits. 
7.4.4 Procedures for Setting Bylaws 
The process involved in setting or revising bylaws that guide LGAs in mobilising their 
own source revenues has been identified as a major challenge to their ability to enhance 
their financial sustainability. It also limits their ability to respond to financial difficulties 
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in budget financing. As Olowu and Smoke (1992) identify, the impact of bureaucratic 
procedures in revewing and approving LGAs’ plans and budgets is to limit their ability 
to exercise entrusted functions effectively. In Tanzania, the process of setting bylaws as 
required by regulation12 is too involving and takes a long time to complete. The process 
starts with drafting a proposal in consultation with the community. This is then submitted 
to council meetings for deliberation before being submitted to the prime minister for 
approval. The length of time involved in setting bylaws can even make the proposed 
rates obsolete by the time it is approved. “You can submit bylaws but the submission 
stays in the prime minister’s office for a whole year or nine months … currently there is 
a bylaw that we have been waiting for almost the year, and we are moving into the 
second year” (official A, who is responsible for budgetary coordination in case study B).  
Generally, the processes involved in setting bylaws seem to constrain LGAs not only in 
raising revenue in the present but also in adjusting to future financial needs. 
Consequently, the official in charge of budgetary coordination in case study B 
questioned the integrity of the relationships among government agencies regarding the 
approval process of bylaws. The view of the staff is that approval could be given at the 
level of regional office, or could be delegated to a permanent secretary instead of the 
prime minister, who is likely to be already overloaded. For instance, at the time of the 
field visit, all three case study councils said that they have bylaws in the process of 
review, meaning that they will have to be signed by the prime minister. “We are 
submitting many activities here at the regional office; why should these [bylaws] not be 
approved at the regional level?” (official A, who is responsible for budgetary 
coordination in case study B). Official A also explained that the council had already 
made such a request to the parliamentary committee that deals with legal affairs when 
its members visited the council, but there had been no feedback. Karanikolas and 
Hatzipanteli (2010) caution that the legal framework that hinders LGAs in making 
decisions, coupled with centralised decision making, limits the successful 
implementation of decentralisation programmes.  
7.4.5 Limited Involvement of LGAs in Matters Affecting their Operations 
One of the factors identified as limiting LGAs in improving their financial ability is the 
loose interrelationships between the central government and LGAs. LGA officials 
                                                          
12 The Local Government Finance Act 1982 provides guidance on how LGAs should set their bylaws 
166 
 
confirmed the existence of a gap between the two levels of government, particularly 
when it comes to making decisions which affect the operationalisation of LGAs. Smoke 
and Lewis (1996) observed similar problem in Indonesia, because the central 
government considered LGA officials to have limited capacity to contribute in key 
decisions. However, it is contrary to the fiscal decentralisation theory which assumes 
LGA officials know their operating environments better than central government 
officials. For instance, LGA officials described that if they had been involved in the 
introduction of the Tourism Act of 2008 they would not have restricted their collection 
of the hotel levy. They also claimed to know better their environment and the behaviour 
of people in their areas, so it would be better if they were involved in various decisions. 
For instance, senior finance official M in case study B said, “the central government can 
decide about something but we are the ones who know the environment, we know what 
can work here and what can’t”. He emphasised the need for LGAs to be involved by 
saying, “they are supposed to give us the option to contribute”. The importance of being 
involved in decision making is enhanced by the way LGA officials value their function 
in serving the community. They consider their work as the final stage in the 
government’s system of providing services to the community. The senior finance official 
M said, “we are the final people; if it is a product we are the ones at the end process that 
makes the product useful to the community”.  
Similarly, the interrelationships among different government institutions seem to have 
an impact on the financial sustainability of LGAs in general. For instance, official A 
who is responsible of budgetary coordination in case study B feels that there is too little 
coordination between the ministry in charge of LGAs and other ministries. He said, 
“there are some issues which look as if PMO-RALG is skipped; some sort of bypassing 
because there are other directives which come straight from respective ministries to local 
governments”. The view of the staff is that it would not have been easy to move the hotel 
levy from LGAs to central government if the ministry in charge had been fully involved. 
If that is the case, then it is contrary to what the statement in the decentralisation policy 
paper, which says that the ministry in charge of local government will coordinate all 
issues relating to LGAs. While explaining similar challenges of loose coordination 
between government institutions in Indonesian decentralisation, Smoke and Lewis 
(1996) point out that the problem highlights the failure of decentralisation design to 
simplify institutional framework. Due to poor coordination, observation from case 
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studies suggests that councils are required to prepare reports on the same issue in 
different formats. For instance, the budgetary coordination official in case study B said 
that, “you will find everyone requires his/her format, the same report can be in two or 
three formats”. Some formats are specific to donors and others to ministries. This 
consumes time and financial resources unnecessarily.  
7.4.6 Budgeting Process  
Limited autonomy in the budgeting process has been identified as a challenge in LGAs’ 
execution of their budgets. Officials complained that the process of being given a ceiling 
for different expenditure categories limits their ability to make adjustments according to 
the expenditure needs of different sectors. Smoke (2013) emphasises that the basic 
principle in LGAs’ budgeting process is that finances should follow LGA functions. 
However, the observation from evaluated case studies shows the practice is opposite. 
While explaining how the budgeting process limits the council’s ability to adjust 
according to council needs, the senior finance official R in case study T, for instance,  
said: 
In budgeting we are given ceilings; for example, the central government says 
this council will be given this amount for roads, this amount for health, etc. If 
the government had really given LGAs power, it would be the LGAs who are 
supposed to send their priorities to the central government, to send their finance 
needs for budget allocations. But the central government decides on our behalf 
and LGAs remain as implementers, so they can decide something that is either 
not needed or the need is bigger than what is provided or otherwise. 
According to budgetary coordination official A in case study B, if the ceiling is not 
adhered to the whole budget will be refused by the ministry. Nevertheless, LGA officials 
seem to lack a clear understanding of the criteria used in the allocation of grants. When 
asked about the criteria for the ceiling and grant allocation, the budgetary coordination 
official in case study B said, “they just look at population, and the other criterion they 
say is the poverty level of the council; but I don’t think this is used”. Meanwhile official 
C who is a councillor in the same case study said, “allocation of the grants to a large 
extent considers the number of people; it also considers the administrative size of the 
council and priority areas”. Since the ability of the council to meet service demand is 
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affected by the ceiling and the grant allocated, a clear understanding by all council staff 
of the criteria used is vital. 
Moreover, as already identified in section 7.2, financial sustainability of LGAs has 
suffered from partial release of the allocated grants from central government for many 
years. However, LGA officials in the case studies believed that the unreleased amount 
is not carried forward in the accounts, because “central government is dealing with cash 
basis accounting and the cash basis doesn’t need to have accruals” (budgetary 
coordination official, case study B). Accounting practice in the central government 
differs from the accrual accounting system used by LGAs. Under accrual accounting the 
amount is supposed to be carried forward as a debt, unless confirmed as unrecoverable 
and written off.  
7.4.7 The Nature of People  
Personal characteristics have been identified as one of the challenges in the improvement 
of financial sustainability of assessed LGAs, especially in own source revenue 
mobilisation. The findings from the comparative case studies indicate that LGAs 
perceive people as lacking the moral behaviour required to comply with regulations 
voluntarily, and hence pay taxes accordingly. For instance, according to the senior 
finance official M in case study B, despite their unwillingness to pay taxes, citizens are 
the first to complain whenever the council is unable to provide satisfactory services. He 
believes that one of the reasons for this is deficiency in the education system, which is 
supposed to mould the behaviour of citizens towards regulatory compliance. He 
criticised the curriculums of education institutions for not providing practical civic 
education, which he considered necessary for voluntary compliance. “It is very likely 
that our young generation goes through colleges, they get training, but something might 
be missing, that module of development studies; I don’t know if it is still taught, it is 
supposed to be taught to every student, and if it is still taught it might be hypothetical 
rather than practical” (senior finance official M, case study B). As a result he does not 
see the purpose of conducting awareness campaigns for tax payers, because he believes 
those who evade taxes are not layman. Instead, he pointed out the need for reinstating 
compulsory army service so that citizens always remain loyal and obedient to the laws 
and regulations, including paying taxes.  
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While the concern of official M in case study B is on personal characteristics of the 
people for the country in general, the senior finance official R in case study K is more 
specific to his council. The official believed that agricultural productivity is low, which 
limits the council’s revenue, because its people are not hard workers. This official said, 
“it just the nature of the people themselves ... it is natural”. However, if they are 
“Sukumas, once they get a farming place, they will work harder than a machine”. The 
Sukumas, referred to as hard workers, are a tribe found in the central and lake zone 
regions of Tanzania including Tabora, Shinyanga, Simiyu, Geita and Mwanza. This 
observation corresponds with Ishii et al.’s (2007) findings which show that differences 
in social background distinguishes the participation level of the people in decentralised 
programmes between two cities in Philippines. On the other hand, in case study T, the 
view of one official is that “laws are not strong enough”, which is why people are not 
motivated to pay local taxes.  
7.4.8 Age of the Council: Reflecting Maturity  
Observation from the case studies suggests that the maturity of the council, as reflected 
by its age, is a challenge in raising revenues as well as in pressurising the council on the 
expenditure side. In corporate fiscal distress studies, organisation’s age has been 
considered as a prominent factor in determining survival or failure (Altman, 1993; Liu 
and Wilson 2002) but not in LGAs studies of similar nature. However, the observation 
from case studies suggests that councils’ age is also relevant in shaping their financial 
sustainability. For instance, the official in charge for budgetary coordination in case 
study B said, “small towns like ours, which are growing, need strong support from the 
government until they can stand on their own. Citizens have not changed from the idea 
of “villageship”; you tell someone that you have to pay for everything, and he/she sees 
it as if you are disturbing him/her”. Before the establishment of the council B in 2004, 
the area was part of a rural district council where charges such as property tax are not 
allowed. Other charges such as contributions for cleaning and toilet fees in market areas 
are also less common in rural councils. As a result, the budgetary coordination official 
A in case study B said, “if you introduce a policy that the people themselves must pay 
for cleaning, this becomes an issue because it is perceived that the service should be 
offered by the government and it is not their responsibility. So that is a big challenge for 
us”. On the other hand, council chairperson in case study T said that people in that area 
are no longer interested in using water wells because they feel that their status has 
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changed with the change in council status. The council changed its status from a 
municipal to a city council in 2005. As a result, people demand tapped water in order to 
match their status of living in a city. Moreover, the staff noted since they became a city, 
the demand for an electricity network increased because people living in a city use 
electric appliances such as TVs in their daily life. Thus, the council has experienced the 
pressure of increased service demand since it became a city council. Issues related to the 
age of the council were not found in case study K, which has maintained its rural council 
status for over 67 years.  
 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
The findings in this chapter indicate that the design and operationalisation of 
decentralisation design in Tanzania contributes to constraining the general financial 
sustainability of LGAs. Observation from case studies shows LGAs are facing recurring 
financial difficulties in meeting their annual budgets. The difficulty is mainly attributed 
to the non-predictability of the central government grants during budget implementation. 
The non-predictability is in terms of both, the amount released and the timing of the 
grant release. Observation shows the impact to be more severe on development activities 
than on recurrent activities. This is due to heavy dependence on central government 
grants for financing development activities, although central government’s dependence 
on donor support also seems to play a role. Own source revenues are mainly spent on 
recurrent activities, while the CAG report (2014) reveals donor withdrawal 
incapacitating the government’s ability to finance LGAs. Consequently, LGA officials 
identify the execution of many development projects as being stacked. Projects which 
appear worst affected are in the health and education sectors, although water and 
agriculture are also affected.   
Observation from case study analysis reveals three approaches used by LGA officials to 
deal with financial difficulties and to increase financial sustainability. The first is to 
involve people in carrying out council activities, either in kind or through financial 
contributions. This option enables the council to offer services even if it is in financial 
trouble. The second approach is to postpone or cut off some of their projects until funds 
become available, which limits access to services. The last approach is to find alternative 
revenue sources to enhance their financial sustainability in the future. However, officials 
indicated that there are a number of challenges which constrain this. Most are external 
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to LGAs related either to the operating environment or the design and/or 
operationalisation of decentralisation. 
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CHAPTER 8 : CONCLUSION AND DIRECTION FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the findings and their implications. It starts by summarising 
the findings and the implication of variations in LGAs’ financial sustainability, in 
response to the first objective of the research. For the second objective, a summary of 
the findings and the consequences of fiscal difficulties, mitigating approaches and 
challenges facing LGAs in improving their financial sustainability is provided. Finally, 
the chapter outlines the significance and contribution of the study, its limitations, and 
areas for further research. The table 8.1 below provides the findings in glance from the 
two analysis chapters; chapter six and seven. 
Table 8.1: Findings in Summary 
Findings from Chapter Six: Assessing variation in LGAs’ financial sustainability 
and identify its explanatory variables 
1. Assessing Variations in Financial Sustainability 
• LGAs comprising a large proportion of poor communities have lower financial 
sustainability compared to LGAs with relatively well-off communities. In 
connection to this, LGAs with poor communities have lower expenditure per 
person, lower revenue raising capacity per person and lower financial 
independence. 
2. Variables explaining variations in financial sustainability 
• Councils’ welfare status whereby LGAs with relatively well-off communities have 
a better financial sustainability position compared to LGAs with a large proportion 
of poor communities. 
• The flow of central government grant; it has a positive relationship with the 
variation in financial sustainability of LGAs 
• The population size; it has a negative relationship with the variation in financial 
sustainability of LGAs. 
• Council size in square kilometre; it has a negative relationship with the variation in 
financial sustainability. 
• Financial management practices as reflected by audit report status (whether clean 
or not). The observation indicates that LGAs with poor financial management 
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practices are more financially sustainable compared to LGAs with better financial 
management practices. 
3. Relationship between government grant, councils’ welfare stutus and revenue 
collection efforts 
• LGAs with relatively poor communities are getting lower average grant allocation 
and distribution per person; this implies grant allocation and distribution 
marginalise LGAs with a large proportion of poor communities. 
• Revenue collection effort has a negative relationship with grant allocation and 
distribution per person. This implies that LGAs that are exerting lower efforts are 
getting higher average grant per person and vice versa.  
• Grant allocation and distribution has a negative relationship with population size 
and council size. 
Findings from Chapter Seven: Consequences of Financial difficulties, Approaches 
used to mitigate and Challenges facing LGAs in enhancing financial sustainability. 
1. Consequences of Financial Difficulties 
• Financial difficulties are prevalent in LGAs’ budget financing throughout the five 
years involved in the analysis. However, development expenditures are more 
vulnerable compared to recurrent expenditures. 
• Observation from case studies suggests four priority service sectors are more 
vulnerable whenever LGAs experience financial difficulties. Such sectors are 
education, health, water and agriculture. 
2. Ways used by LGAs to mitigate financial difficulties and enhance financial 
sustainability 
• Cutting down or postponing the expenditure to the next budget period if it remains 
a priority to the council. 
• Involving people in executing council activities either in kind or in cash terms. 
• Engaging in investment projects to establish alternative revenue sources. 
3. Challenges facing LGAs in enhancing financial sustainability 
• As presented in subsection 7.4, LGAs in Tanzania experiences a number of 
challenges while attempting to mitigate financial difficulties and enhance their 
financial sustainability. The majority of the observed challenges is external to 
LGAs and relate to the design and execution of the decentralisation, meanwhile few 
of them are specific to LGAs.    
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8.2 Variations in LGAs’ Financial Sustainability in Tanzania 
The first objective of the study is to explore the way financial sustainability of LGAs in 
Tanzania varies with reference to decentralisation. In particular, it aims to observe 
whether the design and operationalisation of the reform offer a prospect of enhancing 
equity in access to services. The findings show that LGAs with a large proportion of 
poor people experience lower financial sustainability than those with a smaller 
proportion of poor people. In line with this outcome, the independent sample t-tests 
(subsection 6.3.1) show that the group of LGAs comprising a large proportion of poor 
people has low average spending per person and low average ability to raise revenue per 
person. This confirms the proposition of Andrews et al. (2005), which identifies that the 
wealth or poverty level of service recipients determines the economic resources 
available to LGAs.  
The analysis of explanatory variables of financial sustainability identifies five 
contributing factors. The first is the relative poverty level of the people within the 
council, which has a negative influence. It implies that councils with poor people are 
more likely to experience lower financial sustainability. The second is financial 
management practices reflected by the status of the audit report received. The findings 
suggests that unclean audit reports tend to strengthen financial sustainability, as opposed 
to clean reports. The implication is that there are insufficient fiscal controls within the 
decentralisation system that would reward good performance and penalise financial 
indiscipline. The third contributory factor is the flow of government grants, reflected by 
the proportion actually released versus the amount allocated at the beginning of the 
budget period, which has positive influence. This means LGAs which receive larger 
proportions of their promised grants experience better financial sustainability, and vice 
versa. The fourth is the council size in square kilometres, which contributes negatively; 
and the last is population size which also has a negative contribution. This implies that 
populations and council size tend to constrain the financial sustainability of LGAs. 
Despite the fact that the grant allocation formula allows for population and council size 
(Allers and Ishemoi, 2011a), it seems to be insufficient to make a positive contribution 
to the financial sustainability of LGAs. 
Along with the explanatory factors of financial sustainability, the study also explores 
whether grant allocations and disbursement consider the poverty level and discourage 
soft budget constraints. The intention is to identify whether the design of 
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intergovernmental grants promotes horizontal equity. This is in response to the 
observation in chapter six, that on average the group of LGAs with a large proportion of 
poor people experience lower financial sustainability, lower spending per person and 
lower revenue raising per person. Andrews et al. (2005) states that whenever the 
financial capacities of LGAs differ, the allocation of central government grants is 
expected to neutralise the differences.  
The analysis also aimed to identify whether grant allocation and disbursement 
discourage complacency in LGAs’ own source revenue mobilisation, as Hy et al. (1993) 
propose. The result shows a negative relationship between the level of effort exerted in 
mobilising revenue and both grant allocations and disbursement. The corresponding 
interpretation is that decentralisation in Tanzania does not discourage soft budget 
practices, which is why grant allocation does not reflects revenue mobilisation efforts. 
On the other hand, the results indicate that LGAs with a large proportion of people living 
below the income poverty line have lower grant allocations and disbursement per person 
than those with relatively wealthier populations. This affirms the argument of Allers and 
Ishemoi (2010) that the present grant allocation formula in Tanzania does not 
incorporate fiscal capacity measures, and Allers and Ishemoi (2011b) who revealed the 
existence of divergence from the formula application resulting from regional differences 
in political representation. The impact of this departure from the theory is to increase the 
gap in service access between people living in LGAs with different revenue raising 
capacity. It implies that decentralisation design in Tanzania has not managed to address 
the problem that persisted before the introduction of the grant allocation formula in 2004. 
Boex (2003) found that, prior to its introduction, LGAs with relatively higher financial 
capacity were receiving higher allocations than their counterparts.  
 The danger of marginalising LGAs with relatively poor people is that it will exaggerate 
the imbalance in service access over time. Consequently, it presents the risk of disturbing 
social cohesion, with the possible eruption of conflict against incumbent 
administrations, especially in those marginalised areas. The recent conflict (of 2013) 
between the people in the marginalised Mtwara region and the government regarding 
the natural gas investment project sends a bad signal to the country. The conflict was 
partly attributed to underdevelopment of the region coupled with the lack of key social 
services such as electricity, good roads and schools (Ndimbwa, 2014). Ndimbwa further 
noted that, lack of secondary schools in the region was the reason for 77% of the 
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qualified children not progressing with their studies in 2003. That group of young 
people, who lacked the chance to progress with secondary education have limited 
opportunities and are likely to be at the forefront whenever disruptions of such a kind 
arise.  
8.3 The Impact of Financial Difficulties on LGA Operations 
As part of the second research objective, the study explores the consequence of financial 
difficulties. The findings suggests that LGAs in Tanzania experience recurring financial 
shortfalls in the course of implementing annual budgets. This is due to their heavy 
dependence on central government grants, especially for development activities, grants 
which are unpredictable in terms of the amount allocated versus that released and timing. 
This affects development activities more severely than recurrent expenditure, as the flow 
of grants for recurrent activities is observed to be good.  It might be due to the sensitivity 
of recurrent grant in LGA operations. The category comprises grants for personal 
emoluments and other office expenses.  
The most affected projects, as identified by council officials, are those which involve 
construction projects particularly in four service sectors, health, education, water and 
agriculture. Besides non-disbursement, delays in releasing grants were observed to lead 
to constraining LGAs’ ability to execute their annual service provision targets. LGA 
officials revealed that grants are sometimes released late in the year, making it difficult 
to execute plans for that year; hence a significant amount of the funds is carried forward 
every year. As a result, citizens miss the benefits that would have accrued from the 
postponed activities.  
Own source revenue makes little contribution to LGAs’ overall budget, about 7.4% for 
the group of LGAs analysed in chapter 6; and LGAs have discretion over its use. As a 
result, LGA officials say that own source revenues are spent on office expenses and 
other recurrent expenditures. They added that the central government has issued a 
directive which requires LGAs to allocate 60% of their own source revenues to 
development activities. This directive seems to aim at reducing the load of central 
government in financing LGAs and to strengthen the financial independence of LGAs 
by requiring them to contribute to development activities. Moreover, the requirement 
seems to bring the action of LGAs officials close to the community in order to enhance 
fiscal discipline. When projects are financed by grants, people tend to feel that the 
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project is financed by others and hence are unlikely to institute strong monitoring of the 
actions of local officials (Rodden, 2000). Rodden (2000) adds that the empirical 
literature shows that an increase in grants tends to accelerate spending patterns more 
than the same increase in own source revenue.  
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the financial difficulties in LGAs’ budget execution 
and their consequences arise because of heavy dependence on central government, 
which in turn depends on donor support to fund LGAs. This is reflected in the CAG (T) 
report (2013) which concludes that the ability of central government to release funds to 
LGAs has been affected by withdrawal of donor commitments. For instance, the 
government under-received a significant amount from donors for the year 2011/12, 
corresponding to the under-released amount to LGAs in that year. This may reflect 
Plekhanov (2005) and Bahl’s (2000) proposition, that central government may use 
intergovernmental grant system as part of the strategy to relieve its own budget deficit.  
Generally, both problems of shortfall in the amount of revenue and delay in grant release 
reflect shortcoming in the operation of decentralisation. Considering these findings, the 
prospect of decentralisation to improve public services is generally limited unless 
remedial actions are undertaken to adjust reform implementation, as Guess (2007) 
suggests. Guess (2007) states that decentralisation reform is a work in progress which 
requires sufficient monitoring and rectification of any encumbrances.  
8.4 Ways Used to Mitigate Difficulties and Enhance Financial Sustainability 
This study concludes that LGAs in Tanzania use three main approaches to mitigate 
financial difficulties whenever they arise, and to improve their financial sustainability. 
The first involves people in the provision of services. Council officials revealed that they 
harness the contribution of the populace either through volunteering or as partners in the 
provision of services, that is either in kind or in cash terms. Officials in one council, for 
instance, said that cleaning within the council is done in partnership with small groups 
formed in each street. Such groups collect solid waste from households under the 
coordination of a street chairperson, for a small fee. Similarly, the use of contributions 
in kind is common in construction projects, whereby people are involved directly in 
some construction activities under the supervision of the council’s technical person. 
Contributions, both in kind and in cash increase the ability of councils to offer services, 
even if the council experiences a shortage of funds.  
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The second approach is the postponement of council activities until the fund becomes 
available, but only if the activity remains a priority to the council. Otherwise, the activity 
is trimmed down. Based on the view of LGA officials, the approach of postponing 
activities is also preferred by the central government, particularly for development 
projects which are funded through grants. Whenever the amount of grant disbursed falls 
short of the promised amount, LGAs are advised to re-budget afresh to accommodate 
the missed portion. However, the impact of this approach is to curtail the availability of 
services to the people by delaying it.  
The third approach is expanding the revenue base. Council officials in the three case 
studies identified two approaches LGAs use to expand their revenue base. These are the 
sale of land plots, and engaging in investment projects. The sale of land generates 
revenue to the council not only from the sale itself, but subsequently as land rent and by 
attracting benefits related to the buildings constructed on such plots. Benefits attached 
to buildings include property tax, and business licensing fees for commercial buildings. 
However, the direct proceeds from land sales are not sustainable because plots are only 
sold once and, according to national regulations, the shortest lease agreement is 33 years. 
Meanwhile, the realisation of the subsequent benefits such as property tax is subjected 
to many factors, such as the fiscal ability of the purchasers to construct the buildings and 
the council’s ability to attract investment projects.  
Regarding investment activities, council officials in all three case studies identified 
different projects already underway, including the construction of shopping malls, 
conference facilities and buildings for commercial frames. The officials explained that 
the aim is to reduce financial dependence on central government, while simultaneously 
establishing revenue sources that will provide them with a steady revenue flow. LGAs 
also aim to reduce dependence on income that involves taxpayers. Nevertheless, 
increasing financial sustainability through expanding revenue bases will take longer to 
materialise because investment in real assets takes longer to provide returns. 
Hastings et al. (2015a) observed three approaches to be used in English municipalities 
to mitigate the impact of difficulties arising from austerity programmes and their usage 
follows a pattern. The findings of Hastings et al. (2015a) suggest that, to deal with 
prolonged fiscal difficulties municipalities start to optimise efficiency at early stage, 
followed by retrenchment while waiting for investment projects to materialise. In 
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contrast, the three approaches observed in this study are used concurrently although 
investment projects also require time to materialise. The difference might be due to 
operating environment LGAs are subject with, but they are all aiming to sustain service 
provision. In Tanzanian LGAs, for instance, retrenchment is not viable option because 
recruitment and payroll function is controlled by the central government. 
8.5 Challenges to Enhancing Financial Sustainability 
The researcher observed a number of challenges that constrain the ability of LGAs to 
improve their financial sustainability in general. The first challenge is lack of trust in the 
revenue collection agents, although this is related to the LGAs’ inability to efficiently 
manage the outsourced agents. Another challenge associated with enforcing own source 
revenue collection is the enforcement costs compared to the benefits derived. Officials 
said that some revenue sources, such as property tax, are difficult to enforce through 
legal action against defaulters, because the cost would exceed the benefit.  
Other challenges include politics at the local government level, whereby local politicians 
discourage people from contributing to council activities; the age of the council; and the 
attitude of people towards hard work. LGA officials also believed that the design of 
policy and regulations within decentralisation constrain LGAs’ autonomy in own source 
revenues. The official of a rural council gave the example of the prohibition on rural 
LGAs to collect property tax, while urban councils are allowed to collect it. LGA 
officials also questioned the bureaucratic procedures relating to policy and regulations 
which prolong the process of setting bylaws to administer own source revenue 
collection, consequently limiting LGAs’ ability to adjust with changing needs. 
Moreover, observation from the case studies suggests there is limited involvement of 
LGAs in matters affecting their operations, and limited autonomy in the budget-setting 
process. Generally, LGA officials agreed that limited autonomy over revenue sources 
and in setting rates constrained their ability to increase their financial sustainability. This 
poses the danger of missing the benefits of decentralisation, as Brueckner (2000) stated, 
especially those related to service provision. Based on experience from Latin American 
countries, Brueckner (2000) concludes that limited autonomy in LGAs constrains the 
realisation of the full benefits of decentralisation reforms. 
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8.6 Recommendations 
Based on the findings, there is a need of revisiting the design and implementation of 
decentralisation in order to address identified shortcomings. The study specifically 
recommends three policy issues that need considerations. First, is to revisit 
intergovernmental grant system so as to reflect welfare status of the people hence 
enhancing equitable access to public services across jurisdictions.  Secondly, is to 
increase financial independence of LGAs, which should go parallel with enhancing 
financial management controls. This will help not only reducing heavy reliance on 
central government grants, but also increase accountability of LGAs to own source 
revenue mobilisation and grant utilisation. As Prud’homme (2003) point out, the 
importance of own source revenues to LGAs tend to decline with the increase in central 
government transfers. Thirdly, to streamline policies and legal frameworks accordingly 
so as to address challenges that constrain ability of LGAs to enhance their financial 
sustainability and improve public services.    
8.7 Contribution and Significance of the Study 
The study offers three main contributions. First, it links two research themes, fiscal 
decentralisation and financial sustainability, which have previously been considered as 
distinct and therefore studied independently of each other, even though they are 
inherently interrelated. Empirical studies concentrated on exploring the success or 
failure of reform without considering how reform processes have been carried out, or on 
examining LGAs’ financial conditions independently of decentralisation reforms. The 
scarcity of research that assesses the impact of decentralisation on the financial condition 
of LGAs has been observed by Stone (2015). Moreover, the methodology applied in this 
study, mixed methods, provides additional insight into analysing the two interrelated 
themes together.    
Secondly, the study provides feedback on the progress of decentralisation reform in 
Tanzania while it is still underway. Tanzania being a developing country, high 
expectations have been attached to the implementation of reform in improving services 
to citizens and reducing the poverty level. Therefore, the research findings offer insights 
into areas of weaknesses that can be addressed by policy makers to improve the 
likelihood of achieving the intended benefits. On the other hand, the findings provide 
explanations of why decentralisation does not always provide the intended benefits. This 
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offers useful insight for other developing countries with a similar political and social 
context to Tanzania.  
Thirdly, the study broadens the context in which the financial sustainability of LGAs 
can be analysed. The interpretation of the case studies suggests that there are some 
factors that have been overlooked in analysing the financial sustainability of LGAs, 
although they are also relevant to analysing the financial condition of private sector 
institutions. These factors include councils’ age/maturity and the nature/attitude of 
people towards hard work. The age of the organisation has been considered a prominent 
factor in corporate distress studies (Altman, 1993; Liu and Wilson 2002). In contrast, 
there is no apparent evidence of this factor being considered in local government studies 
of a similar nature.  
8.8 Study Limitations 
The study has some limitations which indicate the need for further research. First, the 
study has not covered the views of the policy makers regarding the design and 
implementation of decentralisation. Although efforts have been made to crosscheck the 
responses of the LGA officials, the views of policy makers from central government 
would provide additional insights. Secondly, generalisation of the findings to the wider 
world are limited because the research employed case study analysis which face such 
criticism. Thirdly, in relation to the generalisation problem, the study has not included 
all LGAs in the quantitative analysis of financial sustainability because of the limitations 
of the criteria used for inclusion. The Poverty and Human Development report used to 
identify the proportion of people living below the income poverty line within LGAs 
reported on only forty councils. However, the limitations do not nullify the usefulness 
of the research outcome.  
8.9 Areas for Further Research 
The research has identified a number of challenges regarding the implementation of 
reform. There is a need for further research to identify whether all the challenges are the 
result of chance or are inevitable. This will provide further insight into the intention of 
those in power to implement reform successfully and attain the anticipated benefits. As 
Keefer and Khemani (2005) suggest, some benefits of decentralisation can only be 
achieved if there is deliberate intention and credibility of power holders to honour their 
promises. Otherwise, political motives will limit its achievement especially in the 
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presence of weak democracy. On the other hand, based on literature Conyers (2007: 
p.22) claims that the problems which hinder benefits of decentralisation in Africa are 
not associated with decentralisation failures as revealed in many studies. Instead, they 
are reflecting “fundamental characteristics” of such countries and would happen even 
within centralised governments. Thus, any further research may also need to explore this 
claim. 
 
Another area which requires further research is the reliability of external assistance in 
supporting reform programmes. The study found that inadequate government support 
for LGAs is partly due to withdrawal of donor commitments. This problem also 
contributed to the collapse of the earlier decentralisation initiatives of 1972 (Belshaw, 
1982). The study should therefore suggest possible ways in which central government 
can increase its financial independence in supporting LGAs.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Measurement Indicators Used in Previous Studies 
Author(s) Type of Ratio/ 
Measure as 
categorized by 
Author 
Formula/Indicators 
Ritonga et.al 
(2012) 
Short term 
Solvency 
1.     Ratio A = (Cash and Cash Equivalent 
+ Short-term Investment) / Current 
Liabilities  
2.     Ratio B = (Cash and Cash Equivalent 
+ Short-term Investment + Account 
Receivables) / Current Liabilities  
3. Ratio C = Currents Assets / Current 
Liabilities. 
Budgetary 
Solvency 
1.     Ratio A = (Total Revenues – Special 
Allocation Fund Revenue) / (Total 
Expenditures – Capital Expenditure), 
2.     Ratio B = (Total Revenues – Special 
Allocation Fund Revenue) / Operational 
Expenditure, 
3.     Ratio C = (Total Revenues – Special 
Allocation Fund Revenue) / Employee 
Expenditure, 
4.     Ratio D = Total Revenue / Total 
Expenditure 
Long Term 
Solvency 
1.     Ratio A = Long Term Liabilities / Total 
Assets, 
2.     Ratio B = Long Term Liabilities / 
Investment Equities, 
3.     Ratio C = Investment Equities / Total 
Assets 
Service Solvency 1.     Ratio A = Total Equities / Population, 
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Author(s) Type of Ratio/ 
Measure as 
categorized by 
Author 
Formula/Indicators 
2.     Ratio B = Total Assets / Population, 
3.     Ratio C = Total Expenditures / 
Population 
Financial 
Flexibility 
1. Ratio A = (Total Revenues – Special 
Allocation Fund Revenue – Employee 
Expenditures) / (Repayments of Loan 
Principal + Interest Expenditures), 
2. Ratio B = (Total Revenues – Special 
Allocation Fund Revenue – Employee 
Expenditures) / Total Liabilities, 
3. Ratio C = (Total Revenues – Special 
Allocation Fund Revenue – Employee 
Expenditures) / Long Term Liabilities, 
4. Ratio D = (Total Revenues – Special 
Allocation Fund Revenue) / Total 
Liabilities. 
Financial 
independence 
1.     Ratio A = Total Own Revenues / Total 
Revenues, 
2.     Ratio B = Total Own Revenues / Total 
Expenditures 
Bhattacharyya 
and 
Bandyopyadhyay 
(2012)  
Own Fund Ratio  (Amount of Own Fund/ Amount of Total 
Receipts) x 100 
Own Fund 
Coverage Ratio 
(independent 
variable) 
(Amount of Total Expenses- Amount of 
Grant)/ Amount of Own Fund x 100 
Lewis (2003) Surplus or Deficit 
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Author(s) Type of Ratio/ 
Measure as 
categorized by 
Author 
Formula/Indicators 
Financial 
Performance 
indicator 
(Defined as local government routine 
revenues minus routine expenditures) 
Michigan 
Department of 
treasury as 
acknowledged 
by Plerhoples 
and Scorsone 
(2010) ; 
Budget Solvency 1(General fund expenditures – General 
fund revenue)/General fund revenue. 
If ratio is < -.01, unit receives a 1; If ratio is 
≥ 1, unit receives a 0. 
2.  (General fund expenditures – General 
fund revenue)/General fund revenue all 
measured in previous year, and two years 
past  
For each year that ratio is < -.01, unit 
receives a 1.  
For each year that ratio is ≥ 1, unit receives 
a 0. 
3. General fund balance/General fund 
revenue  
If ratio is < half a standard deviation, unit 
receives a 1. 
 If ratio is ≥ 0, then unit receives a 0. 
4. Fund (general, special, capital, and debt 
service funds) deficit in current and 
previous year  
If a unit had a negative fund balance in any 
of these funds in the current or prior year, it 
receives a 1. If it did not, it receives a 0. 
Long run 1.     Current population - population of 
2000 If population change is < 0, unit 
receives a 1. 
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Author(s) Type of Ratio/ 
Measure as 
categorized by 
Author 
Formula/Indicators 
If population change is ≥ 0, then unit 
receives a 0. 
2.     Current taxable value – taxable value 
from two years past  
If change in two year taxable value was < 0, 
unit receives a 1. 
If two year TV was ≥ 0, unit receives a 0. 
3.     Current taxable value – taxable value 
from two years past  
If change in two year TV was < one 
standard deviation, unit receives a 1. 
 If change in two year TV was ≥ one 
standard deviation, unit receives a 0 
4.     General long-term debt/taxable value  
If ratio is > one standard deviation, unit 
receives a 1.  
If ratio is ≤ one standard deviation, unit 
receives a 0. 
Service Solvency 1.     General fund expenditures/ taxable 
value If ratio is > one standard deviation, 
unit receives a 1.  
If ratio is ≤ one standard deviation, unit 
receives a 0. 
(Note: standard deviations different for 
townships and cities for this indicator only.) 
Murray and 
Dollery (2005) 
Performance 
indicators i.e. 
financial and 
non-financial 
1. Ordinary Revenue – Total 
2. Ordinary Revenue - Per Capita 
3. Ordinary Expenditure – Total 
4. Ordinary Expenditure - Per Capita 
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Author(s) Type of Ratio/ 
Measure as 
categorized by 
Author 
Formula/Indicators 
indicators used in 
the model (were 
not categorized 
by the author) 
5. Current Ratio (Unrestricted) 
6. Debt Service Ratio 
7. Capital Expenditure Ratio  
8. Annual Report Submitted On-time 
9. State of Environment Report Submitted 
On-time 
10. Financial Report Submitted On-time 
11. Population within council’s boundaries 
12. Area of council in square kilometres 
(sqkm) 
13. A dummy variable, where 1 = Council in 
Rural/ Regional area 
14. A dummy variable, where 1 = Council 
supplies water/ sewerage services 
Australian 
Financial 
Sustainability 
Review Board as 
identified in 
Dollery and 
Crase (2006)  
Indicators of 
Financial 
Sustainability  
1. Net financial liabilities - as the key 
indicator of the council’s indebtedness to 
other sectors of the economy 
2. Operating surplus or deficit - as the ‘key 
indicator of the intergenerational equity of 
the funding of the council’s operations 
3. Net outlays on the renewal or 
replacement of existing assets-  as the key 
indicator of the intergenerational equity of 
the funding of the council’s infrastructure 
renewal or replacement activities 
4. Net borrowing or lending-  as the key 
indicator of the impact of the council’s 
annual transactions – both operating and 
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Author(s) Type of Ratio/ 
Measure as 
categorized by 
Author 
Formula/Indicators 
capital – upon the council’s indebtedness to 
other sectors of the economy 
Cohen et al. 
(2012) 
Indicators of 
Financial distress 
to local 
municipalities  
1. Total liabilities / Total assets – as 
indicator of municipal reliance on third part 
financing  
2. Own revenues/ Total liabilities – as 
indicator of municipal’s capacity to pay 
interest from own revenue 
3. Short term liabilities / Own revenues- as 
liquidity ration indicating relationship 
between short term liabilities and own 
revenues 
4. Operating expenses/ Own revenues – as 
indicator of municipal’s reliance on central 
government subsidies to finance operating 
expenditures 
5. Subsidies/ population – as indicator of 
central government subsidy 
6. Own revenues / population – as a 
measure of financial autonomy and easiness 
to overcome financing problems when 
central government faces difficulties in 
providing subsidies 
 
Source: Author derived from literatures 
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Appendix  B: Variables Used in this Study and their Formulae 
Abbreviation Formula Measure 
Richness 0 for LGAs with well-off 
communities  
1 for LGAs with poor 
communities 
An indicator for the extent of 
poverty level in LGAs 
Type Categorical variable: 0 for urban 
councils and 1 for rural councils 
Control variable 
Auditreport Categorical Variable; 0 for Clean 
report and 1 for unclean report 
Financial Management 
Practices 
TTexppercapita Total Expenditure/ Number of 
people in council 
Ability to Spend on Service 
Provision per Person 
OSpercapita Own source revenues/ Number of 
people in council 
Ability to Raise Revenue per 
Person 
ActualTotal 
Transfersratio 
Actual Total Government Grant/ 
Budgeted Total Government 
Grant 
Reliability of Central 
Government Grant flow 
ActualRecGrant 
ratio 
Actual Recurrent Grant/ 
Budgeted Recurrent Grant 
Reliability of Recurrent Grant 
flow 
ActualDevGrant 
ratio 
Actual Development Grant/ 
Budgeted Development Grant 
Reliability of Development 
Grant flow 
Total Expend.ratio Actual total Expenditure/ 
Budgeted Total Expenditure 
The extent of total expenditure 
Budget execution 
Recurrent 
Expend.ratio 
Actual Recurrent Expenditure/ 
Budgeted Recurrent Expenditure 
The extent of  Recurrent 
Expenditure Budget execution 
Develop. 
Expend.ratio 
Actual Development 
expenditure/ Budgeted 
Development Expenditure 
The extent of Development 
Expenditure Budget execution 
Poppersqkm Number of people in a council/ 
Square kilometres 
Population Density 
OwnSource 
Revs.ration 
Actual own source revenues / 
Budgeted own source revenue 
Own Sources Revenues 
Efforts 
213 
 
Abbreviation Formula Measure 
TTtransfers 
percapita 
Total Central Government 
Transfers14/ Number of People 
Amount of Central 
Government Support per 
Person 
Population Number of people within LGA Council Size 
SqKm Number of square kilometres Council Size 
TotoRevBgtExp Total Actual Revenues/ 
Budgeted total expenditure 
Ability to Finance Budgeted 
Expenditures; it is an 
indicator for budgetary 
solvency 
TTexpTTRev Total Actual Expenditure/Total 
Actual Revenues 
The extent of actual surplus; 
it is an indicator for 
budgetary solvency 
OS/RecExp Own Source Revenues/ 
Recurrent Expenditures 
Financial Independence 
OSTTexp Own Source Revenues/ Total 
Expenditure 
Financial Independence 
Gvtgrnt/OS 
 
Total Central Government 
Grant/Total Own Sources 
Revenues 
Financial Independence 
ROADDISTANCE Road Distance from Dar es 
salaam to region in which the 
council is located (plus 1 km for 
councils not in the regional 
headquarter) 
Control variable  for 
Environmental factor 
 
Source: Author and derivation  from Literatures  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Includes both, development and recurrent grants 
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Appendix C: LGAs’ Financial Sustainability Composite Score 2008/09 - 
2012/13 
SN Name Richness15 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
1 Geita (R) 1 0.5538 0.3545 0.2851 0.3384 0.3262 0.3716 
2 Mbarali (R)  0 0.6179 0.5348 0.3109 0.1689 0.3482 0.3962 
3 Ukerewe (R) 1 0.7216 0.5741 0.2526 0.2266 0.3242 0.4198 
4 Mbozi (R) 0 0.4535 0.6882 0.3140 0.2668 0.4758 0.4396 
5 Namtumbo (R) 1 0.6729 0.5376 0.3186 0.3304 0.4759 0.4671 
6 Sengerema (R) 1 0.9170 0.7198 0.1967 0.2488 0.2621 0.4689 
7 Bunda (R) 1 0.7055 0.6866 0.3952 0.3243 0.3297 0.4883 
8 Mbulu (R) 1 0.7766 0.6944 0.3612 0.4424 0.2261 0.5002 
9 Biharamulo (R) 1 1.0000 0.6624 0.4263 0.2104 0.2616 0.5121 
10 Hanang (R) 1 0.8096 0.8567 0.3856 0.2102 0.3499 0.5224 
11 Igunga (R) 1 0.5954 0.6595 0.5669 0.3058 0.4991 0.5253 
12 Bukoba (R) 0 0.8136 0.6346 0.3243 0.3296 0.5267 0.5258 
13 Lindi (R) 1 0.7298 0.7618 0.4328 0.3992 0.3544 0.5356 
14 Manyoni (R) 1 0.9352 0.5554 0.3231 0.3665 0.5329 0.5426 
15 Hai (R) 0 0.6470 0.7430 0.4957 0.4549 0.5247 0.5731 
16 Meatu (R) 1 0.9335 0.4978 0.3629 0.5785 0.5312 0.5808 
17 Serengeti (R) 1 0.7445 0.6257 0.4104 0.2815 0.9588 0.6042 
18 Lushoto (R) 0 0.7995 0.9728 0.6225 0.3914 0.4629 0.6498 
19 Uyui/Tabora (R) 1 0.7570 0.8210 0.4181 0.7284 0.5626 0.6574 
20 Musoma (R) 1 0.7580 0.9029 0.7766 0.5087 0.4849 0.6862 
21 Kondoa (R) 0 1.0000 0.8118 0.6336 0.5680 0.4356 0.6898 
                                                          
15   Zero for LGAs comprising well-off communities and one for LGAs comprising poor communities, 
as per Capital and Human Development Report, 2005 
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SN Name Richness15 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
22 Kisarawe (R) 1 0.8722 1.0000 0.6663 0.3000 0.6337 0.6944 
23 Shinyanga (U) 0 0.7684 0.7557 0.5637 0.5928 0.8375 0.7036 
24 Bukoba (U) 0 0.8503 0.6831 0.6412 0.6622 0.7710 0.7215 
25 Morogoro (U) 0 0.9314 0.8766 0.6561 0.7269 0.4318 0.7245 
26 Tanga (U) 0 1.0000 0.5697 0.7577 0.6796 0.7080 0.7430 
27 Bukombe (R) 1 0.8251 0.7740 0.6289 1.0000 0.5677 0.7591 
28 Lindi (U) 0 0.5970 0.8483 1.0000 0.6451 0.7431 0.7667 
29 Iringa (U) 0 0.6765 0.7534 0.5461 1.0000 0.8975 0.7747 
30 Babati (U) 1 1.0000 1.0000 0.8027 0.5429 0.5417 0.7775 
31 Singida (R) 1 0.9482 1.0000 0.8298 0.6849 0.5618 0.8049 
32 Arusha (U) 0 1.0000 1.0000 0.4874 1.0000 0.7128 0.8400 
33 Moshi (U) 0 1.0000 0.7577 0.7299 0.8786 1.0000 0.8732 
34 Pangani (R) 0 1.0000 1.0000 0.7413 0.6356 1.0000 0.8754 
35 Mbeya (U) 0 0.8675 0.8918 1.0000 1.0000 0.7683 0.9055 
36 Mwanza (U) 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
  Average - 0.8133 0.7557 0.5462 0.5286 0.5675 0.6423 
Source: Author - DEA model output and Calculations 
Note: (U) stands for urban Council and (R) for rural council 
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Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics 
  
Minimum Mean Maximum Std. Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
ScoreINDyrs .168913 .642249 1.000000 .238007 
Total Expend.ratio 34.42 77.9788 131.24 17.50646 
Recurrent Expend.ratio 38.50 87.7881 129.98 18.15815 
Develop. Expend.ratio 6.82 56.6304 176.08 25.10830 
OS/Rec Exp .012459 .096210 .369602 .064989 
OSTTexp .010198 .077411 .310535 .054708 
ActualTotalTransfersratio 9.53 83.7488 132.78 17.05265 
ActualRecGrantratio 44.70 90.5184 140.60 17.89948 
ActualDevGrantratio 2.29 70.1824 189.52 29.78237 
OwnSourceRevs.ratio 19.56 86.1578 155.00 24.93959 
Poppersqkm 9.11 358.8442 3123.59 633.21 
ROADDISTANCE 35 826.47 1434 377.690 
OSpercapita 697.25 4894.71 20630.33 4356.79 
Population 49521 268913.07 663034 129199.88 
SqKm 59.0 5630.43 28620.0 6552.479 
TTExppercapita 15904.39 63308.76 138622.10 25844.27 
TTtransferspacapita 16713.45 66166.82 148775.82 26415.49 
BudTransPercapita 22296.11 82110.75 192766.55 37251.77 
N=180 
Source: Author derived from analysis 
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Appendix E: Received Grant versus Unspent Amount (in Tanzanian 
Shillings) – All LGAs 
Source: Compiled from CAG Report (2014: 41-42) for financial Year 2012/13 
Appendix F: Grant Release Trend– Total Amount for All LGAs (in 
Tanzanian Shillings) 
Source: Compiled from CAG Report (2014: 32-35) for Financial Year Ended 2012/13 
 
 
 
Recurrent Grant 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
      Amount Received 1,023,504,263,229 1,521,937,206,309 2,105,926,241,086 2,311,080,861,836 2,867,426,385,004
      Amount Spent 976,332,807,352 1,373,576,272,098 1,978,117,478,839 2,186,486,605,144 2,721,098,075,973
      Unspent Amount 47,171,455,877 148,360,934,211 127,808,735,247 124,594,256,692 146,328,309,031
      Percentage 4.6 9.7 6 5.4 5
Development Grant 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
      Amount Received 328,203,178,845 507,866,599,666 542,339,143,645 535,017,077,030 686,302,878,625
      Amount Spent 239,482,549,650 332,092,443,562 367,778,247,642 346,716,653,619 442,625,815,185
      Unspent Amount 88,720,629,195 175,774,156,104 174,560,896,003 188,300,423,411 243,677,063,440
       Percentage 27 35 32 35 36
Recurrent Grant 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
   Amount Approved 848,244,823,445 1,248,760,338,699 1,242,318,963,483 1,618,877,128,175 2,102,969,648,522
   Amount Released 757,195,467,343 1,104,588,746,584 1,111,762,925,260 1,447,482,142,661 1,827,566,402,405
   Amount Unreleased 91,049,356,102 144,171,592,119 130,556,038,222 171,394,985,514 275,403,246,117
   Percentage-unreleased 11 12 11 11 13
  Councils involved 73 87 78 87 99
Development Grant 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
   Amount Approved 386,165,146,158 395,038,612,520 529,494,590,274 595,064,422,505 673,590,626,951
   Amount Released 245,623,406,798 246,475,254,935 308,572,669,609 345,568,067,477 420,283,949,168
   Amount Unreleased 140,541,739,360 148,563,337,585 220,921,920,666 249,496,355,027 253,306,677,783
   Percentage-unreleased 36 38 42 42 38
  Councils involved 105 86 105 113 114
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Appendix G: Case Study – Interview Guide  
1. Questions for Revenue Collection - Operational Staffs 
Questions Probes/further questions Rationale 
1. Can you tell me what your 
current role is all about? 
Which activities are you 
involved with?  
To understand participant’s 
day to day activities in own 
sources revenue collection 
2. How do you manage you 
revenues collection 
activities? 
Do you use agents in 
collecting revenues? How do 
you monitor their revenue 
collection activities to ensure 
that you meet revenue 
targets? 
To understand if the council 
uses revenue collection 
agents and how do they 
manage them to ensure 
revenue targets are attained. 
Do you make visits to 
revenues sources to collect 
revenues? 
To understand if the council 
uses its own staffs who 
make physical visits to local 
tax payers 
Do you conduct self-
compliance awareness 
campaigns? How do you 
make it? 
 
To know if there are any 
local tax compliance 
campaign, the media used 
and the frequency of the 
campaign. 
How do you enforce non tax 
payers 
To know the methods used 
to enforce compliance from 
tax evaders 
3. What are main problems 
you encounter in your 
daily revenue collection 
activities? 
What problems are you facing 
in revenue collections? How 
do you solve them to ensure 
that targets are met?  
To know problem an LGA 
is facing in collection 
revenues and how do they 
solve them 
In your view what are the 
causes of these problems? 
Are there any problem which 
are associated with policy/ 
regulatory shortcomings?  
To understand problems 
encountered in the course of 
collecting revenues. 
4. What are your main 
revenue sources? 
Which sources provided you 
with large share of revenues? 
Which are providing you less 
contribution? 
To identify sources of 
revenues contributing a lot 
to the own sources 
Which sources are providing 
you reliable revenues every 
year? 
To identify sources which 
provides reliable revenues  
Which sources are giving you 
fluctuating revenues from 
year to year? 
To identify revenue sources 
which cannot be relied upon 
5. Are there any rewards for 
meeting or exceeding 
targets or punishment for 
not meeting targets? 
What are the rewards you are 
getting when targets are met 
or exceeded?  What are the 
penalties for not meeting 
targets 
To identify motivations and 
penalties offered to 
motivate own sources 
collection staffs 
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2. Questions for Revenue Collection – Decision making Staffs 
Questions  Probes/further questions Rationale 
1. Regulations allow you to 
collect own revenues from 
a number of sources. Do 
you deploy all allowed 
sources? 
 
Which revenue sources are 
you currently deploying? 
To identify sources of 
revenues which are currently 
deployed  
Which revenue sources are 
you currently not 
deploying? Why are you not 
deploying them? 
To identify sources of 
revenues which are not 
deployed and reasons for not 
deploying them 
2. Are there revenue sources 
that would be appropriate 
for enhancing your 
revenues but regulations 
constrain you?  
Which revenue sources 
would be suitable for you to 
enhance your revenue 
sources?  
To identify revenue sources 
that would enhance LGAs’ 
revenues but regulations 
constrain to engage them. 
What would you suggest to 
make them useful to you? 
To identify 
recommendations on 
enhancing revenues sources 
3. In some revenues sources, 
rates have been 
established by the central 
government through 
various regulation. Do you 
think established rates are 
appropriate? 
Are there sources which you 
would wish to charge higher 
or lower rates but regulation 
constrain you? 
To find out if there are any 
regulatory constraints over 
revenue rates setting 
discretionary 
4. What challenges are you 
facing in collection of 
revenue from allowed 
sources? E.g. Economy 
condition, rain, political 
interference, spatial 
population, internal 
capacity. 
 
Are there any challenges 
associated with economic 
condition that affects 
revenue collection? How do 
they affect you? 
To identify if there are any 
factors associated with 
economy (such as inflation, 
GDP growth/fall) that 
affects local revenue 
collections 
Are there any factors 
associated with weather 
condition (such as rain) that 
affects your revenue 
collections? How do they 
affect you? 
To identify if there are any 
environmental factor that 
affect local revenue 
collections 
Are there any factors 
associated with 
geographical size of you 
council that affects your 
revenue collection? How do 
they affect you? 
To establish if there are any 
factors associated with 
geographical size of the 
LGA on local revenue 
collection 
Are there any factors 
associated with population 
geographical distribution 
(i.e. population density) that 
affects your revenue 
collections? How do they 
affect you? 
To establish if there are any 
factors that are associated 
geographical distribution of 
the population within an 
LGA on local revenue 
collections  
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Are there any factors 
associated with resources 
required affecting your 
revenue collection? How do 
they affect you? 
To identify if there are any 
factors associated with 
resource availability to 
enforce local revenues 
collections 
5. Do you have any external 
binding requirements that 
require you to collect 
revenue to certain targeted 
amount?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are there any requirements 
from other government 
institutions such as ministry 
on amount of local revenues 
you supposed to collect? 
Are there any CAG 
recommendations that 
require you to collect 
revenue to certain targets?  
To identify if there are any 
requirements from the 
central government or CAG 
that pressurises LGAs to 
meet specific revenue 
collection targets. 
Are there any requirements 
on own sources collection 
before you are allocated 
with central government 
grants? Any fiscal system 
built in measures? 
To identify if the design of 
the central government 
system imposes specific own 
source revenues collection 
targets to be met before grant 
allocation is made 
6. Do you have any internal 
measures taken to ensure 
revenue targets are 
attained? 
Which controls do you use 
to enforce revenue 
collection targets 
attainments? 
 To identify operational 
controls used to enhance 
revenue collection efforts 
hence attaining targets 
7. Do you offer any rewards 
or penalties to your 
revenue collection staffs 
when targets are met or 
not met? 
 
Are there any motivations to 
your revenue collection 
staffs for meeting or 
exceeding targets? What are 
the rewards do you provide 
them? 
To identify if there are any 
rewards offered to operation 
staffs especially those 
concerned with enforcing 
revenue collection for 
meeting or exceeding 
revenues targets. 
8. How do you ensure that 
your budgeted revenue 
targets are always 
realistic? 
How do you ensure that 
revenue targets are neither 
underestimated nor 
overestimated? Which 
factors do you consider to 
establish realistic targets?  
To establish if there are any 
measures/controls the 
council uses to ensure that 
the revenue targets are 
always realistic. 
9. Do you involve agents in 
revenue collection 
including those from 
lower LGA levels (if 
any)?  
How do you recruit them? To identify approaches used 
to recruit revenue collection 
agents (if any) 
How do you ensure what 
they remit is what you are 
supposed to receive? How 
do you ensure all revenues 
collected by third parties are 
timely remitted into your 
account? 
To find out the way the 
council enforces revenue 
amount and timing of 
remittance from collection 
agents. 
On Central Government 
Grant 
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1. What factors determine 
your grant allocation 
share? Do they include 
any specific requirements 
in own sources revenue 
collection? 
Which factors determine 
your grant share from the 
central government? Do 
they include any specific 
requirement over own 
sources revenues collection? 
To establish understanding 
of members of council 
management on factors 
determining their grant share 
2. Are there any criteria used 
to disburse grants during 
budget implementation? If 
yes what are they?  
 
 
Which criteria are used in 
disbursements of grants 
during budget 
implementation?  
To identify criteria used to 
disburse grants during 
budget implementation 
Which factors affects the 
flow and timing of grant 
disbursement to your 
council?  
To identify factors which 
influences amount and 
timing of grant flow to 
LGAs 
As a council, do you have 
any influence on the timing 
and amount government 
grants to be disbursed? 
To identify if LGAs can 
influence amount and timing 
of grant flow. 
 
3. Does Association of Local 
Authority Tanzania 
(ALAT) have any 
influence in grant 
allocations and 
disbursements to its 
members? 
Can ALAT influence 
amount and timing of 
government grant to its 
members? 
To identify if the association 
of local government (as 
LGAs’ forum) has power to 
influence amount and timing 
of grants to its members 
4. CAG general reports for 
Local Governments 
indicates consistence 
shortage in central 
government grant 
disbursed to LGAs in 
recently 3 years.  Do you 
know any main reasons 
that contribute into 
consistently shortage in 
central government grant 
disbursement across 
LGAs?  
Which factors contribute to 
consistently shortage of 
grant disbursed to your 
council compared to amount 
approved?  
To identify if LGAs are 
aware of the reasons 
contributing to cutting down 
of central government grants 
during disbursement. 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Is the timing flow of 
central government grant 
appropriate for you to 
implement your activities 
as planned? 
Is the timing of grant flow 
similar for both recurrent 
and development grants? If 
not which is appropriately 
disbursed compared to the 
other? 
To identify similarities and 
differences in grant flow to 
LGAs 
Which grant categories are 
highly vulnerable in grant 
disbursement when central 
government is unable to 
disburse approved budgets? 
 
To identify grants that are 
shortly disburse frequently 
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On Expenditure Side of the 
Budget 
  
1. What factors exerts 
pressure in spending 
requirements?  
 
Which factors influences 
your expenditure needs from 
time to time? Population 
growth? Geographical size 
of the council? Changing 
weather condition exerts any 
specific expenditure needs? 
Central government 
directives? Political 
interferences? 
To identify factors that 
exerts pressure in LGAs 
expenditure side of their 
budgets 
2. How do you establish 
realistic expenditure 
budgets? 
 
What are the main 
challenges in expenditure 
budgeting? What are the 
main challenges of 
establishing realistic 
expenditure budgets?  
To identify the way LGAs 
establish realistic budgets 
and challenges they are 
facing 
3. Have you experienced 
shortfall in central 
government grant 
disbarment in recently 3 
years?  
 
How do you mitigate 
shortfall in central 
government grant 
allocations? Which 
expenditure categories are 
mostly vulnerable when you 
decide to cut expenditure to 
mitigate shortage?  
To identify if there are 
specific categories of 
expenditures which are 
highly vulnerable whenever 
an LGA decides to cut down 
expenditures to mitigate 
financial difficult 
Is it possible to use short 
term loans from financial 
institutions?  
To identify it the council is 
capable of using short term 
loans to mitigate short term 
financial difficulties 
Have you ever thought of 
improving operational 
efficiency so that you meet 
the same targets at less cost 
without compromising 
quality? 
To identify if there is a room 
for LGAs to mitigate 
financial difficult by 
increasing operational 
efficiency 
Do central government offer 
any directives/advice on 
how you should handle the 
shortfall in disbursed 
grants? 
To identify if LGAs get any 
assistance from central 
government on how they 
should handle financial 
difficulties whenever 
happens 
4. How do you mitigate 
shortfall in own source 
revenue collections 
(whenever arises) while 
considering budgeted 
expenditures attached to 
these revenues? 
 
Do you cut expenditure? If 
yes which expenditure are 
highly vulnerable whenever 
there is own sources revenue 
collection shortage? 
To identify if LGAs cut 
expenditure to mitigate 
shortage in revenue 
collection 
Have you ever though using 
debts to finance 
To identify if LGAs use 
debts to finance budgeted 
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expenditures attached to 
own source revenues?  
expenditures instead or 
cutting down expenditures 
5. Regulations allow you to 
borrow, have you ever 
thought using borrowing 
to finance your 
expenditures? 
Which type of expenditures 
are you allowed to finance 
through borrowing? 
Are there any challenges 
that limit council’s ability to 
use borrowings? 
To identify the perception of 
LGA officials and 
practicability of using debt 
finance in LGAs 
6. Do you have any projects 
that stacked half way 
complete or complete but 
not functioning due to 
shortage of funds? 
 
Are there projects stagnant 
for more than two years 
without receiving sufficient 
fund to finance them?  
To identify the impact of 
financial difficulties on 
accomplishing projects 
which are still in progress 
7. Can you provide your 
opinion on the implication 
of current decentralisation 
reforms in meeting your 
long term goal within 
LGA and national goals as 
whole of ensuring 
equitable services 
particularly to the poor 
and reducing gap between 
urban and rural and within 
the rural sectors. 
Is the grant allocations 
system offer prospect to 
achieve the long term goals? 
To establish the view of 
LGA officials on prospect of 
intergovernmental transfer 
system to meet long term 
goal of the council and the 
nation as a whole 
Do allowable sources of 
local revenue offer prospect 
of reducing dependence on 
central government grants 
hence implement your 
budgets effectively?  
To establish the view of 
officials on possibility of the 
council to generate more 
revenues to finance their 
activities and to reduce 
dependence 
Is the discretion over own 
sources rates sufficient to 
collect sufficient revenues 
hence reduce dependence 
rate?  
To establish the view of 
LGA officials on revenues 
collection autonomy on 
generating sufficient 
revenues to reduce 
dependence 
Are the borrowing 
requirements sufficient to 
raise debt finance whenever 
required? 
To establish if there is any 
obstacles in term of 
requirements for LGAs to 
use debt finance 
 
3. Questions on Governance Issues – Members of Council 
Questions Probes/further questions Rationale 
1. Regulations allow you to 
collect own revenues from 
a number of sources. Do 
you deploy all allowed 
sources? 
 
Which revenue sources are 
you currently deploying? 
To identify sources of 
revenues which are currently 
deployed  
Which revenue sources are 
you currently not 
deploying? Why are you not 
deploying them? 
To identify sources of 
revenues which are not 
deployed and reasons for not 
deploying them 
2. Are there revenue sources 
that would be appropriate 
Which revenue sources 
would be suitable for you to 
To identify revenue sources 
that would enhance LGAs’ 
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for enhancing your 
revenues but regulations 
constrain you?  
enhance your revenue 
sources?  
revenues but regulations 
constrain to engage them. 
What would you suggest to 
make them useful to you? 
To identify 
recommendations on 
enhancing revenues sources 
3. In some revenues sources, 
rates have been 
established by the central 
government. Do you think 
established rates are 
appropriate? 
Are there sources which 
you would wish to charge 
higher rates but regulation 
constrain you? 
To find out if there are any 
regulatory constraints over 
revenue rates setting 
discretionary 
4. What challenges your 
council is facing in 
mobilising revenues?   
How do you find the 
effectiveness of your 
council in mobilising 
revenues?  
To find the views of 
councillors on the challenges 
facing the council in 
mobilising revenues  
How do you ensure that 
your revenue targets are 
met? 
To identify ways used by 
councillors to enhance 
mobilisation of revenues in 
their councils 
5. How do you reach into 
agreement regarding the 
best ways on utilising 
collected revenues? 
Is there any conflict of 
interest between council 
staffs and councillors and 
even between councillors 
themselves? 
To find out if there is any 
conflict of interest on the 
way council revenues are 
allocated  
On Central Government 
Grant 
  
6. What factors determine 
your grant allocation 
share? Do they include 
any specific requirements 
in own sources revenue 
collection? 
 
Which factors determine 
your grant share from the 
central government? Which 
role do you play to ensure 
that these criteria are always 
met so that you get 
maximum grant allocation 
for service provision in your 
council?  
To identify understanding of 
councillors and their role in 
managing central 
government grant allocation 
In the recently 3 years has it 
happened that you did not 
met some criteria hence 
reduced you grant share? If 
yes what measure did you 
take to avoid recurrence? 
To understand measure taken 
by councillors in ensuring 
that their council receive 
maximum grant share to 
offer equitable services. 
On Expenditure Side of the 
Budget 
  
7. What factors exerts 
pressure in spending 
requirements?  
 
Which factors influences 
your expenditure needs? 
Population growth? 
Geographical size of the 
council? Changing weather 
condition exerts any 
To identify factors that exerts 
pressure in LGAs 
expenditure side of their 
budgets 
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specific expenditure needs? 
Central government 
directives? Political 
interferences? 
8. Which services are mostly 
affected whenever the 
raised revenues is 
insufficient to meet all 
budgeted expenditures?  
 
Are there expenditure 
categories that are most 
likely to be reduced 
whenever revenues are 
insufficient to finance all 
budgeted expenditures? If 
yes what are those 
expenditure categories? 
To identify whether 
councillors use specific 
expenditure categories to 
mitigate revenue shortage  
9. Do you have any projects 
that stacked half way 
complete due to shortage 
of funds? 
 
Which projects are 
frequently stagnating due to 
lack of fund to finance 
them? 
To identify if there are 
specific areas which are 
highly vulnerable due to lack 
of fund.  
General Question   
10. Can you provide your 
opinion on the implication 
of current decentralisation 
reforms in meeting your 
long term goals? 
How do you enhance your 
revenue sources of the 
council and enhance the 
prospect of being 
financially independent? 
To establish the view of local 
government councillors on 
ways of enhancing revenues 
sources and reducing 
dependence 
How do you find the level 
of autonomy in revenue 
mobilisation, is it 
sufficient?  
To establish the view of 
councillors on council’s 
autonomy level in revenue 
mobilisation 
Source: Author 
 
 
